《A Random Walk Down Wall Street》的读后感大全
《A Random Walk Down Wall Street》是一本由Burton G. Malkiel著作，W. W. Norton出版的Hardcover图书，本书定价：USD 29.95，页数：480，特精心从网络上整理的一些读者的读后感，希望对大家能有帮助。
《A Random Walk Down Wall Street》精选点评：
●Index fund! 返璞归真！
●还是有料可挖的
●据说是Personal Finance指定书籍的有益辅助版……
●推荐！长期的随机漫步原理，对于了解股市历史和理论知识都是非常经典的基础之作
●classic intro to financial economics
●hmm....the normal distribution in MPT....等着读2011版，看怎么解释关于real estate和derivatives...
●开眼了
●Too clssical, too simple, somehow to be wrong
●数据细致详实，方法论得当，同时跨越了几十年去论证，反正我是被说服了，特别值得学习的书。
●介绍性
《A Random Walk Down Wall Street》读后感(一)：读书笔记：《A Random Walk Down Wall Street》
这本书英文比较简单，内容通俗易懂，适合有初级金融知识，并对个人投资感兴趣的朋友阅读。
书的第一部分介绍了有史以来市场上的几个比较有名的大起大落。有郁金香事件，1930年的萧条，日本股市和房地产市场的疯狂，80年代的生物公司风潮，90年代的网络热潮。似乎人们总是重复着同样的故事，无论前车之鉴再多，人们还是会相信自己不是那个“最后的傻子”。
作者将炒股的人大致分为两类。一类是基于K线图分析的过去数据分析，试图找出股市的动量，是一种针对股民心理学分析的炒股方法。另一类是价值分析，CAPM模型，判断股票当期价格和intrinsic value之间的差别来判断买进卖出。作者通过历史数据分析得到的结论是：现实情况处于两者之间，两种炒股方法都不怎么有效。就好像价值分析得到的数据是轮船在海上抛下的锚，这个锚如此容易被波浪拔出，又如此容易再次在另一个海拔落脚。
作者认为市场是有效的，至少是具有若有效性，因此任何对过去价格的分析都不能预测未来的价格。因此数据挖掘分析无效。也不能说股市不同时期之间完全无关，但是数据分析显示，这种相关性如此之弱，以至于交易税就可以轻易和利用相关性获得的收益抵消。作者还具体举例说明若干数据挖掘方法是如何无效的。他特别指出，许多back test有效的炒股方法在真正使用时都变得无效。一位基金经理说：我没有见过哪一个炒股策略在做backward test时无效的，但实际应用起来往往无效。
价值分析效果也不好，作者列了四大因素。1. 公司未来情况变化多端，新情况层出不穷，无法预测。2.公司造假。"财务报表就好像比基尼，它显示出来的部分very interesting，但它隐藏的部分才crucial."3.分析员能力差，没有专业能力。特别值得一提的是，这里指的专业能力要求是非常非常高的，因为预测公司未来现金流这个工作实在是太难了。4.好像不是什么好理由：真正有能力的人都不做分析员了。因此，价值分析也被打入冷宫。
实际上，在美国基金业绩方面，在过去30年间，只有1/4的基金业绩超过了标准普尔500。这个事实对我触动还是挺大，没想到这么多优秀的人才，业绩如此之差，竟然大部分没有跑过大盘。
最后的部分作者对一般投资者进行了教育，提出了进行自我风险评估，投资目标设定，长期投资，减少交易次数，选择免税或尽量避税等方法。都是CFA III内容，因此没有细看。
最后一章，作者对投资股市的三类人提出了建议。作者首先强烈建议大家只需选择指数基金，例如标准普尔500指数或范围更广的指数基金。可以规避风险，费率较其他基金较低，更重要的是，它能打败3/4的基金业绩！投资方式是每月或每季度定期投资，达到长期投资的功效。这一方法对于一开始就有大笔钱财的人不适用，因为股市是长期上涨的。但如果一大笔钱一开始就全部投到股市里去，一定要看准时点，比如不要在中国股市6100点时入市。第二类建议是给那些坚持要自己选股票的人，作者认为他们的成功将多半归结于运气，但仍提醒要选择P/E水平与未来 earnings增长速度相比，低一些的股票。而且自主选择的资金比例不要太大，玩玩就行了。他对想自己炒股的人显示出了同情般的理解：告诉股民他们跑不赢大市，挣不了大钱，就像告诉5岁小孩世界上没有圣诞老人。同时，炒股就像love making，too fun too give up。第三类人是去找基金经理的人，他们有无数选择。这部分作者怎么写的忘了，好像也都是拍拍肩膀祝你好运的话。
我觉得这本书整体上说的还是很有道理的，但在中国的适用性我有些担心。首先，中国作为新兴市场，股市的有效性就很值得怀疑。第二，目前能够比较好代表大盘的也就嘉实300等少数几只基金，选择太少了。但我相信类似的投资方法，比如投资指数基金，进行定投，长期来讲肯定是有效的。定投的好处在于每个月定期投入同等金额的钱，股市上涨时购入份额少，下跌时份额多，能够自动起到降低成本的作用。第二，长期定投能够起到很好的储蓄作用，只要时间够长，肯定有回报。如果你对中国经济和政治环境长期有信心的话。如果没信心，投资海外类基金，目前只能投资少数几只，大市还不好，而且这几只都不是指数类产品，估计将来也属于3/4里面的。中国人民的投资渠道好狭窄：股指基金没得选，房地产类的REIT也没有，alternative investment之类的基金也没有，海外基金也少得可怜。怎么玩啊！
《A Random Walk Down Wall Street》读后感(二)：A Sad Story
The chartist and the fundamentalist are still sneering each other and yelling each other. EMT, MPT, CAPM, APT, Behavioral Finance, (of course, I am not a good reader for not following the advise from Burton to avoid using so many abbreviations. BUT, without the terminology, you expect me to use my investment performance to show I am an expert on investing？) the sophisticated academics including mathematician, physicist are still working hard, assiduously, diligently on these fields, hoping to create a Theory Of Everything in finance, while the Graham and his firm followers shrugged these off, as Warren once said “ And to people that think beta measures risk, the cheaper price would have made it look riskier. This is truly Alice in Wonderland. I have never been able to figure out why it's riskier to buy $400 million worth of properties for $40 million than $80 million.”（Warren has said so many nifty but satiric words about the modern finance theories by help of his CAGR 19.8%）
Wow, it is seems that the investment is a little complex. For many common people, investing, an easy way to make money, is so easily that it can be summed up by only 4 single words “buy low, sell high”. So, investing easily slip to irrational speculating. Then, the tragedies or comedies come up. Should I recall those miserable memories？ Burton did this in his book. Burton’s book includes the tulip-bulb craze, the south sea bubble, the magic ‘growth’ during 1960s, the conglomerate boom, the nifty fifties, the high-tech boom during 1980s, the lost decade of Japan, the Internet bubble with the welcome of the new century, and finally the housing bubble in 2008. Wow, what a long list. Is there a real terminal of speculating？ ：）. How easy it was in early 2000, when the tech stock you brought moved persistently higher, to convince yourself that you were an investment genius. How easy it was then to convince yourself that chasing the last period’s best-performing stock was a sure strategy for success. How exhilarating it was to buy a stock at 9:35 and find it had risen 10% percent by a few minutes. Oh, it also will be a little sad that SEC has a limitation on fluctuation. Burton said that all of these strategies ended in disaster. I am hesitate and finally afraid to say this, surrounded by the people who hold 川润股份,斯米克for another一字涨停, and by the investor who will give a junk company 100PE.
“How about investing just slip a little to speculating and result in rational speculating？”
“Oh, do you say that using chart and some mysterious theory to build a castle in the air？”
“Yes”
“：)”
You stop me by saying that you are a rational investor. So, you turn to Graham and Warren. CAGR 19.8% is so charming that almost nobody can refuse the easy investing method of the Sage of Ohama. You start reading the boring annual, obtaining nothing but a stack of magnificent numbers. Following the principles that summed by the great valuable investors, you wish you bought the company(following the principles, using company instead of stock) that has a margin of safety, a so-called moat, a health growth. You scrupulously play the holes in your decision paper strip. You buy the shares of company and just hold. You collect all the information about the product of the company. You experience the service of the company. You finally become the expert of the industry which the company belong to. But, you just can not (this is a little chinglish) beat the market. Oh, this sound a little sad. Ok, you can beat the market…………..……：）….sometimes. But from a long time horizon, you are everything but Buffet.
If you are rational enough and academic enough, you certainly want to show you are different. So, you use the dazzling, complicated mathematic formulas and models, something like covariance, beta, quantitative risk control, as I mentioned at the beginning of this 吐槽. 吓尿了都！ This has been far beyond my ability. Stop here.
To be honestly, I just tell the story of myself.
I adopt the value-based method to invest now, because I think that this is the easiest and the most accessible way. However, I am not very into valuable-investing, as I mentioned in my another review http://book.douban.com/review/5339940/. My doubt and distrust about the chart and techniques is partly because I do not have enough experience about the market and I am once an unqualified chartist. I learned various techniques and chart analysis in my first two years of investing. When turns to the modern finance theory, it enjoys both criticism and support. Besides, it is so complicated.
It is useless to argue about which method we should adopt to invest. As Hegel once said “存在即合理”. There are so many forces driving the market. No one can consistently predict either the direction of the stock market or the relative attractiveness of individual stocks. Sometimes, as this book emphsis, I believe that we should adopt the ‘buy and hold’ strategy, just as someone stand in the station, waiting the train. The train will come sooner or later. However, for the train that has accelerated, we mediocrities never have a chance to catch up.
o, believe and do what you wanna do, do not fuck the rest.
《A Random Walk Down Wall Street》读后感(三)：标注
1. I view investing as a method of purchasing assets to gain profit in the form of reasonably predictable income (dividends, interest, or rentals) and/or appreciation over the long term.
2. Moreover, productivity improvements are harder to come by in some service-oriented activities.
3. It was his opinion that professional investors prefer to devote their energies not to estimating intrinsic values, but rather to analyzing how the crowd of investors is likely to behave in the future and how during periods of optimism they tend to build their hopes into castles in the air.
4. As a result, he said, most people are “largely concerned, not with making superior long-term forecasts of the probable yield of an investment over its whole life, but with foreseeing changes in the conventional basis of valuation a short time ahead of the general public.”
5. Thus, the optimal strategy is not to pick those faces the player thinks are prettiest, or those the other players are likely to fancy, but rather to predict what the average opinion is likely to be about what the average opinion will be, or to proceed even further along this sequence.
6. The instruments that enabled tulip speculators to get the most action for their money were “call options” similar to those popular today in the stock market.
7. The pool manager accumulated a large block of stock through inconspicuous buying over a period of weeks. If possible, he also obtained an option to buy a substantial block of stock at the current market price. Next he tried to enlist the stock’s exchange specialist as an ally.
8. For example, Haskell sells 200 shares to Sidney at 40, and Sidney sells them back at 40？. The process is repeated with 400 shares at prices of 40¼ and 40½. Next comes the sale of a 1,000-share block at 40？, followed by another at 403/4. These sales were recorded on ticker tapes across the country, and the illusion of activity was conveyed to the thousands of tape watchers who crowded into the brokerage offices of the country. Such activity, generated by so-called wash sales, created the impression that something big was afoot.
9. If all went well, and in the speculative atmosphere of the 1928–29 period it could hardly miss, the combination of tape activity and managed news would bring the public in.
10. Nevertheless, the rules in existence today would not allow an insider to make short-swing profits from trading his own stock.
11. It is not hard to make money in the market. What is hard to avoid is the alluring temptation to throw your money away on short, get-rich-quick speculative binges. It is an obvious lesson, but one frequently ignored.
12. Yes, the SEC was there, but by law it had to stand by quietly. As long as a company has prepared (and distributed to investors) an adequate prospectus, the SEC can do nothing to save buyers from themselves.
13. But just as the warnings on packs of cigarettes do not prevent many people from smoking, so the warning that this investment may be dangerous to your wealth cannot block a speculator from forking over his money.
14. Part of the genius of the financial market is that if a product is demanded, it is produced. The product that all investors desired was expected growth in earnings per share. If growth couldn’t be found in a name, it was a good bet that someone would find another way to produce it. By the mid-1960s, creative entrepreneurs suggested that growth could be created by synergism.
15. Synergism is the quality of having 2 plus 2 equal 5. Thus, two separate companies with an earning power of $2 million each might produce combined earnings of $5 million if the businesses were consolidated.
16. Ostensibly, the conglomerate would achieve higher sales and earnings than would have been possible for the independent entities alone.
17. By an easy bit of legerdemain, they could put together a group of companies with no basic potential at all and produce steadily rising per-share earnings.
19. The management of Able Circuit would like to become a conglomerate. It offers to absorb Baker by swapping stock at the rate of two for three. The holders of Baker shares would get two shares of Able stock—which have a market value of $200—for every three shares of Baker stock—with a total market value of $150. Clearly, Baker’s stockholders are likely to accept cheerfully. We have a budding conglomerate, newly named Synergon, Inc., which now has 333,333 shares outstanding and total earnings of $2 million to put against them, or $6 per share. Thus, by 1966, when the merger has been completed, we find that earnings have risen by 20 percent, from $5 to $6, and this growth seems to justify Able’s former price-earnings multiple of 20.
20. Here we have a case where the conglomerate has literally manufactured growth. None of the three companies was growing at all; yet simply by virtue of their merger, our conglomerate will show the following earnings growth:
21. The trick that makes the game work is the ability of the electronics company to swap its high-multiple stock for the stock of another company with a lower multiple.
22. He automatically sprinkled his conversations with talismanic phrases about the energy of the free-form company and its interface with change and technology. He was careful to point out that he looked at twenty to thirty deals for each one he bought. Wall Street loved every word of it.
23. Second, the government and the accounting profession expressed concern about the pace of mergers and about possible abuses. These two worries reduced—and in many cases eliminated—the premium multiples that had been paid in anticipation of earnings growth from the acquisition process alone.
24. Another lesson that cries out for attention is that investors should be very wary of purchasing today’s hot “new issue.” Most initial public offerings underperform the stock market as a whole. And if you buy the new issue after it begins trading, usually at a higher price, you are even more certain to lose. Investors would be well advised to treat new issues with a healthy dose of skepticism.
25. eBay’s entire success is based on the fact that they have no inventory. By dealing with all the inventory and fulfillment, SwapIt is like all of the crap with none of the benefit.
26. Tyco created “cookie jar” reserves and accelerated pre-merger outlays to “springload” earnings from acquisitions.
27. The key to investing is not how much an industry will affect society or even how much it will grow, but rather its ability to make and sustain profits. And history tells us that eventually all excessively exuberant markets succumb to the laws of gravity.
28. There were many villains in this morality tale: the fee-obsessed underwriters who should have known better than to peddle all of the crap they brought to market; the research analysts who were the cheerleaders for the banking departments and who were eager to recommend Net stocks that could be pushed by commission-hungry brokers; corporate executives using “creative accounting” to inflate their profits. But it was the infectious greed of individual investors and their susceptibility to get-rich-quick schemes that allowed the bubble to expand.
29. Under the old system, which might be called the “originate and hold” system, banks would make mortgage loans (as well as loans to businesses and consumers) and hold those loans as assets until they were repaid.
30. This system fundamentally changed in the early 2000s to what might be called the “originate and distribute” model of banking. Mortgage loans were still made by banks (as well as by big specialized mortgage companies). But the loans were held by the originating institution for only a few days, until they could be sold to an investment banker.
30. The mortgage-backed securities were sliced into different “tranches,” each tranche with different claim priority against payments from the underlying mortgages and each with a different bond rating. It was called “financial engineering.”
31. Moreover, so-called NINJA loans were common—those were loans to people with no income, no job, and no assets. Increasingly, lenders did not even bother to ask for documentation about ability to pay. Those were called NODOC loans. Money for housing was freely available, and housing prices rose rapidly.
32. Our survey of historical bubbles makes clear that the bursting of bubbles has invariably been followed by severe disruptions in real economic activity. The fallout from asset-price bubbles has not been confined to speculators.
33. Rather, the clear conclusion is that, in every case, the market did correct itself. The market eventually corrects any irrationality—albeit in its own slow, inexorable fashion.
34. Because the presumption is that momentum in the market will tend to perpetuate itself, the chartist interprets such a pattern as a bullish augury—the stock can be expected to continue to rise.
35. First, note that the chartist buys only after price trends have been established, and sells only after they have been broken. Because sharp reversals in the market may occur quite suddenly, the chartist often misses the boat.
36. As more and more people use it, the value of any technique depreciates. No buy or sell signal can be worthwhile if everyone tries to act on it simultaneously.
37. The point is that the market may well be a most efficient mechanism. If some people know that the price will go to 40 tomorrow, it will go to 40 today.
38. A useful rule, called “the rule of 72,” gives you a shortcut way to find out how long it will take to double your money. Take the interest rate you earn and divide it into the number 72, and you get the number of years it will take to double your money.
39. Our reformulated question now reads: Are actual price-earnings multiples higher for stocks for which a high growth rate is anticipated？ A study by John Cragg and myself strongly indicates that the answer is yes.
40. There are important advantages to buying growth stocks at very reasonable earnings multiples. If your growth estimate turns out to be correct, you may get the double bonus I mentioned in connection with Rule 1: The price will tend to go up simply because the earnings went up, but also the multiple is likely to expand in recognition of the growth rate that is established.
41. Now consider the other side of the coin. There are special risks involved in buying “growth stocks” when the market has already recognized the growth and has bid up the price-earnings multiple to a hefty premium over that accorded more run-of-the-mill stocks.
42. We can summarize the discussion thus far by restating the first two rules: Look for growth situations with low price-earnings multiples. If the growth takes place, there’s often a double bonus—both the earnings and the multiple rise, producing large gains.
43. University professors are sometimes asked by their students, “If you’re so smart, why aren’t you rich？” The question usually rankles professors, who think of themselves as passing up worldly riches to engage in such an obviously socially useful occupation as teaching. The same question is more appropriately addressed to technicians. Since the whole point of technical analysis is to make money, one would expect that those who preach it should practice it successfully.
44. Curiously, however, the broke technician is never apologetic. If you commit the social error of asking him why he is broke, he will tell you quite ingenuously that he made the all-too-human error of not believing his own charts. To my great embarrassment, I once choked conspicuously at the dinner table of a chartist friend of mine when he made such a comment. I have since made it a rule never to eat with a chartist. It’s bad for digestion.
45. Just as fast as he (or she) creates charts to show where the market is going, the academic gets busy constructing charts showing where the technician has been. Because it’s so easy to test all the technical trading rules on the computer, it has become a favorite pastime for academics to see whether they really work.
46. The basic Dow principle implies a strategy of buying when the market goes higher than the last peak and selling when it sinks through the preceding valley. There are various wrinkles to the theory, but the basic idea is part of the gospel of charting.
47. While there do seem to be some time periods when a relative-strength strategy would have outperformed a buy-and-hold strategy, there is no evidence that it can do so consistently.
48. The point is, however, that the probability of making a shot is independent of the outcome of previous shots. The psychologists conjecture that the persistent belief in the hot hand could be due to memory bias. If long sequences of hits or misses are more memorable than alternating sequences, observers are likely to overestimate the correlation between successive shots.
49. Technical theories enrich only the people preparing and marketing the technical service or the brokerage firms who hire technicians in the hope that their analyses may help encourage investors to do more in-and-out trading and thus generate commission business for the brokerage firm.
50. Pro forma earnings are often called “earnings before all the bad stuff,” and give firms license to exclude any expenses they deem to be “special,” “extraordinary,” and “non-recurring.”
51. My fourth argument against the profession is a paradoxical one: Many of the best security analysts are not paid to analyze securities. They are often very high-powered institutional salespeople, or they are promoted to the prestigious position of portfolio manager.
52. It is the nature of an average that some investors will beat it. With large numbers of players in the money game, chance will—and does—explain some extraordinary performances. The very great publicity given occasional success in stock selection reminds me of the story of the doctor who claimed he had developed a cure for cancer in chickens.
53. Bogle said, “In 30 years in this business, I do not know anybody who has done it successfully and consistently, nor anybody who knows anybody who has done it successfully and consistently. Indeed, my impression is that trying to do market timing is likely, not only not to add value to your investment program, but to be counterproductive.”
54. Many academics agree; but the method of beating the market, they say, is not to exercise superior clairvoyance but rather to assume greater risk. Risk, and risk alone, determines the degree to which returns will be above or below average.
55. It is, of course, quite true that only the possibility of downward disappointments constitutes risk. Nevertheless, as a practical matter, as long as the distribution of returns is symmetric—that is, as long as the chances of extraordinary gain are roughly the same as the probabilities for disappointing returns and losses—a dispersion or variance measure will suffice as a risk measure. The greater the dispersion or variance, the greater the possibilities for disappointment.
56. As long as there is some lack of parallelism in the fortunes of the individual companies in the economy, diversification can reduce risk. In the present case, where there is a perfect negative relationship between the companies’ fortunes (one always does well when the other does poorly), diversification can totally eliminate risk.
57. The basic logic behind the capital-asset pricing model is that there is no premium for bearing risks that can be diversified away. Thus, to get a higher average long-run rate of return, you need to increase the risk level of the portfolio that cannot be diversified away. According to this theory, savvy investors can outperform the overall market by adjusting their portfolios with a risk measure known as beta.
58. Systematic risk, also called market risk, captures the reaction of individual stocks (or portfolios) to general market swings. Some stocks and portfolios tend to be very sensitive to market movements. Others are more stable. This relative volatility or sensitivity to market moves can be estimated on the basis of the past record, and is popularly known by—you guessed it—the Greek letter beta.
59. Now, the important thing to realize is that systematic risk cannot be eliminated by diversification. It is precisely because all stocks move more or less in tandem (a large share of their variability is systematic) that even diversified stock portfolios are risky.
60. If investors did get an extra return (a risk premium) for bearing unsystematic risk, it would turn out that diversified portfolios made up of stocks with large amounts of unsystematic risk would give larger returns than equally risky portfolios of stocks with less unsystematic risk. Investors would snap at the chance to have these higher returns, bidding up the prices of stocks with large unsystematic risk and selling stocks with equivalent betas but lower unsystematic risk. This process would continue until the prospective returns of stocks with the same betas were equalized and no risk premium could be obtained for bearing unsystematic risk. Any other result would be inconsistent with the existence of an efficient market.
61. If investors really did not worry at all about volatility, the multitrillion-dollar derivative-securities markets would not be thriving as they are. Thus, the beta measure of relative volatility does capture at least some aspects of what we normally think of as risk. And portfolio betas from the past do a reasonably good job of predicting relative volatility in the future.
62. Only systematic risk will command a risk premium. But the systematic elements of risk in particular stocks and portfolios may be too complicated to be captured by beta—the tendency of the stocks to move more or less than the market. This is especially so because any particular stock index is an imperfect representative of the general market. Hence, beta may fail to capture a number of important systematic elements of risk.
63. The factors derive from their empirical work showing that returns are related to the size of the company (as measured by the market capitalization) and to the relationship of its market price to its book value.
64. It is a simple, easy-to-understand measure of market sensitivity. Alas, beta also has its warts. The actual relationship between beta and rate of return has not corresponded to the relationship predicted in theory during long periods of the twentieth century. Moreover, betas for individual stocks are not stable over time, and they are very sensitive to the market proxy against which they are measured.