《Moneyball》读后感摘抄

　　《Moneyball》是一本由Michael Lewis著作，W. W. Norton & Company出版的Paperback图书，本书定价：USD 15.95，页数：320，特精心从网络上整理的一些读者的读后感，希望对大家能有帮助。

　　《Moneyball》精选点评：

　　●Topic很有趣，但是有点乱。似乎是在讲棒球运动的新视角，或者说是统计与战略营销什么的，但是又花了好多篇幅写人物性格，尤其是Billy Beane。经常会觉得混淆：这到底是人物传记还是纪实文学？

　　●本书描写的奥克兰A队总经理比利·比恩（Billy Beane）不只是一个点子多多的精明棒球队老板。他还是逆向投资的表率，知道如何采取与众不同的做法取得成果，这当然也是精明投资者赚钱的方法 　這是一本將社會科學理論應用於實際棒球場上的一本書，就我個人觀點，他像是一本厚厚的論文，一本經由質化研究進而實證的一本書。

　　●堪称典范的英语文学作品，对场景的描述，对人物的刻画都极细腻，可读性极强并且非常值得回味。而内容而言，对于棒球迷启发，不意外当年引起如此大的反响。

　　●题材过于陌生，真的不是很听得懂，可能看完电影之后感受会有所不同吧

　　●Search for undervalued ball players the same way undervalued stocks are sought; statistics is the tool;it is fun to see the underdog win.

　　●Michael Lewis

　　●Michael Lewis never disappoints me.

　　●好故事。虽然我不懂棒球降低了它的趣味。每个无效都代表一个机会。但纠正无效可能是一个很艰辛的过程。

　　●虽然对棒球术语不怎么熟，还是读下来了，很有意思

　　●会想起在BART断断续续读这本书的实习的暑假，那本hardcover早不知道哪去了。Giants拿了那个赛季的冠军，有点感慨，到现在也再没回过湾区。

　　《Moneyball》读后感(一)：数据如何颠覆棒球

　　若要论什么运动赛事最多迷信、迷思，那无疑是棒球赛事，随便举个例子，从Curse of the Bambino, Curse of the Billy Goat 到 Curse of Rocky Colavito都是

　　这本书描述了当时，Oakland A’s 如何跳脱成规、成见，用数据来筛选出最有潜力的球员，并用这些洞见成功赢得数场比赛

　　一般来说，好的球员价码当然高，代表要组织一队明星队伍就只有像洋基这么有钱的队伍办得到，而穷队伍只能捡剩的。这样比赛也没啥好比，有钱队伍可以轻松获胜，穷队伍注定永远输下去。Oakland Athlete’s 是联盟第二穷，本书详述了到底是何种选才标准、评估数值设计，让这只穷队伍在2001年突破重围获得极好的成绩

　　读这本书的时刻其实正是时候，最近因自己也面临一些个人职涯方面的危机与质疑，所以读这些选手的故事和个人发展，刚好都能拿来借鉴到底该怎样调整心情面对接下来的磨练

　　其实，棒球是我一直以来都很喜欢的运动。在数好球坏球安打全垒打几出局数之外，投手与打击者的正面对决精彩万分。投手就像是作家一样，在各个球路间为球局写下基本定调，并要能熟练的隐藏动机，让人摸不透下一招是什么。打击者呢，首先，要面对笔直以130千里飞速飞来的球就够可怕的，能站直观察来球就得有足够的勇气。再来，打击的时候要如何选球，要如何挥棒，如何在2好状况下决定下一步，都是千回百转的心理战术

　　九局下来能目睹非常多顶尖运动员的精彩对决

　　最重要的是，无论比数如何，在棒球里，永远都有转机。每一次的打击，都是崭新的机会，每一次都有重头开始再来一次

　　《Moneyball》读后感(二)：为什么LGD这个没有大老板的俱乐部也能存活下来

　　这本书发现、提出、解答了一个问题：只拥有纽约洋基队三分之一预算的奥克兰运动家队，为什么能取得比洋基队更好的成绩？

　　抽象点来说：在棒球的自由市场中，什么战胜了金钱，什么没有？

　　具体到经济学上，要赢一场比赛，一支队伍需要支付的边际成本是多少刀？

　　最后的答案大家都知道了，结论也很简单：你比其他人算得更准，或者比他们付得更多。于是，棒球又变成了一个比较公平的游戏。

　　长得不好看的（丑陋就没气势、没观众眼缘），走路一瘸一拐的，投球姿势奇怪的，甚至女朋友丑的（这说明不够自信）球员，在传统球探眼中都不合格。他们最想要全能型选手。

　　而奥克兰只看一点：你能不能上垒？（get on base）（或者是击球）纯技术的。因此，奥克兰招的尽是些其他队眼中的「弱鸡」。以至于刘易斯在陪伴采访过程中，见到一个新招募的球员后，直接问比利：「这人有什么问题」（So, what’s wrong with him？）

　　因为《点球成金》也是我最爱的一部电影，看了许多遍，所以也大致说说原著和电影的不同。和《肖申克》一样，我觉得电影总体上超越了原著。

　　1. Bill James的开创性事业在电影中仅提了一次，书中是大书特书。其实也好理解，BJ所做的贡献就一点：为评判球员定下了一个量化数据的标准。而比利所做的就是实践这一理论。

　　2. 比利在大联盟失败的原因略过了。事实上，比利被选中就是传统球探模式的失败代表。比利深以此为恨，他也终将带着武器回来，摧毁这一传统。

　　3. 按照联盟规定，经理被禁止去球员休息室，然而片中比利最激烈的一场爆发就是在休息室对着Giambi弟弟——此人被解雇的过程也没有那么戏剧化；那一场爆发，实际上是在奥克兰回来后，比利对着教练们发的火。

　　4. 改动最大的当属比利和他女儿的关系。一个场景：电影里凯西给比利打电话，说，爸爸求求你，快回去看看比赛吧，11-0了，奥克兰要创造历史云云。然后比利急掉头。

　　书中是，比利在办公室看着比分一路领先，然后给女儿打电话：凯西，你在看比赛吗？

　　顿了一下。

　　什么？美国偶像？你在看美国偶像？

　　然后比利给女儿说了下比赛盛况，嘲笑了她几句，最后让她挂了。

　　多窘迫。

　　但电影最成功的地方，也是想单独拎出来说的，是「脸谱化的人物结构」。

　　1. 比利+保罗（强攻弱受？）

　　书中保罗来自哈佛（不知道为什么片中改成耶鲁了），聪明过人，也丝毫没有软弱的时候。在比利准备去波士顿红袜队时，保罗就准备接下奥克兰，并且开始和比利谈判球员合同了。

　　2. 比利+凯西（大叔萝莉）

　　发现这个配合真是绝佳。书里凯西一点也不可爱，很符合我心中美国少女的不体恤父母的形象。但片中简直是一个拥有内战前夕美利坚民族传统美德的少女，心地善良，关心父亲，为人着想。更别说那首动人涕下的you are such a loser。

　　3. 比利+教练（正反派）

　　书里，主教练非常驯服于比利的严苛管理。基本上没有与他作对过，换人也只是因为前面几个球员都不行了。而片中，他作为传统保守势力的代表，无能、外厉内荏，成功后还居功自傲，而比利则是一个幕后英雄，真正的桂冠诗人。不知教练看了此片是何等感受。

　　最后，扯点题外话，最近看《浪潮之巅》益发觉得大学老师之愚昧。谷歌作为世界上最重要的一家广告公司从来没有被他们在课堂上作为广告公司提出过。而谷歌之所以能战胜传统媒体的一大原因也是他的定位精准。

　　第二次工业革命的媒体，又叫大众传媒，从广告投放上来说，是一个非常低效的招牌。几百万看报纸的人需要完全不一样的东西，却都只能看sb恒源祥、脑白金等广告，被动地接受这些我们完全不需要、跟我们生活八竿子打不着边的东西。

　　而谷歌将每一个广告商分到每一个关键词上，而且以广告点击数，而非搜索页面浏览数计费。简洁，科学，高效，边际成本几乎为零。

　　和谷歌比起来，nyt, nyer简直就是玩具。

　　从这个角度讲，谷歌、比利、马云、亚马逊在做的都是同一件事，降低市场运行的不确定性，减少社会的交易成本，尽可能筛除运气/风险带来的波动，让这个世界变得更稳定，更理性（善意的），更好。

　　所以，不要老是纠结于你能否挣大钱，要问问，你对这个社会的贡献有多大，让他能为你付那么大一笔钱？

　　最后，采完电竞那稿时我就一直在返回此书，现在我也想写一本书了，关于中国电子竞技，就写为什么在王思聪这类富二代的强势整合下，在几乎所有电竞俱乐部都成为富二代玩具的局里，为什么LGD这个没有大老板的俱乐部也能存活下来。

　　《Moneyball》读后感(三)：转载：『MONEYBALL』读后感

　　Moneyball--the art of winning an unfair game.

　　作者：Michael Lewis

　　科學與傳統

　　這是一本將社會科學理論應用於實際棒球場上的一本書，就我個人觀點，他像是一本厚厚的論文，一本經由質化研究進而實證的一本書。但實際上，這本書對於MLB一百多年的歷史，的確造常相當大的衝擊。本書將進攻的觀點徹底顛覆，認為長打率與上壘率是攻擊中最重要的兩個因素，而上壘率經過研究，又比長打率重要三倍，因此結論是，球隊應該挑選上壘率高的球員作為首選，速度、守備、甚至打點能力，則應該擺在次要。同時認為，球員的選球能力，是天生心理素質與體能天份所相互建構而成，不容易經由後天改善太多(讓我聯想到陳金鋒)。因此，運動家隊GM，Billy Bean與其副總敵潑辣司，展開一連串的實證，在這段期間，我們親眼目睹了運動家小市場球隊的王朝，Evan他門總是在季後賽打不好。

　　而本書最另我感到震撼的是，圈內人認為將科學置入MLB，視為無稽之談，大多數經理人所相信的仍是經驗與傳統的進攻法則。而科學實驗硬是要將運氣成分抽離由人所主導的棒球賽，並做實證。對於傳懂棒球人的觀點，造成不少重創，進而大肆反彈與批判。說實話，本書某些觀點，也令我感到震撼，例如，盜壘與觸擊，就科學的觀點，是完全沒有用的東西，這真是大大顛覆的傳統的棒球哲學，並且撼動了我根深蒂固的棒球觀念。我在這裡想跟2004奧運總教練徐生明說，你看過MONEYBALL了ㄇ？台灣的教練們應該好好拜讀一下科學觀點。

　　金錢遊戲

　　運動家隊之所以會展開一連串的實證，其原因在於邪惡帝國在九零年代中期開啟金錢戰爭，各方起而效之的後果就是造成FA市場嚴重失衡，整個棒球缺乏效率，因而導致小市場球隊必須以不同的經營方式，來取得更多的勝利，並且斤斤計較將錢花在刀口上。而Billy Beane以他的方式，讓我們見證運動家隊的成功。所引起的是整個棒球界開始檢視傳統觀念與科學觀念，到底哪一個才會幫助球隊贏球？而同時也越來越多球隊，願意引進這種科學觀念，來改造球隊，並且讓球員市場更具有效率。藍鳥與紅襪就是其中的兩支球隊。說實話，我想2004年紅襪能打破BABE的魔咒，除了我所堅信BABE靈魂厭惡棒球變成金錢遊戲之外，我想另一位科學棒球實踐家，紅襪隊新的GM，愛撥斯坦(哈佛畢業，Beane是他效法對象)才是最重要的關鍵因素。但我還不確定我的想法是否正確，改天我會在去找101大樓Page One書店裡，找關於2004紅襪封王相關書籍來探討。

　　科學進攻與科學投手

　　科學，就是要將人的因素以及運氣的成分抽離。就進攻面，他們將棒球場上每一個區塊，用座標表示，並將每一球擊出去的力道、角度與落點加以分類，並考慮每一球形成安打的機率後，換算成實際得分值，進而套入每個選手實際比賽的歷史資料，去換算成每位選手他實際上所貢獻的得分值。利用這種科學數據，去挑選球員，是他們的中心思想。去尋找市場上被低估的打擊好手，或是被忽略的業餘好手，而本書以Scoot Hatteberg作為實例。在選擇投手上，他們將所有野手能干預的因素抽離，也就是安打與失分，並採用全壘打、三振與四壞作為統計基礎來做分析，不過相當可惜的，本書並沒有透露他是如何去做分析，令我有點失望。而本書所提到的另一重點是，滾飛比相當優秀的投手，以科學觀點來看，是具有價值的，因為就科學觀點，滾飛比率越佳，象徵被打全壘打越少，投球效率越高，本書所舉出的球員是，Chad Bradford。這對王建民來說可真是好消息呢！但我不希望王建民淪落到被運動家選走，因為代表他已經沒有市場價值。不過想想，這不太可能發生，因為他在紐約目前身價正被看好哩。

　　我的感想

　　我從小，就對棒球統計數據很有興趣，當我看這本書時，幾乎就要同意本書所有觀點。唯一的疑點是，科學研究真的能夠這　客觀的將人為與運氣成分抽離，亦或盜壘與戰術的重要性，到底能否幫助球隊贏球？但總體而論，Bean的科學棒球，在這幾年真的獲得相當大的成功，運動家二十一連勝，在2001年夏天的尾巴達成，我想這絕對是科學研究對於棒球最大的成就之一。另外，令人高興的是，MLB圈內人開始檢討這個封閉的體系，對於一個球員的評價標準也開始動搖，以往注重全壘打與球速的棒球圈，是否會轉變成重視選球與滾飛比的棒球呢？說實話，我很難預測未來MLB會變成啥樣。但我真正想表達的是，身為在台灣的MLB球迷，資訊接受真的有限，因為語言與地域畢竟是個隔閡，英文不夠好的球迷，幾乎不可能去體會到MLB棒球的精隨，而且說實話，ESPN或是公共電視轉撥棒球的球評與主播，所講的一些知識，有很多根本是common sence，沒有任何的深度，引經據典的例子也是少之又少，我想這不能怪他們，畢竟他們懂的已經比我們多了，但應該可以更好！此外，我認為台灣棒球要能夠成長，圈內人一定多吸收一些新知識，而不是整天關起們來打球，看到一些高中教練用甩耳光來教訓高中球員及一些狗屁方法來操球員，看了真另人心寒。眼見高中好投手出國後，一個個受傷，心想，這些圈內教練們，你們應該有所覺悟！棒球，除了經驗法則，更應該加入科學成分，如何讓球員接受科學化的訓練，是大家應該去思考的阿！

　　今天，是2005年MLB最後一天的賽程，若紅襪輸球，印地安人贏球，將在後天進行加賽，看誰能拿到季後賽的外卡資格。想一想真的太刺激了，棒球的魔力無窮阿，這種一場定生死的比賽，更是有種令人受不了的吸引力。比賽是在台灣時間凌晨兩點，可是我明天要上班ㄝ，怎辦，要看嗎？好掙扎，管他先PO出這一篇讀後感，希望愛棒球的人可以一起跟我討論這本書喔。哈哈哈(傻笑)

　　《Moneyball》读后感(四)：How to maximize "winning" under budget constraint

　　illy Beane, the main character in this book, was a overrate hot prospect, was a scout at the age of 31, but his career as general manger brings more far-reaching effect on baseball, or we could barely say, on the whole professional sports.

　　On the first day in the front office, Billy Beane delved the real meaning for his job: "in professional baseball it still matters less how much money you have than how well you spend it." The truly economical meaning, as he try to solve, is the measure of financial efficiency: how many dollars over the minimum $7 million does each team pay for each win over its forty-ninth？ How many marginal dollars does a team spend for each marginal win？

　　I do remember the first time I learn game theory in advance-microeconomic class. My dear professor set a matrix between two players: pitcher and hitter. He is a fan of Detroit Tigers who was born in Colorado, while I am a new adherent of Red Sox who come from China. It doesn't matter when we discuss baseball and how the game works. On my side, I love pitcher more than other roles on the field. Pitcher is the soul, the leader inside defense, the exactly same job as center back in soccer. On Beane's side, the most important quality in a pitcher was not his brute strength but his ability to deceive, and deception took many forms. That's why we need to find the merit of defense, rather than some risk-appreciaton performance.

　　What we care about is winning, do defense and find a way to cost opponent. Thus we need to find good hitter, the powerful but must be good hitter, since the physical gifts required to play pro ball were, in some ways, less extraordinary than the mental ones. We need to find the way to measure good player among those pseudo-good players, trying to avoid the type II error. Scouts, who thought their own experience was typical when it wasn’t. There was also a tendency to be overly influenced by a guy’s most recent performance: what he did last was not necessarily what he would do next. We need more scientific way to measure players, judge their performance and acquire them at the lower price. That is the foundation for us to maximize "winning" under budget constraint.

　　Here comes sabermetrics: everything from on-field strategies to player evaluation was better conducted by scientific investigation—hypotheses tested by analysis of historical statistical baseball data—than by reference to the collective wisdom of old baseball men.

　　Why would the people in charge allow professional baseball to be distorted so obviously？ The answer was equally obvious: they believed they could judge a player’s performance simply by watching it. Ironically when Clint Eastwood played an old scout in "Trouble with the Curve", he tried to tell us how important an experienced scout is in baseball, but the pale ending part shows us how statistics could do better than just "scout" by eye, or by feeling. They don't care about statistics, what those scouts care is how the talent looks, how he played under their sight, and his family gene. We know they use some indicators, but we know better on numbers, since those digits don't lie.

　　ill James is the pioneer in sabermetrics. When he published his 1977 Baseball Abstract, two changes were about to occur that would make his questions not only more answerable but also more valuable. First came radical advances in computer technology: this dramatically reduced the cost of compiling and analyzing vast amounts of baseball data. Then came the boom in baseball players’ salaries: this dramatically raised the benefits of having such knowledge.

　　Old fashion way doesn't work. People cares about performance, but fans don't care about how to recruit players, what they care is winning, keep winning and never stop. For winning, a hitter should be measured by his success in that which he is trying to do, and that which he is trying to do is create runs. Good pitchers were pitchers who got outs; how they did it was beside the point.

　　illy Beane find the key for his A's 19 consecutive winning : two, both offensive statistics, inextricably linked to baseball success: on-base percentage and slugging percentage. Everything else was far less important. In his model an extra point of on-base percentage was worth three times an extra point of slugging percentage. We know other managers will copy his formula, but the point is not that Billy Beane is infallible. The point is that he has seized upon a system of thought to make what is an inherently uncertain judgment, the future performance of a baseball player, a little less uncertain. He’s not a fortune-teller. He’s a card counter in a casino.

　　The point is not to have the highest on-base percentage, but to win games as cheaply as possible. Economically, we "win".

　　《Moneyball》读后感(五)：summary by chapter

　　reface

　　he wrote this book because he was amazed how A's performed so well with so little money

　　Chapter 1 the curse of talent

　　Introduce the traditional methods in choosing player and tell Bill Beane's less-than-successful career as a player.

　　Chapter 2 how to find a ballplayer

　　20 years later, Beane became the GM of A's. He had Paul as his assistant, who was a Harvard graduate. They tried the new method and disagree with the scouts.

　　Chapter 3 the enlightenment

　　This chapter begins with Beane’s career with the Mets. He has just been signed along with another high school phenom, Darryl Strawberry, and Roger Jongewaard thinks that Beane is more ready for pro ball than Strawberry. The Mets send Strawberry to their rookie league but advance Beane to play with their college players. They think that Beane is better equipped to deal with the pressures and frustrations of the majors. Unfortunately, Lewis explains, Beane “didn’t know how to think of himself if he couldn’t think of himself as a success.”

　　eane returns home after the season and enrolls at the University of California at San Diego, though he would not graduate. By the following year, he would be playing alongside Strawberry, who would go on to be named the most valuable player in the Texas League. During this time, Beane lives with Lenny Dykstra, who did not have Beane’s tools, but was mentally built for baseball because “he was able to instantly forget any failure and draw strength from everyone success.” It was from Lenny, Beane would later explain, that he began to learn what a baseball player was. Over the following years, Beane would continue grinding his way up through the minor leagues, propelled by his private fears and other peoples’ dreams. The difference between who he was, and who other people thought he should be, grew day by day.

　　On the field, Billy was able to make spectacular plays, but he continued to struggle at bat. Mentally, Beane would unravel if he struck out.

　　In 1985, Lenny joined Strawberry in the Big Leagues. In 1986, Beane was traded to the Minnesota Twins, where he starts in left field. Though he gets five hits in his first game, he goes hitless the following two nights and is taken out of the starting lineup. For the next three years, Beane would play “up and down between Triple-A and the big leagues, with the Twins, the Detroit Tigers, and, finally, the Oakland A’s.” Before long, the consensus is that Beane was failing because of mental reasons, not physical ones. Harvey Dorfman, who wrote The Mental Game of Baseball, would become Beane’s “baseball shrink.” Though Dorfman suggests that baseball will “yield itself” to Beane’s character, Beane argues that “sports psychologists are a crutch.” Ultimately, in Beane’s view, his character did not match with baseball mentality and he hangs up his spikes.

　　However, he does not leave baseball. By 1990, Beane was married and his high school girlfriend was seven months pregnant. Lewis explains that Beane had “blossomed into the physical specimen the scouts had dreamed he would become. And yet, somehow, the game had shrunk him.” Instead of going to spring training, Beane walks into the front office and asks to be an advance scout, a job that entailed traveling ahead of the big league team and analyzing future opponents. Beane’s request comes as a surprise since none of the front office staff had played big league baseball and all wished they had. Oddly, Beane chose to retire when he was supposed to be entering his prime. Lewis notes that he “had reason to feel some distaste for baseball’s mystical nature. He would soon be handed a weapon to destroy it.”

　　andy Alderson was the general manager of the A’s at this time. Though he did not have a background in baseball, he soon “concluded that everything from on-field strategies to player evaluation was better conducted by scientific investigation.” In 1991, when the A’s were owned by Walter A. Haas, Oakland had the highest payroll in baseball. However, when Haas died, his successors were not prepared to treat a baseball team like a form of philanthropy, as Haas did. Alderson had to start thinking about the most efficient way to use his funds, and he decided to spend money on hitting. Drawing on his background in the marines, Alderson organized his farm teams as “boot camps.” His players were told to adopt three maxims when they were at bat: act like a leadoff man and try to get on base; every batter should possess the power to hit home runs; and hitting was less a “physical skill than a mental skill.” Lewis concludes that “by 1995, Alderson had created a new baseball corporate culture around a single baseball statistic: on-base percentage.” Alderson even had Eric Walker write a pamphlet summarizing these principles. However, the on-base percentage culture was dominant only in their minor league teams. The big league team was controlled by manager Tony La Russa, who Alderson characterizes as a "middle manager." However, when La Russa leaves the team for a job in St. Louis, Alderson hires Art Howe to implement his ideas.

　　hortly after Beane joins the front office, he and his wife divorce. Despite this, he quickly impresses Alderson. He is able to shed his prejudices about how to play the game and adopts Alderson’s system. When asked where he learned to value on-base percentage, Alderson credits Bill James's approach to baseball as an inspiration. Lewis concludes that these new theories "led to a green field as far away from professional baseball as you could get and still be inside the park."

　　Chapter 4 field of ignorance

　　Lewis tells the story of Bill James and his methodology of baseball statistics.

　　Chapter 5 the jeremy brown blue plate special

　　The fifth chapter, “The Jeremy Brown Blue Plate Special,” returns to Billy Beane’s story in his role as the general manager of the Athletics. The 2002 draft is about to begin and Beane has a list of 20 players that he covets. His top priority is Nick Swisher, a hitter. Though Beane has never seen him play, he has heard a great deal. More importantly, he has seen the statistics on Paul DePodesta’s computer. Beane does not sleep for two nights before the draft because he is so excited. However, on the day of the draft, Beane is worried that he will not be able to sign his top picks.

　　The major league general managers all know each other and before the draft begins, they call each other in the hopes of finding out who others are drafting. Beane has seven first round picks, but he does not get to pick first. When Beane learns that the Mets may end up drafting Swisher—not because they think he is the most talented player but because their top choices will be taken by others—Beane is furious. Although years have passed since he would break bats after striking out, Beane’s fury is still enough to silence a room full of athletes. But Swisher remains on the board as the Brewers and the Rays, who both pick ahead of Beane, end up drafting high school pitchers. This pleases Beane to no end since high school pitchers are a notoriously unreliable investment.

　　Though Beane’s objective criteria for drafting players gives him an advantage over other players, he still has far less money than they do to sign players. Teams are not allowed to meet and negotiate with players, but Lewis points out that every team does it. The Athletics negotiate with players ahead of the draft with special enthusiasm. One scout, Rich Sparks, tells Steve Stanley, a center fielder from Notre Dame expecting to be drafted, that the A’s intend to draft him in the second round. They will offer only $200,000, but they intend for him to play in the majors. Meanwhile, Billy Owens, another scout, has begun to work a similar strategy on Jeremy Brown, a catcher. They will offer him only $350,000, and they will require him to lose weight. Beane knows when they draft him, agents will call and tell him that they can get him more money, and this obviously will not work to the Athletics’ advantage. However, if Brown stays true to their verbal agreement (which he does), it would be a great deal for Beane.

　　Although Beane is trying to be objective, Lewis notes that many of Beane’s goals seem personal. His obsession with Nick Swisher, for example, recalls Lenny Dykstra because “Swisher is the same character as the one that had revealed Billy’s shortcomings to himself—made it clear to him that he was never going to be the success everyone said he was born to be.” His decision to draft Brant Colamarino seems to have as much to do with his unorthodox body type as it does his on-base percentage. Lewis suggests that Beane

　　had gone looking for, and found, his antithesis. Young men who failed the first test of looking good in a uniform. Young men who couldn’t play anything but baseball. Young men who had gone to college.

　　It makes Beane “a human arsenal built, inadvertently, by professional baseball to attack its customs and rituals.”

　　Ultimately, the draft goes better than Beane could have hoped for. He drafts Swisher and then his top pitchers. In total, he manages to draft 13 of his 20 desired picks: four pitchers and nine hitters. “Don’t think this is normal,” Beane tells DePodesta

　　Chapter 6 the science of winning an unfair game

　　In the sixth chapter, “The Science of Winning An Unfair Game,” Lewis explains how Beane uses market inefficiencies to compete with richer teams. The problem is that the Athletics have $40 million to spend on twenty-five players and the Yankees have $126 million. Beane argues that it would be wrong to try to do what the Yankees are doing because latter has three times the money to spend. So while the Yankees can afford to buy major league stars that are in their prime, the A’s cannot. Beane is forced to find young players and veterans that are undervalued by the market.

　　In 1999, Major League Baseball studied whether the poorer teams were hurting the competitiveness of the league. The Commissioner’s "Blue Ribbon Panel on Baseball Economics" concluded, as Lewis puts it, that poor teams didn’t stand a chance, that their hopelessness was bad for baseball, and that a way must be found to minimize the distinction between rich and poor teams.

　　One member of the panel, columnist George Will, pointed out that the ratio of the payrolls of the seven richest and seven poorest teams in baseball was 4:1. The ratio in professional basketball was 1.75:1. The ratio in professional football was 1.5:1. Paul Volcker, the economist, raises two questions against these findings. First, why do the rich keep paying higher prices to buy teams？ Second, why do the Oakland Athletics win so many games？ When Beane speaks to the panel, he argues that the Athletics’ success is likely to wane because of the inequalities in the league. Further, their inability to afford stars will keep fans away. However, Beane is merely trying to sway the panel to give him a further advantage. Beane knows that as long as a team is winning, fans will come. And, thanks to the scientific method that he and Paul DePodesta were applying to baseball players in order to find market inefficiencies, the A's would continue to win.

　　In 2002, the A’s end up losing their three biggest stars: Jason Isringhausen, Johnny Damon, and Jason Giambi. Most teams at this point would begin a “rebuilding” process, but Beane intends to continue winning. In some ways, he feels, losing these players is not as bad as it seems. Isringhausen is a closing pitcher, and a closing pitcher’s value is determined by his “saves.” However, Beane and DePodesta have studied this statistic and found that the closer rarely “saves” the game. Consequently, Beane makes a habit of buying pitchers with a fast arm and inflating their number of saves. Then he sells the overvalued pitcher and uses whatever assets he gains to invest in the team. Johnny Damon leaves a hole in both defense (center field) and offense (leadoff hitter). The question posed by Damon’s departure is: what is the “relative importance of on-base and slugging percentage？” Ultimately, Damon’s likely replacement, Terrence Long, will not field as well as Damon, but he is a good hitter. DePodesta calculates that Damon’s departure will cost the team about 15 runs, or one run every fifteen games: not cataclysmic.

　　Jason Giambi, unfortunately, will be harder to replace. Giambi may have been a weak first-baseman, but he was a “machine for creating runs.” As DePodesta explains:

　　the variance between the best and worst fielders on the outcome of a game is a lot smaller than the variance between the best hitters and the worst hitters.

　　Chapter 7 giambi's hole

　　In the seventh chapter, “Giambi’s Hole,” Michael Lewis recalls one of the times he visited the Oakland Athletics clubhouse. He explains that the clubhouse is “famously the cheapest and least charming real estate in professional baseball and the video room was the meanest corner of it.” From this video room, Lewis will watch the Athletics play the New York Yankees, who have recently signed Jason Giambi, Oakland’s best hitter in the previous season.

　　To fill the void left behind by Giambi, Beane and DePodesta have decided to “recreate the aggregate.” Though they cannot afford to replace Giambi, they can replace his on-base percentage. It will not be easy, since Giambi’s on-base percentage is second only to Barry Bonds’. Beane looks at the players he has lost and tries to bring in new players that will, collectively, provide that on-base percentage. Beane decides to sign David Justice, Scott Hatteberg, and Jeremy Giambi (Jason’s little brother). Each of these players is undervalued because the Major League executives view them as “defective.” Justice, for example, is old. Hatteberg used to be a catcher, but can no longer throw. Giambi’s on-base percentage is good, but his defense is alarmingly weak. Nevertheless, DePodesta believes that these players will get on base enough to make up for their weaknesses and for Giambi's departure.

　　Lewis explains that many players are surprised by the way that Beane runs the Athletics. Unlike other general managers, Beane is not distant. Some players complain that Beane will not let them steal bases or that he wants them to take walks whenever possible. But many attribute the Athletics’ success to their innovative general manager. Beane is unusual, and he doesn't hesitate to chase players down to lecture them on their performance. Even the manager, Art Howe, is told what to do, including telling him to stand rather than sit in the dugout so that he will look more inspiring to his players. Beane is not allowed in the dugout, and he never watches games because his anger will make him too “subjective.” Instead, Beane works out in the weight room or drives around Oakland listening to tapes on European history.

　　The game against New York starts out badly for the Athletics. Lewis finds himself rooting for the A’s, whom he likens to David fighting Goliath. Though he gets angry when the Yankees take the lead, he notices that DePodesta watches the game in a different way. Paul explains that Lewis is watching the game like a fan because he is focusing on "outcomes." Paul is more concerned with "processes." However, when the umpire calls a strike that should have been a ball, Paul erupts in frustration. He quickly reminds himself that the Athletics are trying to win 95 games, which means that they have to lose 67 times. Unfortunately, the Yankees end up winning this game.

　　Chapter 8 scotte hatteberg, pickin' machine

　　The eighth chapter, “Scott Hatteberg, Pickin’ Machine,” explains how Scott Hatteberg, a catcher, came to thrive playing first base for the Athletics. Hatteberg had played catcher for the Boston Red Sox. However, when he lost his throwing ability due to a ruptured nerve in his throwing arm, the Red Sox dropped him. The Colorado Rockies signed him briefly, but ultimately gave him up to free agency. The minute (literally) after his contract with the Rockies expired, Paul DePodesta calls his agent to offer him a chance to play with the Oakland Athletics. It is only after Scott signs with the A’s that he learns that Beane intends for him to play first base. Beane promises not to suggest that he will be replacing Jason Giambi. Hatteberg is intimidated, but he asks his wife to hit ground balls to him.

　　At first, Hatteberg struggles at first base. Ron "Wash" Washington, the infield coach, has been sent some tough assignments while working for Billy Beane, a general manager that does not value fielding. However, Hatteberg is an especially weak first baseman. His footwork is awful and he does not react to the ball. Nevertheless, Wash begins to work on his new first baseman, praising him to boost his confidence and calling him a “pickin’ machine.” Surprisingly, Hatteberg’s athleticism and growing confidence allow him to improve to the point that people start commenting that he is an above-average first baseman. Hatteberg soon discovers the advantages of playing first and one of them is that he gets to chat with players. He even suggests that there is an etiquette to striking up a conversation with the opposing team, but after a conversation starts, he will not hesitate to ask which of the A’s pitchers is toughest to hit.

　　Lewis suggests that Hatteberg’s ability is tied to his personality. This is especially true of the way that Hatteberg approaches hitting. Hatteberg studies pitchers very closely and he keeps track of the pitches that they throw him. The Red Sox criticized him for doing this, but in Oakland, he is praised for his careful approach. Hatteberg almost never swings at the first pitch, and he always studies pitchers until he has figured out the best pitch they will give him. Every hitter in the Majors has a hole in the strike zone that he cannot hit, and usually DePodesta can find it with little effort. However, Paul cannot find Hatteberg’s hole. In this way, Lewis points out, Hatteberg is the opposite of Beane. While Beane devotes so much effort that he thought himself out of the Majors, Hatteberg is competitive because of his careful thought.

　　Chapter 9 the trading desk

　　The ninth chapter, “The Trading Desk,” begins with the Oakland Athletics playing the first of three games against the Cleveland Indians. Art Howe, who manages the A’s, has put Mike Magnante (Mags) on the mound to end the game. Art has done this because Mags is a left-handed pitcher. Art has also done this in spite of Beane’s specific instructions to pitch Chad Bradford, whom he has described to Art as the “closer before the ninth inning.” Mags gives up five runs. Meanwhile, the Indians’ left-handed reliever, Ricardo Rincon, earns a save.

　　It is late July, and the trade deadline is approaching. There is a whiteboard wall in Beane’s office, and on it are the names of the several hundred players that the A’s control. On a second whiteboard are 1,200 players from other major league teams that Beane would like to acquire. As the trade deadline approaches, the value of players will fluctuate throughout the league. Lewis explains that Beane’s task is to

　　ersuade other teams to buy his guys for more than they were worth, and sell their guys for less than they were worth. He’d done this so effectively the past few years that he was finding other teams less eager to do business with him.

　　The Indians are still willing to take his calls, which is fortunate since Ricardo Rincon is one of the pitchers Beane would like to acquire.

　　The Indians are having a losing season and are looking to sell off the pieces of their team. However, the San Francisco Giants have also expressed an interest in Rincon, and they are willing to offer more than Beane can afford. To improve his position, Beane offers the Giants a player he has just sent down to the minor leagues, Mike Venafro, to reduce their need for a left-handed reliever. Beane will no longer have to pay Venafro, which will allow him to raise roughly half of what he needs in order to pay Rincon’s salary. However, he also offers Venafro to the Mets, thinking that he might be able to get more money out of them.

　　eane approaches trades with certain rules in mind:

　　1. The first rule is: “No matter how successful you are, change is always good.” Lewis points out that the Athletics’ roster already looks very different than it did at the start of the season. Jeremy Giambi, who was a good leadoff hitter, has been traded because he does not take the game seriously enough for Beane, a subjective judgment.

　　2. The second rule is: “The day you say you have to do something, you’re screwed.” This rule is useful for Beane, particularly because he knows how to take advantage of other teams once they decide that they “have to do something.”

　　3. Beane’s third rule is: “Know exactly what every player in baseball is worth to you. You can put a dollar figure on it.”

　　4. The fourth rule is: “Know exactly who you want and go after him.” Beane does not want Cliff Floyd, but he tells the manager of the Expos that he does. Beane does this because he knows that the Red Sox want Floyd. Beane wants Kevin Youkilis, who is playing in the minors for the Red Sox organization. Beane expresses interest in Floyd in order to insert himself into the deal.

　　5. The final rule is: “Every deal you do will be publicly scrutinized by subjective opinion....Ignore the newspapers.” Lewis points out that Beane is not very good at following the fifth rule, but that does not stop him from making trades in accordance with the other rules.

　　In fact, Beane is constantly searching for trades, or “trawling.” He calls other general managers and often discovers that they are willing to part with unexpected players. “Dangling Carlos Pena as chum,” Beane discovers that the Detroit Tigers are willing to part with Jeff Weaver, a young, expensive pitcher. Beane cannot afford Weaver, but he knows that the Yankees want him. Beane wants Ted Lilly, a young, undervalued pitcher playing for the Yankees. Even better, he manages to get the Tigers to pay him $600,000, and the Yankees toss in a couple of their “hottest prospects.” He sets another “hook” with Cory Lidle, and he ends up acquiring Ray Durham, an All-Star second baseman, from the White Sox. He gets the White Sox to give up the cash to pay Durham’s salary in exchange for Jon Adkins, a Triple-A pitcher with a 95-mile-per-hour fastball. Beane calls it an “A trade.”

　　eane ends up acquiring Rincon, just hours before the Athletics play the second game of the series against the Indians. Rincon cannot quite figure out what has happened to him, and Beane actually finds the new Athletics pitcher walking out of the Coliseum while the general manager is on his way to the gym to work out. He guides Rincon back to the A’s locker room. Beane asks Art Howe to tell Magnante that he has been let go.

　　Chapter 10 anatomy of an undervalued pitcher

　　When the tenth chapter, “Anatomy of an Undervalued Pitcher,” begins, the Oakland A’s are on a phenomenal winning streak, largely thanks to the addition of Ricardo Rincon and Ray Durham. They are now at the top of the very competitive American League West. On September 4, 2002, the A’s are playing to beat the American League record for consecutive wins. They just have to beat the Kansas City Royals. At the top of the seventh inning, the A’s are winning 11—5, but just as suddenly, Tim Hudson gets into trouble. Howe looks at his bullpen and remembers Beane’s command to turn to Chad Bradford.

　　Lewis notes that many major league pitchers are eccentric. Turk Wendell, for example, brushes his teeth between innings. Bradford approaches the mound calmly. However, no one would look at Bradford’s delivery and call it “normal.” Lewis explains that Bradford:

　　jackknifes at the waist, like a jitterbug dancer lurching for his partner. His throwing hand swoops out towards the plate and down toward the earth. Less than an inch off the ground, way out where the dirt meets the infield grass, he rolls the ball off his fingertips. When subjected to slow-motion replay, as this motion often is, it looks less like pitching than feeding pigeons or shooting craps.

　　He is not a sidearm pitcher, though he is sometimes called one. He is actually a “submariner,” which Lewis suggests is a word that attempts to make throwing underhand “sound manly.” It is Bradford’s unusual delivery that allows him to eventually play for the A’s.

　　From a young age, Bradford dreamed of being a pitcher, but few ever expected his dream to become a reality. His father, who suffered a stroke when Bradford was still a young man, would defy doctor's predictions that he would never walk again and go on to play catch with his son. When Bradford's father threw, he threw underhanded. In high school, Bradford’s coach suggested that he move his delivery from 12 o’clock to 2 o’clock, which improved Bradford’s speed. He made it to the minor leagues, playing for a White Sox farm team. However, the team never took him seriously, and Bradford eventually found himself pitching in a Calgary ballpark where the thin mountain air was perfect for hitters. Amazingly, Bradford was successful. Though he was called up to the majors to play, the White Sox soon sent him back down to Triple-A, where he would remain, hoping that some other team would notice his impressive statistics and call him up to the majors again.

　　Voros McCracken, a Chicago lawyer and fantasy baseball fanatic, begins to study the impact pitchers have on the game. He discovers that pitchers cannot influence whether a ball falls for a hit once it is in play. This allows him to produce a metric that reveals a pitcher’s worth, and he soon realizes that Chad Bradford is one of the best pitchers in the minor leagues. He writes an essay, which he posts to the website baseballprospectus.com. Bill James takes notice of the article, but it is only when Paul DePodesta notices the piece that Bradford’s dream of playing in the majors becomes a reality.

　　y now, Beane has to be careful when he expresses interest in a player. He calls the White Sox and suggests that he is looking for “a guy who could be twelfth or thirteenth pitcher on the staff.” They can get back to him. When the White Sox mention Bradford’s name, Beane simply replies, “He’ll do.”

　　Chapter 11 the human element

　　The eleventh chapter, “The Human Element,” finds the A’s streaking for their twentieth consecutive win. The Kansas City Royals are a weak team and would usually draw a small crowd, but tonight is a media sensation. Though Beane would rather go for a drive, he is talked into a media junket before the game. The A’s take an 11—0 lead early. Art Howe calls Chad Bradshaw in to close the game. However, Bradshaw is in the middle of a psychological slump. For the first time, he is the only one that doubts his talent, as opposed to the only one that believes in it. And he cannot get over it. Howe takes him out of the game before the inning is over, but by then the Royals have scored five runs.

　　Lewis finds himself watching the game on television with Billy Beane in Art Howe’s office. With his team ahead eleven runs, Beane allows himself to watch the game. Lewis explains that Beane, baseball's scientist, normally views watching the game as act that will make him subjective. All he needs are the cold, hard statistics. He watches his third baseman, Eric Chavez, bat and points out that his numbers suggest he will go on to play as well as Barry Bonds, Jason Giambi, and Alex Rodriquez. As the Athletics continue to give up their 11—0 lead, Beane begins to lose his objective stance. No longer the objective, serene scientist, Beane moves from irritation to anger to rage. Eventually, he leaves the office to pace around the clubhouse. As the Royals continue to score, Lewis begins to hear Beane throwing things around the clubhouse in his frustration. The game is tied at 11.

　　On the field, Howe calls upon Scott Hatteberg to pinch hit. Hatteberg is not expecting to play. He has had too much coffee and is carrying a bat he has never used before. Nevertheless, he enters the batter’s box determined not to swing at the first pitch. He is looking for a high pitch that he can hit for a double. Instead of a double, he hits it out of the park. He looks to the dugout as he rounds the bases and “by the time he touches home plate, he’s less man than boy.” The Athletics have just won twenty consecutive games, breaking the American League record. Within five minutes, Beane returns to Art Howe's office and was able to look him "in the eye and say that it was just another win."

　　Chapter 12 the speed of the idea

　　The twelfth chapter, “The Speed of the Idea,” finds the Oakland Athletics in the first round of the playoffs against the Minnesota Twins. Although Beane has defied all expectations and led his low-payroll team into the playoffs, no one is prepared to acknowledge his accomplishments. Instead, the media criticizes his approach, arguing that the playoffs are different. In the playoffs, teams need to be aggressive. They need to “manufacture” runs rather than just avoid outs. In other words, they need to steal bases and make sacrifice bunts. Beane does his best to convince his coaches of the theory behind the A’s stats-based strategy.

　　However, the A’s end up losing to the Twins in five games. Beane tells Lewis that his theory "doesn’t work in the playoffs.” Paul goes on to explain that the sample size of a playoff series is too small for accurate measurement, but that actually the A’s produced on average more runs during the playoff series than they did during an average regular season game. Really, they lost because their pitcher played poorly, which could not have been foreseen. The playoffs are a “crapshoot,” and a cold, hard judgment of Beane's philosophy. Still, there are other teams that have begun to take note of Beane’s approach. The Toronto Blue Jays’ new owner refuses to just spend money on a team and goes searching for a new general manager. Every GM that he interviews says that he will compete with the Yankees if he is given a similar payroll. Beane and DePodesta both refuse the owner's offer, but the A's third-in-command, J.P. Ricciardi, accepts Toronto's offer.

　　When the new owner of the Boston Red Sox, John Henry, begins to “overhaul his franchise in the image of the Oakland A’s,” he hires Bill James as a consultant. He also offers Billy Beane $12.5 million to come in as general manager, which would make him the highest paid general manager ever. Beane agrees and begins thinking of all the moves that he can make. However, Beane finds that he cannot sign the contract and he turns the job down. He explains to the press that “I made one decision based on money in my life—when I signed with the Mets rather than go to Stanford—and I promised I’d never do it again.” Nevertheless, Henry’s offer validates Beane’s strategy, and it puts a dollar price on his ability as general manager. In other words, it shows that “for a brief moment, he was right and the world was wrong.”

　　Epilogue the badger

　　tory of Jeremy