《The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order

　　《The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order》是一本由Samuel P. Huntington著作，Simon & Schuster出版的Paperback图书，本书定价：USD 16.99，页数：368，特精心从网络上整理的一些读者的读后感，希望对大家能有帮助。

　　《The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order》精选点评：

　　●Though his work is critiqued severely in the academia, it's still a thunder breaking book.

　　●作为读者，这是一本需要去读，但不能太当真的书。#回头mark

　　●还没读批判文章，隐约感到是不是对文化的强调太绝对了？尤其是文化中几乎只谈宗教…不过还是比福山读来好接受一些…

　　●看了川普书单以及弗州议员还有tedcruz之流在巴黎之后的反应突然意识到了这书影响之毒瘤简直堪比锡安长老啊我操

　　●英文版看的累死了

　　●從不同的角度出發，對這本書的評價很有趣。這學期給我上過課的老師似乎（除了老肖）都嘲笑過這本書，他們的解讀是Huntington太搞笑了，居然說未來衝突的來源是不同的文明，他們其實還是站在西方文明一統天下的基礎上。而國內這本書的觀點還蠻受歡迎，這是因為老人家覺得中華文明是西方文明最強大的挑戰者，這迎合了我們這個文明的自尊。根本就沒有political neutrality存在的呀！！！

　　●在图书馆读过的第一本，看到一半就选择了放弃，历时整整一个月。我有些痛很半途而废的自己，也讨厌浅尝辄止的自己，明确自己其实对政治学和国际关系的兴趣应该仅仅保留在浅显的追逐热点而已，最后还是看了中文版的读书笔记才明白了其中的框架和内容，“文明冲突论”是追逐“天下大同”的借口，立场不同，便会有太多的企图，模糊的强弱分界线，变化的世界秩序指南，都在从上至下的影响所谓文明认同感。突然想起来在图书馆门口碰到所谓支持在我看来反派角色的香港同胞，有的时候我会觉得爱是万能的，但在这些时刻，我会觉得扣着言论自由的帽子鼠首两端是罪恶的，是道貌岸然的，但我无能为力，我企图用爱化解和包容，但是无动于衷和变本加厉只会加深伤害，最近在很多时刻觉得孤独，觉得无助和茫然，觉得握不住时间的手，就像永远都无法构建的秩序。

　　●目前学术界对于亨廷顿批评多过认同。要理解我们的现在时，还是得重新拾起马克思。

　　●IR必读理论体系 把世界分为7个以不同文化区别开的体系和地缘政治团体 仍有争议的理论但是对各大战争和分歧都有独到的见解之处

　　●大部分观点现在读来都比较自然。

　　《The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order》读后感(一)：不过尔尔

　　热衷宏大叙事的学者，古今中外大同小异。亨廷顿这本书，如同众多宏大叙事的著作一样，大而无当，既不深入，又不准确，如果这样子的水平都能在国际政治中出风头，做明星，那些决定世界大事人类和平的政客们，都是一帮怎样的蠢货啊！难怪我们要生活在这样一个战乱不断的世界上。

　　《The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order》读后感(二)：第一次写英文书总结

　　考虑到今后恐怕还需要用英语写论文，这本英文书就用英文写下总结，权当练笔吧。

　　The theme of this book is definitely civilization. A civilization is regarded in this book as a, to some extent, a unit in which a predominant power should be reposonsible to the safety and order of it and the countries are bound together naturally by culture.

　　The first question arises as to why people should be bound together by culture？ Why should they regonize themselves as a member of a civilization rather than fighters for an ideology？ The answer, according to Huntington, is deeply rooted in human psychology. Human need a way to identfy who they are which is usually accomplished by identifying who they are. The collapse of the Soviet Union brought ruin to the past communism ideology from which The people living in Eastern Europe needed to build their faith, and thus culture naturally became a choice.

　　I am personally disposed to believe this answer. That reminds me of some criticism to "爱国贼". Usually these people are thought to be mostly low-income citizens. Their tones are radical and, in some people's eyes, irrational. But I don't think they deserve all the criticism. Low-income people need identity, and because of their weak financial ability and undereducation, the nationalism could be their only choice, however, well-educated critics often see themselves as the predominant power in public opionions and have varied connections with the same kind of persons abroad or, in other word, from other civilizations. Thus their identities are not only based on the nationalism or culture. In short, everyone has the desire to know where they belong to. The only difference is well-educated people have more choices.

　　Huntington propably have better understanding and deep academic experience of Islam compared to China. He is right in that China has builted close relationship with Pakistan and Iran. If his theory is correct in this aspect. The relationship between China and Pakistan is far from special. It was for the need to deter Soviet Union and India, and now only India. So Pakistan will never be an exception to "No forever enemy and no forever friend".

　　ut I am still skeptical to his theory because I don't think he has an accurate understanding of China which can be proved in the last chapter in which he imagined China could let Taiwan gain the membership in U.N. All things about China are more like a basket of symbols in contrast to the stories about Islam. He admits that western economics is wrong in Japanese economy in response to Yen appreciation. The trade deficit to Japan was enlarged due to the special Japanese culture. But if it is true, how could Huntingdon believe China will behave like the west in the ascending peiod. I never think Chinese civilization has the perfect morality, but his argument probably deserves more examples and explanations. So is his inclination to believe political pluralism can prevent violence impetus.

　　In the end of his book. Huntingdon severely criticized culture pluralism in U.S. politics, arguing this could shake the foundation of unity of U.S. And this contradicts to the faith of the fathers of United States of America. It was written in around 2000. Now 2 decades past. Let's see what will happen next.

　　At last, a imagined nuclear war was depicted in his final chapter. 真是脑洞大开。

　　后记：回头看，英文笔记还是挺生硬的。

　　《The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order》读后感(三)：A master piece, stands the test of time, 23 years and counting......

　　我读的不是图片上的这个版本，而是Simon & Schuster2003年版的paperback.

　　93年亨廷顿在外交事务上发表了文明的冲突一文后，引起轩然大波；三年后他为进一步阐发观点，发表此书，之后更是争议不断，此书也成为国际关系史上近几十年来最有影响的作品。93年那篇文章我很早之前就读过，至今还记得当时读过之后很气愤，觉得这种不讲证据就挑拨事端的文章实在阴险、也没水平。不记得后来什么时候买了这本书，但只读了头两章，好象还是没觉得书里讲的有什么道理，又放下了，一放就好些年，头发都放白了。这一阵子觉得现在国际形势正在巨变的关头，不妨再从文明冲突这个角度了解一下，再加上也没劲头做别的正经事，就重新看起来。

　　这次把书读完了，全面地想了想，才觉得，书虽然问题很多，但仅以战略远见这点而言，确实是杰作，也难怪影响如此深远。

　　先把问题简单讲讲。首先是西方中心论和隐藏得很深的白人至人主义。不过，象他这样地位的西方主流学者，没有西方中心论才奇怪。把西方说成一个独立的文明还算是个可商量的事（用甘地的话说：Western civilization would be an interesting idea)，但还要进一步说民主、自由、人权、个人主义、法治这些东西，不是东方的、不是亚洲的，而是西方文明独有的（引用的Arthur Schlessinger Jr. 的话），而且儒家文明还没有这些，而只有等级、专制、集体对个人的压制等，这就是狭隘的西方中心。基于这一点，书中的最后一章可以算是他的政策建议，提出的纲领自然也就是在美国国内反对文化多元主义，强调西方文明是美国立国之基本原则、不可动摇。第二个问题是证据的选择与运用。书中用了很多一看上去就是道听途说的小道消息。不过这倒不是个大问题，此书本来就不是实证研究。

　　由此也联系到第三个问题——这既可以说是此书最大的问题，也可以说不是个问题——也就是此书到底是用实证来证明文明冲突已经成为国际关系的主线，还是推出一个纲领来呼吁不同的行动主体以文明为主线来结成阵营、指导行动？书中所做出的样子是前者，核心观点就是说冷战之后国际关系中的地震带fault line已经变成了文明间的冲突，而且还用了诸多的章节来讲已经出现的文明冲突的形态、特征等等。但这里的证据经常是有问题的，对事件的解释过多强调了文明差异的作用，而忽视了其他因素，比如说实际利益。（理论上，作为constructionism，此书的对手自然就是realism, 这种选择性的解释也是意料之中。）但书里还有另一条平行的线索就是预言今后国际关系的走势将是文明冲突的加剧、并呼吁西方国家觉醒起来、团结起来。这一点上当然就没有可靠的证据，但他的观点却一点不含糊、很不留余地，因此听起来不象有理有据的推断、而象倡议书、宣言，是在为了制造文明冲突而摇旗呐喊。

　　当时此观点发表之后，我记得一个普遍的批评就是说此书（尤其是借助作者之地位）是在制造一个自我实现的预言：本来文明冲突不是什么大不了的事，但现在大家都这样想了，没有冲突也会制造出冲突。书封底中王赓武的推介讲的也是这个意思："It is not just about the future, but may actually help to shape it." 我自己当时的反应也是这样，觉得那篇文章的用意就是挑拨事端，制造矛盾，为冷战后可能要散伙的西方集团制造新的“敌人”，从而使其继续团结。

　　现在再来评价此书，我们无法判断出版之后这23年里的历史有没有真被书中的观点改变，但书中的论点得到了更多的事实的支持倒是肯定的，这也是现在读此书会觉得其深有远见的原因。

　　此书的观点很简单：世界分为8大文明（西方基督教、东正教、 伊斯兰、中华文明、日本、拉美、非洲、南亚）。冷战结束后的世界秩序既没有变成西方一家独大、也不是众国林立、各不分属、也不是新的两极对立，而是以文明为群体而形成的多极对立。世界上已经出现了三大趋势，即西方的相对衰落、伊斯兰复兴(The Islamic Resurgence)、和东亚尤其是中国的经济发展；因此今后世界上最主要的冲突、也是驱动国际关系的核心动力是西方与伊斯兰和中华文明之间的冲突（其他几个文明基本上是打酱油的）。

　　他对三大趋势的判断显然是极有远见的，在这一点上比起他的学生Fukuyama君就高明得不知凡几了。他做出此判断的时候是1993-96年，亚洲金融危机、911、使馆被炸、中国入世这些事还要好几年之后才发生，西方正沉浸在打败苏联、赢得冷战的喜悦与自豪之中，日本正处在其经济实力的顶峰，而中国的经济体量尚只有日本的1/4、中国在国际上刚从89之后的制裁与孤立缓过劲来，还在一个劲地韬光养晦、忍气吞声。虽然伊斯兰复兴已经有明显的苗头、这一点比较明显，但要看出未来持续的趋势是西方的衰落、中国的崛起、而且两者是不可调和（中国因为文明不同而不会走西方道路、加入或被接纳入西方阵营），这还是要有眼光的。

　　书中第4章开头讲到构成西方霸权地位的14个方面，虽然在当时仍完整无缺，但冷战和帝国主义的消耗已经使得西方到了强弩之末，因此而推断西方已经开始走下坡路了。现在再回头看看，23年后，中国已经在这14个方面上大面积地挤进领先集团、甚至直接将西方赶下王座：own and operate the interational banking system (中国有最大的银行、建立起了独立的支付系统), control all hard currencies (人民币获得特别提款权地位), are the world's principal customer (中国已经成为最大的消费国、贸易国), provide the majority of the world's finished goods (中国已成为最大的工业国), conduct most advanced technical research and development (中国已与美国齐头并进、超越欧洲和日本), dominate access to space (中国即将成为唯一有空间站的国家), dominate international communications, dominate the high-tech weapons industry (这两点也都变了)。其他就不罗列了，但西方一家独大的局面是彻底完蛋了。

　　他认为西方相对东亚是在经济上被赶超（他说的还只是东亚，当时毕竟日本还是东亚的领头羊），而相对于伊斯兰则是上人口上被击败：既是出生率、更是因为移民。在这一点，亨氏要是这些年来的变化、尤其是这两年的欧洲开放难民入境之事，非得被早气死几年。他所提出的反对文化多元主义的主张，其实就是反移民、尤其是来自不同文明的移民、尤其是伊斯兰移民（文化上不可融合、生育率还高），唯如此才能保护西方文明在西方国家的主导性。但欧洲这些白左们这些年来干的事情却恰恰相反、使劲往这个坑里跳、拦都拦不住。这大概正应证他书中所说的，90年代时西方的衰落才刚刚缓慢地开始，但到了某个关头会突然加速。

　　书中也提到伊斯兰恐怖主义的兴起，并追溯到美国在阿富汗战争中对圣战组织的支持，但过多地把这些归结于伊斯兰教内部的文明复兴的过程、而忽视了西方为了其战略目的而故意扶持。他在书中能讨论的西方与伊斯兰文明冲突的例子还主要是前南地区分裂后出现的冲突和91年的海湾战争。当时他岂能想到会有911这样的事和之后在阿富汗和伊拉克的两场赤裸裸的文明战争。小布什当政时用的一帮人都是与老亨一派的新保守主义者，应该是深受文明冲突观点影响的，但为什么会做出发动伊拉克战争这样激化文明冲突的事情，很难理解。布什下台之后，美国似乎是想将与伊斯兰文明的冲突一劳永逸地解决，因此去搞什么阿拉伯之春、再对利比亚和叙利亚动武、想通过改变政权来解决文明冲突。但结果呢，捅了一堆马蜂窝。

　　亨氏在书中有这么一段话："The dynamism of Islam is the ongoing source of many relatively small fault line wars; the rise of China is the potential source of a big intercivilizational war of core states (p.209)." 简单地说，对西方而言，伊斯兰是肌肤之痛，中国崛起才是真要命的。所以西方过去这20年的所为一定是要把老家伙的棺材板都气翻的。

　　书中还有很多有意思的地方，只能简单地记录一下了：

　　- 他一再强调东亚兴起很强的文化自觉、和脱离西方的尝试，并一再以日本、新加坡和马来西亚领导人的言论来佐证。这可能在97年亚洲金融危机之前有过这么股势头(Asian triumphalism, p.108)，但现在再看日本和新加坡，哪有一点文明自信。反倒是好象被中国的崛起而吓得使劲往美国怀里钻。

　　- 关于乌克兰，他准确地预见到其最大的可能性是以东正教和天主教为界分裂成东西两部，且分别被拉入西方和俄罗斯两个阵营进行对抗。

　　- 书中讲到90年代中期美国在经济上面临日本的赶超时所采取的措施与今日中美贸易摩擦中如出一辙，更可见中美之冲突跟是不是“民主”没有一毛钱的关系。p.222.

　　- 用在文明圏中的地位来划分出lone countries (Ethiopia, Japan, Haiti), cleft countries (Ukraine, Sudan 两个还真都分裂了, Sri Lanka), and torn countries (Turkey, Mexico, Russia).

　　- 伊斯兰文明中对集体的认同是个U shape: 对部落高、对国家低、对超越国家的宗教又高。

　　- 对中国和中华文明有诸多恶意的或无知的误解，认为中国强大了会想把蒙古夺回来、把越南占领，这真不知是什么逻辑。

　　- 美国其实是个文化上很脆弱的国家，因为他没有历史、没有基于文明和血缘的民族认同，有的只是一套所谓的建国理念。所以一旦这套意识形态忽悠不了人了，其立国根基会很脆弱，其崩溃可能很快。这也是他强调美国必需抗拒文化多元化、强化西方核心价值观的原因。但今日之美国明显是越走越偏了。p.306.

　　- 书中最后讲到新加坡在90年代尝试建立起自己的一套核心文明价值的努力(Shared Values), 对其很是赞许。但今天看来，新加坡的这种努力未必成功，这些核心价值因为没有跟母体文明（中华文明）联系起来，变成了无源之水，很容易在全球化浪潮中被冲垮，在今天就很难抵御得了西方价值观的冲击、尤其是当政府还尝试保持与西方阵营的亲近时。

　　《The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order》读后感(四)：摘抄和感想的混合体

　　#对亨廷顿的批判#

　　1.有些冲突看起来像是基于文明，实际上文明只是一个动员手段，根本原因是更深层次的，如经济危机、社会结构失衡：

　　Having declared that difference between nations classes, and ideologies will not be the primary source of conflict, he is unable to connect the rise of radical Islamism, for example, with the collapse of world oil prices, Western support for corrupt local regimes, the failure of secular elites to extend the benefits of modernization to local workers and peasants, massive unemployment among Arab youth, the persistence of internal ethnic and class divisions, the collapse of socialist alternatives, and so forth. Nor can he explain why so many middle-class Indians now see Hindu revivalism as a solution to their problems, or what drives many contemporary Russians to endorse through popular vote the neo-fascist policies of Vladimir Zhirinovsky.

　　2. 人对意义、归属感、与他人关系、安全感、发展的机会的需求是永恒的。哪种社会结构能满足，哪种结构就会继续存在。

　　y specifying the commonalities hinted at by Huntington, the paradigm of basic human needs challenges realist assumptions at their source. Conflict specialists John Burton, Paul Sites, and others argue that serious social conflict is not generated by individual aggressiveness or international lawlessness as much as by the failure of existing systems to satisfy people!ˉs basic needs[3]Certain needs (e.g., identity, bonding, security, meaning, and development) are shared by all human beings. Unlike interests, they are not bargainable; people will not trade their identities or belief-systems for money or surrender them even at gunpoint. And unlike values, they are not specific to particular cultures or civilizations. Local cultures, or the state of a society!ˉs development, define the satisfiers of basic needs, but the needs themselves ar

　　universal. Moreover, they are irrepressible, demanding satisfaction no matter how a society!ˉs leader may seek to suppress or manipulate them. If adherence to a street gang, a nation, or a civilization is a way of attempting to satisfy unfulfilled needs for identity, bonding, and security, neither coercion nor persuasion will alter that behavior. On the other hand, the conflicts generated by unsatisfied needs can be resolved (not just managed) by altering existing social and political arrangements to the extent necessary o satisfy them. The problem, ordinarily, is not a shortage of satisfiers; it is the unwillingness of elites to make the necessary system changes.

　　3. 如果文明要成为一个超国别集团的凝聚力，需要有哪些条件？

　　In that light, what are the circumstances that could generate pan-national or civilizational conflicts in the post-Cold War era？ In modern times, at least, culture is unlikely to function as a political rallying-point unless at least three conditions are met:

　　1）受到来自另一文明的一群人的迫在眉睫的威胁。关键是对归属感、自由度、和生计的强烈威胁。

　　First, the participants must feel that their identities, liberties, and livelihoods are seriously and immediately threatened by powerful, culturally distinguishable outsiders, often supported by local allies!aan !°ene within.!± The degree of perceived threat is far more salient, in that regard, than the degree of perceive cultural difference.

　　2）阶级、种族、国家等结构已无法满足这些需求。

　　econd, participants!ˉ other methods of satisfying their basic needs for identity, development, meaning and security must be discredited or currently unavailable. The merger of one!ˉs class or nation with other in some pannational entity is unlikely to occur unless class- and ethnic-based organizations have already proven ineffectual.

　　3）同一文明圈里必须出现一个强有力的领导者。

　　Third, some regional hegemon must be capable of persuading or forcing weaker nations to accept its !°representation!± of their cultural and political interests. Even Huntington would probably find it hard conceive of a Slavic-Orthodox civilization without Russia, a Hindu civilization without India, or a Confucian civilization without China. In fact, where no contender for hegemony exists, as in the case of the Buddhist nations, Huntington does not count the civilization as a !°player!± at a

　　举例：用纳粹德国的形成举例。

　　an-nationalist militancy, in other words, is not a spontaneous growth but a response to political

　　ubordination, cultural humiliation, and blocked economic development. The case of Germany illustrates that process. It took Napoleon!ˉs conquests to provoke the construction of a Germanic political identity and Prussian hegemony to give that identity institutional expression. It took British and French imperialism to convince Germans that, as the German nationalist Ernst Hasse wrote in his work Deutsche Politik , they !°had the same right to expand as other great peoples, and that if not granted this possibilit overseas, [they would] be forced to do it in Europe.!± And it took a combination of the Versailles system the Great Depression, and the collapse of liberal and socialist alternatives to convert pan-German nationalism into Nazi racial supremacy. By the same token, if the Islamic-Confucian alliance so feared by Huntington should materialize to challenge Western power, or if Slavic-Orthodox peoples should reunite around a hegemonic Russia, cultural values and the !°will to power!± will have far less to do with su developments than with the inability of Western-dominated peoples to satisfy their basic needs for identity, security, and development.

　　举例：用印度举例，形成冲突的并不是文明本身，而是该文明所处的社会、政治体制（一个团体打压、奴役另一个团体，“你死我活”），体制无法满足人的基本要求，就应改变体制。但亨廷顿认为冷战后的世界已经无力做出这种改变。

　　Why, indeed, unless basic human needs are unfulfilled, should those who participate in different cultures fight？ While human history surely provides examples of violent cultural and civilizational conflict, more prevalent still are stories of culture-groups avoiding, tolerating, or accommodating each other; merging with other groups to form new entities; or absorbing or being absorbed by others. In fact, from the perspective of conflict resolution, Huntington has got things exactly backwards. Struggles between social classes and between different levels of the power-knowledge hierarchy can be very difficult to resolve.Conflicts based primarily on cultural differences alone are easier to settle. That is because the parties to intercultural conflicts generally seek goods such as identity and mutual recognition, which are not in short supply, and because the clash of cultural values or world-views is not nearly as absolute as Huntington

　　implies. Hindus and Muslims in India do not generally make war on each other simply because one group loves cows and the other eats them. One can imagine any number of sociopolitical systems that would permit cow-lovers and cow-eaters, those who worship in temples and those who worship in mosques, to recognize each other!ˉs identities and interact without massacring each other. The principal obstacles t Hindu-Muslim peace in India are not incompatible cultural values but social and political conditions that allow each group to believe that it can survive only at another!ˉs expense. Without altering the condition that make it impossible to satisfy basic human needs, conflicts like that one cannot be resolved.

　　Huntington!ˉs pessimism with regard to resolving civilizational conflict is evidently based not only on his cultural relativism, but on the silent assumption that, in the brave new post-Cold War world, this sort of system-change is impossible.

　　批判者认为可以改变，并且应该改变，但具体如何改变？他也不知道。

　　We disagree. In response to Huntington!ˉs dark vision of civilizational struggle, we answer: Destructiv conflict between identity groups, including pan-nationalist or civilizational groupings, can be averted and can be resolved if they do occur. But a violent clash of civilizations could well result from our continuing failure to transform the systems of inequality that make social life around the globe a struggle for individual and group survival! A systems that feed the illusion that either one civilization or another must be dominant

　　an-national movements remain, as they have been in the past, misguided responses to foreign

　　domination and native misgovernment. In our view, Huntington!ˉs call for the global defense of Wester interests against competing civilizations therefore represents the worst sort of self-fulfilling prophecy.

　　evertheless, his rhetorical question, !°If not civilizations, what？!± deserves an answer. Satisfying bas human needs on a global basis will require a powerful movement for social change!aa movement waitin to be born.

　　#亨廷顿理论的展开#

　　介绍八大文明，提到汤因比的历史研究，所以真正要理解亨廷顿的理论来源，还是要看汤因比。

　　Civilizations may involve a large number of people, as with China (!°a civilization pretending to be state,!± as Lucian Pye put it)

　　Western civilization has two major variants, European and North American, and Islam has its Arab, Turkic and Malay subdivisions. Civilizations are nonetheless meaningful entities, and while the lines between them are seldom sharp, they are real. Civilizations are dynamic; they rise and fall, they divide and merge. And, as any student of history knows, civilizations disappear and are buried in the sands of time.

　　Westerners tend to think of nation states as the principal actors in global affairs. They have been that,however, for only a few centuries. The broader reaches of human history have been the history of civilizations. In A Study of History , Arnold Toynbee identified 21 major civilizations; only six of them exist in the contemporary world.

　　These include Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilization. The most important conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural fault lines separating these civilizations from one another.

　　1. 人神、个人与集体、父母与子女、政府与公民、丈夫与妻子、自由还是权威、平等还是分层，这些看法植根于传统，不会很快消失。

　　这些差别不等于冲突，冲突也不一定等于流血冲突，但在历史上，最漫长最血腥的冲突都来自文明的冲突。（还是要看历史研究）

　　First, differences among civilizations are not only real; they are basic. Civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most important, religion. The people of different civilizations have different views on the relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy. These differences are the product of centuries. They will not soon disappear. They are far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political regimes. Differences do not necessarily mean conflict, and conflict does not necessarily mean violence. Over the centuries, however, differences among civilizations have generated the most prolonged and the most violent conflicts.

　　2. 世界变小，互动增多，面对面生活我更意识到我跟你有多不同。文化和文明身份觉醒。（到底会觉醒还是会消失？）

　　econd, the world is becoming a smaller place. The interactions between peoples of different

　　civilizations are increasing; these increasing interactions intensify civilization consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities within civilizations.

　　3. 经济全球化，国家作为归属感提供者的角色被削弱。目前来看，宗教又跑出来作为替代了。

　　目标群体一般是年轻、受过高等教育的中产技术精英、职业人士、商人（简直专为我国仁波切龙泉寺莱德福新儒家信徒定制的一句话…）。

　　Third, the processes of economic modernization and social change throughout the world are separating people from long-standing local identities. They also weaken the nation state as a source of identity. In much of the world religion has moved in to fill this gap, often in the form of movements that are labeled !°fundamentalist.!± Such movements are found in Western Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism and Hinduis as well as in Islam. In most countries and most religions the people active in fundamentalist movements are young, college-educated, middle-class technicians, professionals and business persons. The !°unsecularization of the world,!± George Weigel has remarked, !°is one of the dominant social facts of l in the late twentieth century.!± The revival of religion, !la revanche de Dieu,!± as Gilles Kepel labeled it

　　rovides a basis for identity and commitment that transcends national boundaries and unites civilizations.

　　4. 西方盛极而衰，其他文明渐渐觉醒。

　　Fourth, the growth of civilization-consciousness is enhanced by the dual role of the West. On the one hand, the West is at a peak of power. At the same time, however, and perhaps as a result, a return to the roots phenomenon is occurring among non-Western civilizations. Increasingly one hears references to trends toward a turning inward and !°Asianization!± in Japan, the end of the Nehru legacy and t!°Hinduization!± of India, the failure of Western ideas of socialism and nationalism and hen!°re-Islamization!± of the Middle East, and now a debate over Westernization versus Russianization Boris Yeltsin!ˉs country. A West at the peak of its power confronts non-Wests that increasingly have the desire, the will and the resources to shape the world in non-Western ways.

　　原来社会精英都是西方制造，人民都沉浸在传统文化中；现在慢慢地社会精英更多是土产，而人民对西方的生活态度越来越喜闻乐见。（所以未来的趋势到底是西方化还是去西方化？精英说了算还是人民说了算？）

　　In the past, the elites of non-Western societies were usually the people who were most involved with the West, had been educated at Oxford, the Sorbonne or Sandhurst, and had absorbed Western attitudes and values. At the same time, the populace in non-Western countries often remained deeply imbued with the indigenous culture. Now, however, these relationships are being reversed. A de-Westernization and indigenization of elites is occurring in many non-Western countries at the same time that Western, usually American, cultures, styles and habits become more popular among the mass of the people.

　　5. 政治经济斗争中，你都可以当骑墙派，爱哪边哪边，因为问题不过是：“你支持谁？”。但在文明冲突中，问题是：“你是什么？”。民族间的流血斗争已不鲜见，但宗教其实比民族更排外。你可以一半法国血统，一半阿拉伯血统，但你不可能一半穆斯林、一半天主徒。

　　（问题是，基督教基本已经世俗化，现在真正还是一神教的就是伊斯兰了，而其危害程度的陡增，如前面批判里提到的，也是因为上世纪美国自己在中东作孽。 如果穆斯林像现代基督徒那样去“信教”，那上帝和安拉都死了，无所谓什么冲突。）

　　Fifth, cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones. In the former Soviet Union, communists can become democrats, the rich can become poor and the poor rich, but Russians cannot become Estonians and Azeris cannot become Armenians. In class and ideological conflicts, the key question was !°Which sid are you on？!± and people could and did choose sides and change sides. In conflicts between civilizations the question is !°What are you？!± That is a given that cannot be changed. And as we know, from Bosnia the Caucasus to the Sudan, the wrong answer to that question can mean a bullet in the head. Even more than ethnicity, religion discriminates sharply and exclusively among people. A person can be half-French and half-Arab and simultaneously even a citizen of two countries. It is more difficult to be half-Catholic and half-Muslim.

　　6. 经济区域化很明显。一方面，经济区域化促进文明共同体形成，另一方面，没有共同的文化基础，很难成功区域化。（日本的例子很奇怪。日本和东亚其他国家完全没有所谓的文化隔阂吧。就算有，到底怎么体现在经济上了？）

　　Finally, economic regionalism is increasing. The proportions of total trade that were intraregional rosebetween 1980 and 1989 from 51 percent to 59 percent in Europe, 33 percent to 37 percent in East Asia, and 32 percent to 36 percent in North America. The importance of regional economic blocs is likely to continue to increase in the future. On the one hand, successful economic regionalism will reinforce civilization-consciousness. On the other hand, economic regionalism may succeed only when it is rooted in a common civilization. The European Community rests on the shared foundation of European culture and Western Christianity. The success of the North American Free Trade Area depends on the convergence now underway of Mexican, Canadian and American cultures. Japan, in contrast, faces difficulties in creating a comparable economic entity in East Asia because Japan is a society and

　　举例：拿中国、香港、台湾、新加坡和海外华人举例。（这几个地方的华人不仅仅是一个文化圈，好多人上溯三代真的是一家人。用家族观念如此深重，又刚好在百年前发生大迁徙的中国人举例真的好吗… … 华人家族真是东亚经济的脊梁骨啊）

　　Common culture, in contrast, is clearly facilitating the rapid expansion of the economic relations between the People!ˉs Republic of China and Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and the overseas Chines communities in other Asian countries. With the Cold War over, cultural commonalities increasingly overcome ideological differences, and mainland China and Taiwan move closer together. If cultural commonality is a prerequisite for economic integration, the principal East Asian economic bloc of the future is likely to be centered on China. This bloc is, in fact, already coming into existence. As Murray Weidenbaum has observed, From Guangzhou to Singapore, from Kuala Lumpur to Manila, this influential network!aoften based on extensions of the traditional clans!ahas been described as the backbone of the East Asian economy.

　　举例：欧洲的文化丝幕

　　The Velvet Curtain of culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology as the most significant dividing line in Europe. As the events in Yugoslavia show, it is not only a line of difference; it is also at times a line of bloody conflict

　　举例：中东——美国作的孽

　　This centuries-old military interaction between the West and Islam is unlikely to decline. It could become more virulent. The Gulf War left some Arabs feeling proud that Saddam Hussein had attacked Israel and stood up to the West. It also left many feeling humiliated and resentful of the West!ˉs military presence I the Persian Gulf, the West!ˉs overwhelming military dominance, and their apparent inability to shape thei own destiny. Many Arab countries, in addition to the oil exporters, are reaching levels of economic and social development where autocratic forms of government become inappropriate and efforts to introduce democracy become stronger. Some openings in Arab political systems have already occurred. The principal beneficiaries of these openings have been Islamist movements. In the Arab world, in short, Western democracy strengthens anti-Western political forces. This may be a passing phenomenon, but it surely complicates relations between Islamic countries and the West.

　　Those relations are also complicated by demography. The spectacular population growth in Arab

　　countries, particularly in North Africa, has led to increased migration to Western Europe. The movement within Western Europe toward minimizing internal boundaries has sharpened political sensitivities with respect to this development. In Italy, France and Germany, racism is increasingly open, and political reactions and violence against Arab and Turkish migrants have become more intense and more widespread since 1990.

　　On both sides the interaction between Islam and the West is seen as a clash of civilization. The West!ˉ!°next confrontation,!± observes M. J. Akbar, an Indian Muslim author, !°is definitely going to come fthe Muslim world. It is in the sweep of the Islamic nations from the Maghreb to Pakistan that the struggle for a new world order will begin.!± Bernard Lewis comes to a similar conclusion

　　旧仇新怨熬成一锅，谁也不能阻挡双方非理性的步伐。

　　We are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the

　　governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations!athe perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both.[2]

　　#亨廷顿再次发文捍卫自己的理论#

　　As with any paradigm, there is much the civilization paradigm does not account for, and critics will have no trouble citing events that it does not explain and would not have predicted. However, the debates the civilizational paradigm has generated around the world show that, in some measure, it strikes home.

　　信仰和家庭、血缘和观念是构成人们归属感、身份感的基本部分，是人们会流血捍卫的东西。

　　Wherever one turns, the world is at odds with itself. Thus, at issue is what could be responsible for these conflicts if it is not the differences in civilizations themselves. In the end, faith and family, blood and belief are what people identify with and what they will fight and die for. That is why the clash of civilizations is replacing the Cold War as the central phenomenon of global politics and why a civilization paradigm provides, better than any alternative, a useful starting point for understanding and coping with the changes.

　　一种成功的理论模型不必解释所有现象，只要比其他模型更成功地解释大多数现象。

　　!°To be accepted as a paradigm,!± Kuhn wrote, theory must seem better than its competitors, but it need not, and in fact never does, explain all the facts with which it can be confronted.

　　要预防、解决文化冲突，必须要深入了解文化哲学，了解对方和我们的共同点。

　　Culture Is To Die For

　　Wherever one turns, the world is at odds with itself. If differences in civilization are not responsible for these conflicts, what is？ The critics of the civilization paradigm have not produced a better explanation for what is going on in the world. The civilizational paradigm, in contrast, strikes a responsive chord throughout the world. In Asia, as one U.S. ambassador reported, it is !°spreading like wildfire.!±

　　Europe, European Community President Jacques Delors explicitly endorsed its argument that !°futur conflicts will be sparked by cultural factors rather than economics or ideology!± and warned, !°The We needs to develop a deeper understanding of the religious and philosophical assumptions underlying other civilizations, and the way other nations see their interests, to identify what we have in common.!± Muslims in turn, have seen !°the clash!± as providing recognition and, in some degree, legitimation for tdistinctiveness of their own civilization and its independence from the West. That civilizations are meaningful entities accords with the way in which people see and experience reality.

　　History has not ended. The world is not one. Civilizations unite and divide humankind. The forces making for clashes between civilizations can be contained only if they are recognized. In a !°world o different civilizations,!± as my article concluded, each !°will have to learn to coexist with the others.!± Wultimately counts for people is not political ideology or economic interest. Faith and family, blood and belief, are what people identify with and what they will fight and die for. And that is why the clash of civilizations is replacing the Cold War as the central phenomenon of global politics, and why a civilizational paradigm provides, better than any alternative, a useful starting point for understanding and coping with the changes going on in the world.

　　#论述媒体该怎样运用亨廷顿理论#

　　这篇论述媒体该怎样运用亨廷顿理论的文章简直就是亨廷顿理论是unfortunate self-fulfilling prophecy 的铁证啊。

　　媒体集中报道文化冲突事件，媒体集体用亨廷顿理论解释时事，文化冲突论当然越来越深入人心。而文化也本来不过就是人心里的东西。文化冲突的先决条件也不过是人所“认为”的威胁。

　　The News Media and the !°Clash of Civilizations

　　hilip Seib. Parameters .

　　Abstract (Document Summary)

　　eib uses Samuel Huntington!ˉs thesis regarding the clash of civilizations to analyze how the news media might better shape its coverage of world events. He sees the clash theory as a means for focusing media resources following the Cold War era. The ability to have a geographic region and a bad guy will permit the media to be more efficient [in] their application of resources.

　　之后的部分是亨廷顿详细论证自己的理论。比较值得看的部分是他对文明的理解、对历史上文明扮演的角色的介绍。

　　亨廷顿举的例子里，主要

　　1）华人——虽然家族观念很强，但很热爱和平是真的。

　　2）穆斯林——虽然眼下极端势力高涨，但来源与其说是伊斯兰教本质的问题不如说是美国的中东政策造的孽。虽然其教义是提供了原始材料。但圣经也没有好到哪去。

　　3）欧洲——不是特别了解... 近年来主要是北极熊和其他民族的矛盾，这个除了分裂似乎也没什么别的办法。

　　虽然历史上文明的冲突构成了最血腥最漫长的历史，但历史不一定会以同样的方式重演。学者、媒体和国际机构扮演着很重要的角色。