《Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals》读后感锦集

　　《Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals》是一本由Immanuel Kant著作，Yale University Press出版的Paperback图书，本书定价：USD 22.00，页数：194，特精心从网络上整理的一些读者的读后感，希望对大家能有帮助。

　　《Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals》精选点评：

　　●KEEP CALM BUT I KANT

　　●最精准的英译本

　　●康叔叔你多点几个句号不好么= =

　　●Wood 的直譯有時簡直不忍卒讀，卻保留康德原文的文氣，有志深入研習用

　　●诘诎聱牙

　　●Kant almost kills me

　　●终于算是连拉带扯地看完了

　　●人可以被作为手段，但必须同时被作为目的

　　●来一场“比比谁的从句更多”大赛

　　●Rethinking Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals这一部分值得推荐。

　　《Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals》读后感(一)：道德形而上学Sec II重要内容

　　1.The distinction between hypothetical imperative & categorical imperative:

　　a. Hypothetical Imperatives: Conditionally hold on me— if you happen to want/given that…...; I can renounce that end;

　　. Categorical Imperatives: Necessity; under any condition;

　　kant会说plato里的带上ring就啥事都做的人只是hypothetical imperative,而非categorical imperative

　　2.The derivation of four paradigmatic duties

　　1)duties to self vs. duties to others

　　2)perfect duties vs. imperfect duties

　　erfect duties: not to murder;

　　Imperfect duties: develop my talent&help my neighbor; there is no particular action/moment that I must develop 【就是有一定的自主空间，在时间上和种类上】

　　Q：那是不是Imperfect duties在量上也有自主空间？比如我可以弹1小时钢琴也可以弹4小时钢琴】

　　desirablility和conceivability是有区别的；例子：生孩子

　　问：那陪家人和develop talent是不是两个contradicted will？因为时间资源是有限的。

　　《Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals》读后感(二)：general formula

　　Kant的generalization method to obtain moral law

　　Kant为了说明moral law来自于理性，所以就列出一个general formula,说人就是从这种方式得到的categorical imperative：

　　第一步：把你做这件事的所想达到的目的列出来（maxim）

　　第二步：想象一个世界所有人都为了达到这个目的这样做，你自己也在这个世界中

　　第三步：看当你的maxim成为你所想象的世界中成为moral law的时候，有没有矛盾出现。如果有，这件事就不可以做；如果没有，这件事就可以做。

　　他又说矛盾分为两种：

　　1，概念上的矛盾，就是说，在那样一个世界里，你这么做不能达到自己的目的

　　2，意愿上的矛盾，就是说，在那样一个世界里，你这么做可以达到自己的目的，但却不想生活在这样一个世界里。

　　我们先不说他的general formula怎么样，先看看我们普遍认为好的和认为坏的事，在用general formula测试以后的结果是什么样的。

　　我们普遍认为抢劫是不对的，那么把抢劫放在kant的那里，会是什么结果呢？

　　他可能会说，如果想得到什么都可以随意抢劫的世界，是没有人愿意生活的，是contradiction in will，所以不能通过。

　　但对robber king而言，那是个再好不过的世界了。他看不出这样一个世界有任何的不好之处。如果想说，他可以通过理性知道那不是好的行为，那么这是个循环论证。所以，至少对robber king，这个general formula的检验是失败了。但他仍然可以说对大多人而言它还是成功的。那么，我们再看看别的行为。

　　比如说我，每次逛街以后都不在商业街那站坐车，而往前多走一站路，这样有坐位的几率会大一些，如果没座位，就得站上一个多小时。

　　我们来看看我的行为能否通过kant的general formula的测验

　　我的maxim是：为了可以不站着回来，多走一站路再坐车。

　　如果每个去那里逛街的人，都是多走一站路再上车，那么我的目的就达不到，也就是说，这是contradiction in concept

　　按照普遍的认为，我这个行为绝对没有什么伦理上的错误。那么，错误就肯定在general formula上。它阻止一切因为利用和别人的行为在时间上，空间上的不一致来达到自己的目的的行为，不管是伦理的还是非伦理的。在这个世界上，volition is individual, 所以才有很多事我们可以去做而达到目的，而没有伦理上的不对，而这些行为的总和增加了世界的快乐而不是痛苦。Kant用一个不存在的generalized的世界的后果来作为我们在这个世界的道德标准，并且把伦理和非伦理的事情都想包括近来，使他的general formula不成为一个convincing的测验，也就不能给他的moral law来自于理性的观点给有力的支持。

　　以上只是说general formula的不完善之处，并没说他的观点是不对的。

　　《Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals》读后感(三)：Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals笔记 Preface&Sec I

　　reface

　　1:All rational cognition is either material and concerned with some ob- ject, orformal and occupied only with the form of the understanding and of reason itself and with the universal rules of thinking in general, without distinction of objects. Formal philosophy is called logic. material philosophy: laws of nature-physics; laws of freedom-ethics.

　　Logic can have no empirical part, that is, no part in which the universal and necessary laws of thinking would rest on grounds taken from experience. Physics and Ethics contain empirical parts: the first as laws in accordance with which everything happens, the second as laws in accordance with which everything ought to happen, while still taking into account the conditions under which it very often does not happen.

　　When pure philosophy is merely formal it is called logic; but if it is limited to determinate objects of the understanding it is called metaphysics.

　　is it not thought to be of the utmost necessity to work out for once a pure moral philosophy, completely cleansed of everything that may be only empirical and that belongs to anthropology？

　　absolute necessity : The command that thou shall not lie

　　道德哲学建立在practical knowledge的pure part上而非empirical part

　　他要的也不是wolff的universal practical philosophy，因为那也还是有empirical 成分的，他要的是pure thinking, that is, of thinking by which objects are cognized completely a priori

　　ection I：Transition from common rational to philosophic moral cognitio

　　7:只有Good Will可以be considered good without limitation. 其他的如courage, resolution, and perseverance，Moderation in affects and passions, self-control, and calm reflection 都得在character是善的／good will之前提下才能善

　　a good will seems to constitute the indispensable condition even of worthiness to be happy

　　A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes, because of its fitness to attain some proposed end, but only because of its volition, that is, it is good in itself and, regarded for itself, is to be valued incomparably higher than all that could merely be brought about by it in favor of some inclination and indeed, if you will, of the sum of all inclina- tions.【什么意思？什么叫good in itself： this will should wholly lack the capacity to carry out its purpose，then, like a jewel, it would still shine by itself, as something that has its full worth in itself.；大概就是不用有practical use？但是good will的purpose是什么呢？它的用处还可以和自身分开？】

　　8：In the natural constitution of an organized being, that is, one consti- tuted purposively for life,2 we assume as a principle that there will be found in it no instrument for some end other than what is also most appropriate to that end and best adapted to it. Now in a being that has reason and a will, if the proper end of nature were its preservation, its welfare, in a word its happiness, then nature would have hit upon a very bad arrangement in selecting the reason of the creature to carry out this purpose，因为instincts来做可以做得更好，而且reason会干扰nature得目的。【所以应该说reason不是服务于自然，或者不是服务于人的preservation的目标的；reason和instincts的冲突—所以reason的目的是什么呢？】

　　we find that the more a cultivated reason purposely occupies itself with the enjoyment of life and with happiness, so much the further does one get away from true satisfaction—lead to hatred of reason---they find that they have in fact only brought more trouble upon themselves instead of gaining in happiness【感觉这里的reason带来的效用有点像freud的superego&civilization和尼采的acetic ideals】

　　所以结论是reason不服务于happiness，不是用来得到happiness的工具，它有更宏大的目标

　　10:the true vocation of reason must be to produce a will that is good, not perhaps as a means to other purposes, but good in itself for which reason was absolutely necessary。This will need not, be- cause of this, be the sole and complete good, but it must still be the highest good and the condition of every other, even of all demands for happiness.

　　所以理性服务于first and unconditional purpose——建立一个good will；而不服务于second and conditional purpose，即happiness

　　于是我们来阐明good will是什么，但我们得先阐明duty是什么，duty包含了good will的概念。

　　11:谈的范围：不谈what conflict with duty，不谈与duty conform但并非出自duty而做的；只谈an action conforms with duty and the subject has, besides, an immediate inclination to duty.

　　例子：正常的人都怕死都要preserve life，所以一个正常人选择生合乎义务却并非出于义务（而是出于喜恶），没有道德含义；然而一个不幸的人厌憎生命，却一直坚强奋起反抗而不选择去死，wishes for death and yet preserves his life without loving it, not from inclination or fear but from duty, then his maxim has moral content.那么他的行为就是有道德含义的。【这个很有意思，再仔细想想；我总觉得kant是在扭着来，就好像一个Yale的人去当乡村教师，一个坏的人选择做好事，一个非肯塔基人选择变成肯塔基人的例子一样，他似乎是要求必须与本能相反？可是没有选择怎么办？比如一个人的生命就是没有遇到不幸，那么活着岂不是就注定不是道德的了？？】

　　比如Lesi举的那个trolley problem，用hume的passion和kant的inclination／duty，可以算作the inclination to honor, which, if it fortunately lights upon what is in fact in the common interest and in conformity with duty and hence honorable, deserves praise and encouragement but not esteem，仍然并非出自moral／reason

　　（…………kant是个抖m吧！他说一个冷漠的对他人痛苦无动于衷的人却帮助别人的痛苦，不是出自天性上的喜好而是出自义务，这就是有道德含义的，那我要是天性就不冷漠呢？？）

　　12:To assure one's own happiness is a duty (at least indirectly)； for, want of satisfaction with one's condition, under pressure from many anxieties and amid unsatisfied needs, could easily become a great temptation to transgression of duty;所以inclination会有可能胜过对幸福的追求／duty，比如一个胃癌患者可能会吃他觉得美味的东西而不考虑自己的健康（更长远的幸福），这时候假如duty（对自己的幸福的duty）阻止了他，让他停下，这就是moral的

　　圣经里的爱邻人爱敌人不是病理学上的爱，而是实践性的意志上的爱，出于duty的爱不是出于inclination，唯一可以被commanded的爱

　　13:an action from duty has its moral worth not in the purpose to be attained by it but in the maxim in accordance with which it is decided upon, and therefore does not depend upon the realiza- tion of the object of the action but merely upon the principle ofvolition in accordance with which the action is done without regard for any object of the faculty of desire.一个出于duty的行动的道德价值不在于结果，而在于意愿／意图／动机

　　第一条原则：应出于义务而非出于爱好；第二条原则：一个行动的道德价值不在结果，而在意图；第三条原则：duty is the necessity of an action from respect for lam.（也就是说一个行动要是activity of the will，而非inclination，才值得respect，an action from duty is to put aside entirely the influence of inclination and with it every object of the will）

　　14:Thus the moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect expected from it and so too does not lie in any principle of action that needs to borrow its motive from this expected effect. For, all these effects (agree- ableness of one's condition, indeed even promotion of others' happiness) could have been also brought about by other causes, so that there would have been no need, for this, of the will of a rational being, in which, however, the highest and unconditional good alone can be found【就是假如做一件事不是出自will, duty, law，那么做这件事不需要rational being; 相反，只有做一件事是出自will duty and law，才需要是rational being，所以这么说来结果不重要，因为不论是出自inclination还是will都可能达到同样的结果，但并非出自同样的动机，只有动机对道德是重要的，因为动机能展现到底是不是rational being以及rational being／will的价值】

　　ut what kind of law can that be, the representation of which must determine the will, even without regard for the effect expected from it, in order for the will to be called good absolutely and without limitation？

　　答：universal law./ ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law.

　　15:例子：问：我是否可以在困境中作出一个我不打算遵守的承诺？答：一般会考虑利益，比如这个承诺带来什么好处坏处，但只要这么想我就仍然不是出自道德或义务做的承诺；我必须这么想：假如我做出的行为被当作universal law，我会满意吗？如果每个人处于这个情况下都选择撒谎（选择我选择的），是否可以？他觉得人不会愿意，因为 for in accordance with such a law there would properly be no promises at all, since it would be futile to avow my will with regard to my future actions to others who would not believe this avowal or, if they rashly did so, would pay me back in like coin; and thus my maxim, as soon as it were made a universal law, would have to destroy itself.【后一个理由，说因为这变成universal law之后他们会回敬我，这有点迷——难道这不还是在根据利益行事吗？“因为如果我撒谎了，以后别人也会对我撒谎，所以对我不好，所以我不撒谎”，又有点像基于social contract的互相制约了——所以终极问题：道德的准则是把每个maxim放在universal law里，看看是否能接受，那“是否能接受的标准”又是什么呢？岂不是还是利益？其实还是没有解决问题啊；他说it is an estimation of a worth that far outweighs any worth of what is recommended by inclina- tion, and that the necessity of my action from pure respect for the practical law is what constitutes duty, to which every other motive must give way because it is the condition of a will good in itself, the worth of which surpasses all else. 也就是说是对一个超越一切inclination的good in itself的法则的敬重，但这好扯啊，这法则来源于哪里，这法则的标准是什么，这法则是什么？】

　　17:Yet we cannot consider without admiration how great an advantage the practical faculty of appraising has over the theoretical in common human understanding.【practical faculty和theoretical faculty是指什么？所以这个意思是说在道德判断上每个普通人都能做，就这要想想要不要其他人也这么做，而不用去管抽象的模糊的甚至自相矛盾的法则】

　　18:natural dialectic, that is, a propensity to rationalize against those strict law of duty and to cast doubt upon their validity, or at least upon their purity and strictness, and, where possible, to make them better suited to our wishes and inclinations, that is, to corrupt them at their basis and to destroy all their dignity - something that even common practical reason cannot, in the end, call good.人会有一种倾向，就是让law迎合自己的喜恶，这种情况下，它就变恶了。

　　《Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals》读后感(四)：道德形而上学Sec II前半部分

　　ection II：Transition from popular moral philosophy to metaphysics of morals

　　如果我们把duty当作a concept of experience ，那么因为无法区分人到底是出于duty还是出于自爱而做一件事，所以哲学家们以往都归于自爱，不承认人有duty的倾向，并谈及人本性的脆弱，这是不行的，我们也没有把duty当作一个 concept of experience。人们怀疑德行，也就是纯粹出自于duty的行为到底存不存在。

　　例子：一个人可能没有一个真诚的朋友，但他还是可能会要求朋友对他有真诚的友谊，因为这是一个义务，这个义务先于经验的存在而存在。

　　20:its law is so extensive in its import that it must hold not only for human beings but for all rational beings as such, not merely under contingent conditions and with exceptions but with absolute necessity, then it is clear that no experience could give occasion to infer even the possibil- ity of such apodictic laws就是说这个法则在偶然的必然的情况下都有效，因为太有效太强大了，所以绝不是经验能推出来的。

　　21:Even the Holy One of the Gospel must first be compared with our ideal of moral perfection before he is cognized as such; even he says of himself: why do you call me (whom you see) good？ none is good (the archetype of the good) but God only (whom you do not see)/ But whence have we the concept of God as the highest good？ Solely from the idea of moral perfec- tion that reason frames a priori and connects inseparably with the concept of a free will. Imitation has no place at all in matters of morality圣徒以及所有呈现出来的例子都先跟一个model比较，比如圣徒跟上帝，但是这些例子包括圣徒只是榜样，榜样只是鼓励，德性法则中是没有模仿的，上帝的善的观念来自于哪呢？必定来自于理性先天的理念、超越一切模仿与经验的理念【这里和柏拉图的forms／ideas of goodness很像，问的就是亚里士多德的问题：如果所有good的概念来自于form of good，那form of good又来自于哪呢？由此反驳了柏拉图。而kant则回答，form of good是某种理性先天的理念是某种pure reason，可是pure reason又来自于哪，可能他也不知道来自于哪但这个理念就是很值得尊重（有点扯，简直gnosis了）】

　　22:But such a completely isolated metaphysics of morals, mixed with no anthropology, theology, physics, or hyperphysics and still less with occult qualities (which could be called hypophysical), is not only an indispens- able substratum of all theoretical and surely determined cognition of duties独立纯粹的以形而上学基础的道德原则；只通过pure practical reason，不通过experience，让人不动摇很坚定，导致善而非恶

　　24:Everything in nature works in accordance with laws. Only a rational being has the capacity to act in accordance with the representation of laws, that is, in accordance with principles, or has a will【不明白？】

　　the will is a capacity to choose only that which reason independently of inclination cognizes as practically necessary, that is, as good.意志必须来自于理性，合乎理性，意志就是选择reason independently of inclination cognizes的东西的能力。但是如果这个意志不仅仅受到理性的影响，那么客观上必然的行动就变得contingent了，and the determination of such a will in conformity with objective laws is necessitation.

　　Imperative和Command：The representation of an objective principle, insofar as it is necessitat- ing for a will, is called a command (of reason), and the formula of the command is called an imperative.

　　Imperatives通过ought来表达，代表着客观上的必然，但并非主观上的必然（因为即便做某一件事是善的，意志仍可能因为主观上不舒适而不做）；pleasure是主观上的感觉，只对感官有用，不是通过理性原则适用于每一个人（not as a principle of reason, which holds for everyone.【但我觉得恰恰相反啊……因为每个人感官的相似性以及社会的construction，所以做同一件事的时候很大几率有同样的感受，也就是说pleasure恰恰是有可能适用于每一个人的；而reason则相反，因为文化的不同以及意志的薄弱，很可能就不适用，说是rational being但又有多少呢？】

　　一个perfect good will是不用被强迫的，因为它已经与客观法则完全一致了

　　25:all imperatives command either hypothetically or categoric. The former represent the practical necessity of a possible action as a means to achieving something else that one wills (or that it is at least possible for one to will). The categorical imperative would be that which represented an action as objectively necessary of itself, without reference to another end. Imperative又分为hypothetical和categorical，感觉kant想讨论的是第二种，就是那种good in itself，for itself，不为了其他任何目的，不把自己当成means而是当成ends的东西【和亚里士多德的eudaimonia很类似啊，就是good in itself不是为了achieve什么】

　　在hypothetical imperative里，有两种情况，一种是the subject does not always know that it is good那就被称为 problematically practical principle ；另一种是even if he knows this, his maxims could still be opposed to the objective principles of a practical reason被称为 assertorically practical principle.

　　而categorical imperatives，因为不是手段行动与意图不相关，所以自身相关必要，则被称作apodictically practical principle【迷茫，为什么又说declares the action to be of itself objectively necessary without reference to some purpose，好吧，知道它是good in itself，但是按之前kant说的难道不是做一件事的时候应该想这是出自义务而非其他的意图比如自爱吗？结果后来又提出来了universal principle说不论什么情境下做这件事都行才能做】

　　Rules of skills：All sciences have some practical part, consisting of problems [which sup- pose] that some end is possible for us and of imperatives as to how it can be attained. These can therefore be called, in general, imperatives of skill. Whether the end is rational and good is not at all the question here, but only what one must do in order to attain it— Technical(技术的）

　　Councils of Prudence：skill in the choice of means to one's own greatest well-being can be called prudence* in the narrowest sense—Practical （实用的）

　　Commands of morality:行动中本质性的善在于the will：Finally there is one imperative that, without being based upon and having as its conditionr any other purpose to be attained by certain con- duct, commands this conduct immediately. This imperative is categori- cal. It has to do not with the matter of the action and what is to result from it, but with the form and the principle from which the action itself follows; and the essentially good in the action' consists in the disposition, let the result be what it may. This imperative may be called the imperative of morality.—Moral（道德的）

　　Councils是在偶然的、主观愿意的情况下被遵守，而commands则是任何条情况下都要被遵守，是neccessity

　　28: for in the volition of an object as my effect, my causality as acting cause, that is, the use of means, is already thought, and the imperative extracts the concept of actions necessary to this end merely from the concept of a volition of this end (synthetic propositions no doubt belong to determining the means themselves to a purpose intended, but they do not have to do with the ground for actualizing" the act of will but for actualizing the object).

　　analytic proposition：if I fully will the effect I also will the action requisite to it——在幸福的问题中，Rules of skills和Councils of Prudence都是analytic的，换句话说，只要知道幸福是什么（即知道目的），这两个都愿意做出相应的行动。然而问题在于，“幸福是什么”本身是一个飘忽不定、难以回答的问题，人们只能根据经验性的建议来行动，这就是councils

　　for happiness is not an ideal of reason but of imagination, resting merely upon empirical grounds, which it is futile to expect should determine an action by which the totality of a series of results in fact infinite would be attained【这句话很有意思，幸福是与想象相关而非与理性相关的】

　　31: 唯一的categorical imperative： only a single categorical imperative and it is this: act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.

　　duties（义务）：1)duties to self vs. duties to others 2)perfect duties vs. imperfect duties（Perfect duties: not to murder; Imperfect duties: develop my talent&help my neighbor; there is no particular action/moment that I must develop 【就是有一定的自主空间，在时间上和种类上；那是不是在量上也有自主空间？比如我可以弹1小时钢琴也可以弹4小时钢琴】）

　　把自己的情况put into the universal law，来看有没有contradiction in conceiving the world(conception）（example 2)，或者contradiction of willing it（example 4）

　　1）一个痛苦的、想要自杀的人去自杀是否符合道德：a nature whose law it would be to destroy life itself by means of the same feeling whose destination^ is to impel toward the furtherance of life would contra- dict itself and would therefore not subsist as nature用破坏生命的方式来促进生命的情感，不符合常理，所以不行。【真的吗？那是不是应该这样问，所有十分痛苦的人、想要自杀的人是否可以去自杀，我觉得有可能是“是”；因为会根据情境的具体情况有不同的答案啊，要多聚体？】

　　2）一个无钱偿还的人是否应该在困境中作出有力偿还的虚假承诺：不应该。问：when I believe myself to be in need of money I shall borrow money and promise to repay it, even though I know that this will never happen. 变成普遍法则后，the universality of a law that every- one, when he believes himself to be in need, could promise whatever he pleases with the intention of not keeping it would make the promise and the end one might have in it itself impossible, since no one would believe what was promised him but would laugh at all such expressions as vain pretenses.【与之前同样的问题，这是否还是出于长期的功利主义以及自利？就是如果我瞎承诺其他人也瞎承诺不符合social contract然后以后我也会被欺骗？哦……有意思，他说的是difficulty in conceiving this world，因为当所有人都这么做了之后，即便你promise了也没有人相信你，所以你的promise will add nothing】

　　3）一个为了享乐本能而荒废自己的才能、游手好闲的人：不符合duty。as a rational being he necessarily wills that all the capacities in him be developed, since they serve him and are given to him for all sorts of possible purposes.【那不如反过来问：一个为了不浪费自己才能而荒废自己享乐本能的人是否符合duty？假设人人都不享乐而只工作？反正娱乐业是没有了……还有，怎么看degree的问题，比如我陪家人和我develop我在事业上的天赋的冲突？毕竟resource is limited。还有，后代，如果每个人都不要后代肯定不行，所以就每个人都得要后代吗？】不是关于desirability，而是关于conceivability，也许imperfectibility更相关

　　4）一个不伤害别人可是也对别人漠不关心的人：不符合义务。For, a will that decided this would conflict with itself, since many cases could occur in which one would need the love and sympathy^ of others and in which, by such a law of nature arisen from his own will, he would rob himself of all hope of the assistance he wishes for himself.因为他不关心别人，却想得到别人的关心，这是不可能的【与2）同样的问题】

　　34:we would find a contradiction in our own will, namely that a certain principle be objectively necessary as a universal law and yet subjectively not hold universally but allow exceptions.【其实就是每个人都想成free rider！既想要自己不付出又想要别人给自己付出，哪来这么好的事】

　　a resistance of inclination to the precept of reason (antagonismus), through which the universality of the principle (universalitas) is changed into mere generality (generalitas) and the practical rational principle is to meet the maxim halfway理性和inclination的对抗。

　　the sublimity and inner dignity of the com- mand in a duty is all the more manifest the fewer are the subjective causes in favor of it and the more there are against it吐槽：他真的是抖m吧？自然倾向／爱好越反对这个命令就说明这个命令越好？？

　　35:价值恰好在于free from all contingency---a worth raised above all price - consists just in the principle of action being free from all influences of contingent grounds, which only experience can furnish

　　迈入道德形而上学啦！去思考没有发生但应该发生的—— In a practical philosophy, where we have to do not with assuming" grounds for what happens but rather laws for what ought to happen even if it never does, that is, objective practical laws, we do not need to undertake an investigation into the grounds on account of which something pleases or displeases

　　36: material&formal，绝对和相对，随意预设的结果相关的都是相对的，因为它只取决于行为与欲望的关系。The subjective ground of desire is an incentive', the objective ground of volition is a motive; hence the distinction between subjective ends, which rest on incentives, and objective ends, which depend on motives, which hold for every rational being.Practical principles areformal if they abstract from all subjective ends, whereas they are material if they have put these, and consequently certain incentives, at their basis. The ends that a rational being proposes at his discretion as effects of his actions (material ends) are all only relative; for only their mere relation to a specially constituted^ faculty of desire on the part of the subject gives them their worth, which can therefore furnish no universal principles, no principles valid and necessary for all rational beings and also for every volition, that is, no practical laws. Hence all these relative ends are only the ground of hypothetical imperatives.

　　自身的存在本身就有价值，物自体？End in itself：But suppose there were something the existence of which in itself'has an absolute worth, something which as an end in itselfcould be a ground of determinate laws; then in it, and in it alone, would lie the ground of a possible categorical imperative, that is, of a practical law；beings the existence of which is in itself an end

　　38:回归到之前的四个例子：

　　1.自杀的男人要问自己：whether his action can be consistent with the idea of humanity as an end in itself人的存在是存在的目的本身，不是用以维持某种可以忍受的现状直到生命终结的手段【为啥？】因此，不能支配自己的humanity，不能把它杀死。I must here pass over a closer determination of this principle that would prevent any misinterpretation, e.g., as to having limbs amputated in order to preserve myself, or putting my life in danger in order to preserve my life, and so forth; that belongs to morals proper【这些例子怎么讨论？】

　　2.撒谎的人只是把他人当做手段来利用，而非end in itself把他人的人格存在当成了手段而非目的。

　　3.人格的促进是目的本身，不能只把人格的促进当做手段【为什么】

　　4.人抱有的自然目的就是自己的幸福，如果不帮别人，那每个人就只是消极、而非积极地与自己的目的融合，所以不行

　　39:意志是立法者，不是服从法律的人

　　40:自律他律原则：if one thought of him only as subject to a law (whatever it may be), this law had to carry with it some interest by way of attraction or constraint, since it did not as a law arise from his will; in order to conform with the law, his will had instead to be constrained by something else to act in a certain way/ By this quite necessary consequence, however, all the labor to find a supreme ground of duty was irretrievably lost. For, one never arrived at duty but instead at the necessity of an action from a certain interest. This might be one's own or another's interest. But then the imperative had to turn out always conditional and could not be fit for a moral command. I will therefore call this basic principle the principle of the autonomy of the will in contrast with every other, which I accordingly count as heteronomy.