《韦伯作品集Ⅶ ：社会学的基本概念》读后感1000字

　　《韦伯作品集Ⅶ ：社会学的基本概念》是一本由（德）马克斯・韦伯著作，广西师范大学出版社出版的平装图书，本书定价：10.00，页数：93，特精心从网络上整理的一些读者的读后感，希望对大家能有帮助。

　　《韦伯作品集Ⅶ ：社会学的基本概念》精选点评：

　　●今天读完，了解了韦伯社会学必须首先搞清楚的几个问题。

　　●“比较通俗化的需求与尽可能让概念精确化的需求当然不会完全一致，所以有些情况下只好牺牲掉前者。”

　　●笔记1.35万字（对，我就要保留两位小数）

　　●比较着迷于韦伯对“组织”的解释。但是，这不就是韦伯《经济与社会》第一卷第一章的内容么……不过比起阎克文译本这个译本有丰富的注释。说起来这个《韦伯作品集》里有几本是《经济与社会》的选译……还是先看完两大卷近2000页的《经济与社会》再来看台译本吧。（阎克文主编的《马克思·韦伯全集》什么时候出版啊，没翻译完先出几卷译好的也行啊！“以飨读者”是多么人性化的词！）

　　●阅读韦伯无法绕开的前提

　　●印象不深了，除了正当性和支配的概念。

　　●真能读懂基本概念其实很难

　　●社会学是一门科学

　　●乱读一气……以后要重读的……社会学！

　　●关于支配类型，几处翻译问题非常关键。但是几个正当性类型在韦伯这里内在的并列关系，掩盖了寻找法治国动力的机会。理性概念的扩充与此齐头并进，也进一步导致其社会学分类研究无法满足他自己设定的“理解”要求。

　　《韦伯作品集Ⅶ ：社会学的基本概念》读后感(一)：这个译本不如上海人民的好

　　这个本子翻译实在是很难读，怎么也读不下去。刚看到上海人民2000年出版的胡景北的译本，感觉比他真是晓畅明白太多了，那种犀利的穿透性，真是畅快淋漓。一下子就明白了韦伯的思路，他为什么要提理想型，而理想型的提出的绝大意义，是读任何二手文献都没法感受到的。这就是读经典原著的意义。

　　而经典原著的翻译实在是太重要了，如果没有好的译本，还不如学好英文看原著或英文译本。

　　《韦伯作品集Ⅶ ：社会学的基本概念》读后感(二)：从社会行动到社会实体

　　十六权力和支配 权力（authority/domination）是指行动者在一个社会关系中，可以排除抗拒，以贯彻其意志的机会，无论这种机会的基础是什么。（机会不代表一定会实现其意志） 支配：一项特定内容的命令会得到特定人群服从的机会 纪律：经由反复练习的态度，使一群特定的人对于命令有着即刻执行、自动与依循固定模式服从的机会。 支配组织：组织成员从属于既定秩序的支配关系之下 十七政治组织和神权组织P12 政治性组织：在特定地域范围内，宣称其管理干部和气规则的支配效力；还有暴力作为政治性组织特有的最后手段。 到国家：为实行秩序而使用暴力的正当性独占的权利；；；而且不能以组织行动的目的来定义政治性组织，而是从手段角度：即支配考虑：暴力的使用，不可或缺的本质 （从手段-效力角度考虑国家，而不是考虑国家的目的，将其拟人化；而面对全球国家体系理论，国家拟人化，目的化考量被纳入）

　　《韦伯作品集Ⅶ ：社会学的基本概念》读后感(三)：社会行动与社会关系——韦伯的理解社会学

　　这本《社会学的基本概念》是韦伯《经济与社会》著作当中的第一章，最初版本为1913年《关于理解社会学的一些范畴》，本文是《范畴》的简化版本。

　　这本书是韦伯的概念手册，在书里，韦伯界定了三个最为主要的观念，分别是，社会学、社会行动和社会关系。

社会学是一门科学，其意图在于对社会行动进行诠释性的理解，并从而对社会行动的过程及结果予以因果性的解释。（3页）所谓行动意指行动个体对其行为赋予主观的意义——不论外显或者内隐，不作为或者容忍默认。“社会的”行动则指行动者的主观意义涉及到他人的行为，并且志向其过程的这种行动。（3页）

　　社会行为有四种，分别是目的理性行为、价值理性行为、情感行为和传统行为。

所谓社会关系，乃是由多数行动者互相考虑对方，因此指向彼此联系的行为。是故，社会关系基本上完全建立在人们可以就一种（有意义的）特定方式从事社会行动的机会上。

　　社会关系非常复杂，基于不同的社会行动，可以形成不同的社会秩序。规律性的行动产生风俗和习俗，规范性的行动形成正当的秩序，保障秩序的手段包括常规和法律，而抵抗行为则形成了斗争。

　　在正当的秩序一节，韦伯所提出的正当性基础的命题至为关键。

　　按照不同的分类标准，社会关系可以分为共同体关系、结合体关系；开放社会关系、封闭社会关系。封闭社会关系中有特定个人执行规则的、并有执法权的，叫做组织。组织可以是自律、他律，或者自治他治的。组织可以是由自由协议产生的，也可以是由强制与服从产生的，对封闭社会关系成员内部的强制权力，被叫做宪法；而对于非成员，组织往往主张地域管辖。组织还可以分为行政组织和规约性组织，规约性组织的最理想代表是法治国。韦伯界定了经营行为、经营组织、社团和机构。

　　最后，韦伯区分了权力、支配和纪律。支配可以形成支配组织，政治性组织如国家，神权组织如教会。

　　以上总结仅仅根据正文部分，小字部分并未有涉及。正文部分更加接近韦伯所说的理想类型，小字部分则是对于种种例外状况和模糊边缘进行讨论。

　　在这个小本子当中，已经出现了韦伯学说中自始至终非常重要的概念，比方说社会行动的四种类型，正当秩序的基础，理性的概念，意义问题，社团、组织、国家等等。

　　简略版思维导图一张：

　　《韦伯作品集Ⅶ ：社会学的基本概念》读后感(四)：韦伯：《社会学的基本概念》读书笔记

　　

【社会学的定义】社会学（这个词具有多重含义，下面仅以我们所理解的方式予以定义），是一门科学，其意图在于对社会行动进行诠释性的理解，并从而对社会行动的过程及结果予以因果性的解释。所谓“行动”意指行动个体对其行为赋予主观的意义——不论外显或内隐，不作为或容忍默认。“社会的”行动则指行动者的主观意义关涉到他人的行为，而且指向其过程的这种行动。【3】***（Sociology, in the meaning understood here of a word often used in quite different senses, shall mean: a science that in construing and understanding social action seeks causal explanation of the course and effects of such action. By “action” is meant human behaviour linked to a subjective meaning on the part of the actor or actors concerned; such action may be either overt, or occur inwardly— whether by positive action, or by refraining from action, or by tolerating a situation. Such behaviour is “social” action where the meaning intended by the actor or actors is related to the behaviour of others, and the action is so oriented. pp.78-78.）***[Sociology (in the sense in which this-highly ambiguous word is used here) is a science concerning itself with the interpretive understanding of social action and thereby with a causal explanation of its course and consequences. We shall speak of "action" insofar as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to his behavior-be it overt or covert, omission or acquiescence. Action is "social" insofar as its subjective meaning takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course. pp.4]

I. 方法论的基础

1. [“意义”在这里可以有两种含义：（a）事实存在的意义，是指某个行动者在历史既定情况下的主观意义，或诸多事例中行动者平均或相类似的意义，（b）纯粹类型的意义，是指以概念建构的方式被当作一种或多种行动者的类型来想像其可能的主观意义。]不牵涉客观正确的或形而上学式的“真正”的意义。【4】***[“Meaning” is here either: a) the actual meaning that is: α) subjectively intended by one actor in a historically given instance, or β) subjectively intended by several actors in approximating the average of a given number of cases; alternatively, it is. b) in a conceptually constructed pure type, the meaning subjectively intended by actor or actors conceived as a type.pp.79.]***（"Meaning" may be of two kinds. The term may refer first to the actual existing meaning in the given concrete case of a particular actor, or to the average or approximate meaning attributable to a given plurality of actors; or secondly to the theoretically conceived pure type of subjective meaning attributed to the hypothetical actor or actors in a given type of action.pp.4.）

2. 韦伯指出，有意义的行动（meaningful action）和不具主观意义赋予的反射性行为（reactive behaviour）之间界限模糊，如纯粹的习惯性行为介于二者之间。【4-5】“再体验的可能性”对理解的准确性是重要的，但不是意义诠释的绝对条件。【5】***[The capacity of fully and inwardly “reliving” something (Nacherlebbarkeit) is important to clarity (Evidenz) of understanding, but is not an absolute condition for the construal of meaning. pp.80.]***（"Recapturing an experience" is important for accurate understanding, hut not an absolute precondition for its interpretation; pp.5.）

3. 对意义的诠释追求“确证”（self-evidently true）。韦伯区分了两种特质：（a）理性的（逻辑的或数学式的）；（b）拟情式的再体验（情绪的或艺术欣赏式的）。【5】他进一步解释道，理性的确证主要是适用于其主观意义关联能够以知性清楚理解的行动，最极致的表现即与数学公式或逻辑命题相联系的意义关联；拟情的确认适用于可以完全再体验当事者所经历的情感关联的行动。【5-6】Keith Tribe分别翻译为intellectually和emotional context，（pp.80.）Guenther Roth与Claus Wittich亦使用了intellectual和emotional context.（pp.5.）终极“目标”和“价值”问题。[人们行动所倾向的一些终极“目标”和“价值”，我们可能常常无法确证式地去理解。在一定条件下，我们虽然对这些目标价值可以知性的掌握，然而当它与我们自己所相信的价值偏离得越远，我们就越无法拟情式的体验去理解。依个别的情况我们必须满足于：对这些价值只作知性的诠释；或当这种尝试也失败时，我们只能把它当作既成事实来接受，而在此基础上，尽可能地去知性地诠释或达到拟情体验最近似的程度，以便对受这些动机驱使的行动过程多少能有所理解。”【6】***[we are very often not capable of understanding the selfevidence of many of the ultimate “purposes” and “values” to which, in our experience, human action can be oriented. While we might possibly be able to understand them intellectually, the more radical the divergence of such ultimate values from our own, the greater also our difficulty in understanding them by empathetically reliving them in imagination. We must, then, as circumstance dictates, be satisfied with construing them intellectually; or, failing that, simply accept them as givens, making the best of such intellectual or empathetic appreciation as can be mustered in understanding the course that action motivated by them takes.pp.80-81.] ***[many ultimate ends or values toward which experience shows that human action may he oriented, often cannot be understood completely, though sometimes we are able to grasp them intellectually. The more radically they differ from our own ultimate values, however, the more difficult it is for us to understand them empathically. Depending upon the circumstances of the particular case we must be content either with a purely intellectual understanding of such values or when even that fails, sometimes we must simply accept them as given data. 11ten we can try to understand the action motivated by them on the basis of whatever opportunities for approximate emotional and intellectual interpretation seem to be available at different points in its course.pp.5-6.]在韦伯看来，对一种以类型建构为目的的科学分析而言，所有非理性的、由情感决定的行动要素，都可以视作与目的理性行动的概念式纯此类型的“偏离”部分加以研究与描述。……也只有出自……这种方法论上的考虑，“理解社会学”的方法才称得上是“理性主义”的。【7】（For a scientific approach that constructs types, all irrational, affectively conditioned, meaningful contexts for behaviour that influence action are best studied and represented as “diversionary elements” with respect to a constructed, purely purposively rational course for such action.pp.81.……To this extent, and only for the purposes of methodic convenience here, is the method of a sociology of Verstehen “rationalistic.” pp.82.）***（For the purposes of a typological scientific analysis it is convenient to treat all irrational, affectuaIIy determined elements of behavior as factors of deviation from a conceptually pure type of rational action.……Only in this respect and for these reasons of methodological convenience is the method of sociology "rationalistic."pp.6.）

4. 韦伯指出，[所有关于人类行动的科学，也必须计及缺乏主观意义的过程及对象，如：行动的起因、结果和促发或阻碍行动的现象。“缺乏意义”并不等同于“不生动”或“非人类的”。……意义可能得自许多相关的目的，若没有论及意义的话，这样一个客体就全然无法理解。所谓的理解，因此是关系到行动者对行动或作为手段或作为目的的选择，而且也常牵涉到行动的指向，只有在这样的范畴中，才谈得上对这种对象的理解。从而，缺乏意义的过程和情境（无论生动或不生动、人类的或非人类的）是指那些无法关联到主观意义内涵的动作。换言之，如果这些动作不能与手段或目的建立关联，而只表现为行动的刺激、促发或阻碍，那么它们就缺乏意义。……对实际行动者及理解式的观察而言，这些是必须接受“资料”来参考的。]【7-8】***（All sciences of action treat events and objects devoid of meaning in terms of the manner in which they stimulate or result from, or foster or inhibit, human action. “Devoid of meaning” is not the same as “lifeless” or “nonhuman.” Every artefact— for instance, a machine— can only be construed and understood by reference to the meaning that human action of possibly quite diverse kinds has given, or has sought to give, to its production and use; in the absence of such reference, the artefact remains entirely beyond understanding. What is therefore here “understood” is the relation of the artefact to human action, as a “means” or as an “end” envisaged by actor or actors, and to which their action is oriented. Understanding of such objects can only be effected through these categories. By contrast, without an intended meaning all events or circumstances— animate or inanimate, human or nonhuman—remain senseless so long as they cannot be related to the “means” and “ends” of action, but merely stimulate, foster, or inhibit such action.pp.82）Guenther Roth与Claus Wittich也把顾译本中“不生动”的翻译为lifeless（无生命的,pp.7.）胡景北译本令人困惑地翻译为“不可体验”。【胡译本，5】

5. 韦伯区分了两种理解方式：（1）对既有的行动的主观意义作直接观察的理解；（2）解释性理解，根据“动机”获得可理解的及更概括的“意义脉络”（理性的动机理解）【9-10】[只要行动在一个可理解其动机的意义关联中，我们的理解可以视作是对实际行为过程的一个解释。因此，对一个涉及行动意义的学科而言，“解释”意味着能够掌握到根据行动者自己的主观意义，他的行动所系属其中的意义关联。]【10-11】Guenther Roth与Claus Wittich译本中分别翻译为direct observational understanding和explanatory understanding（pp.8.）根据注释7，这一翻译是根据上下文，判别的主要标准是从不涉及任何更广泛背景的直接观察中推导出行为之意义或者符号表达方式的可能性，故而翻译为“观察的”。【pp.58；中译文参见阎克文，152页】Keith Tribe对此表示异议，把二者分别翻译为direct and immediate understanding和explanatory understanding. 理由在于[Aktuell denotes something that is “live,” “ here and now,” con temporary, and I have therefore rendered it as “direct and immediate” (since the use of “con temporary” or “immediate” on their own might be ambiguous).]这一处翻译受到帕森斯的影响。（pp.83.）胡景北译本则翻译为“即时理解”和“解释性理解”，与此相近。【胡译本，7-8】至于“意义关联”，Guenther Roth与Claus Wittich翻译为context of meaning（pp.8.；阎克文据此翻译为意义背景，97页）Keith Tribe翻译为contextual meaning（pp.84）胡景北译本翻译为“意向联系”。【胡译本，8】

6. “理解”意味着对下列意义的诠释性掌握：（a）what in an individual instance was really intended (viewed historically), or (b) what was really intended as an approximation or average (as a massed sociological appraisal), or (c) what is for the pure type (ideal type) of a frequently recurring phenomenon the sense or context that must be scientifically (“ideal typically”) constructed. pp.85. 这与第1点相对应。但即便诠释获致清楚确证，仍不能基于确证性即宣称它在因果上是有效的诠释，而始终只是因果性假设。【11-12】韦伯给出的理由有：真正驱动力的“动机”（motive）和“压抑”（repressed factors）的隐藏；相同或相似行动背后可能出自很多动机的组合；不可能完全掌握冲突动机的相对强度，【12】我们时常只能靠“思想实验”的不确定方法，即持续思考着动机联系的元素以及建构出行动的可能步骤，以达成因果归属的判断。【13】（Unfortunately, we are often compelled to employ the uncertain means of “thought experiments,” isolating and building upon individual components of a motivational chain and then constructing the probable path that will ensue, so that we might then arrive at a causal imputation.pp.86.）以Gresham’s Law和迈尔的假设为例。

7. 顾忠华译本翻译为：“动机”是主观意义的复合体，意指行动者本身——或是从观察者来说——对于行为所提供的有妥当意义的“理由”。所谓行为过程的关联乃是“主观上妥当的”或“意义上妥当的”，意指在关系中的各要素，根据我们感情和思考的习常模式，可被认为构成了“典型的”——通常我们称其为“正确的”——意义关联。相对的，事情前后序列的诠释，如果我们根据经验的规则发现它始终以同样的方式进行，便是“因果上妥当的”。【14】***Guenther Roth与Claus Wittich译本中翻译为[a complex of subjective meaning which seems to the actor himself or to the observer an adequate ground for the conduct in question. The interpretation of a coherent course of-conduct is "subjectively adequate" (or "adequate on the level of meaning"), insofar as, according to our habitual modes of thought and feeling, its component parts taken in their mutual relation are recognized to constitute a "typical" complex of meaning. It is more common to say "correct.” The interpretation of a sequence of events will on the other hand be called causally adequate insofar as, according to established generalizations from experience, there is a probability that it will always actually occur in the same way. pp.11. ]***Keith Tribe的新译本是这样翻译的：[A “motive” is the meaningful context that appears, to the actor himself or to an observer, to be the relevant and appropriate “basis” for a form of behaviour. We consider behaviour that is contextualised in this way to be “meaningfully adequate” according to our usual ways of thinking and feeling, to the degree that we consider that the relationship among its elements form a typically meaningful context—or, as we usually say, the “proper” context. “Causal adequacy,” by contrast, refers to a sequence of events where it is known from experience that there is the chance that the sequence will always recur in exactly the same manner. pp.87. ]胡景北译本翻译为:“动机”表示一种意向联系。在行为者自己或者观察者眼中，它是行为的带有意向性质的“原因”。“合意向”表示，根据我们的一般思维和感觉习惯，一种互相联系地展开的行为达到了这样的程度，即这一行为的各个部分的关系，可以视为典型的（我们习惯上说“正确的”意向联系。相反，“因果律”则表示，一些事件的前后发生顺序，达到了这样的程度，即根据经验规则，这一顺序有可能在事实上总是按照同样的方式出现。【胡，12】顾译本，因果上妥当的诠释是根据经验检视过的发生几率，并参酌我们认定的规范来判断某个问题“正确”或“不正确”的解决方式，它意味着根据任何可被计算的、在理想情况下可被量化的几率规则，一个被观察的特定过程会依序跟随（或伴随）另一个特定过程发生。【14-5】进一步，“一个具体行动的正确因果诠释意味着：行动的外在过程及动机可以被如实地把握，并同时达到对其一切关联的有意义的理解。而对一个典型的行动（可理解的行动类型所作的因果性诠释，意指其被宣称是典型的过程，既可以在意义上妥当地展示出来，又可以因果妥当地（不论何种程度）确认。……缺乏意义的妥当性……仍然是个不可理解的统计几率而已。”且韦伯指出，仍须证明有意义的过程会以可给定的频率或近似的方式发生（机会），这才得以做出正确的因果性陈述。【15】在社会行动的可理解的主观意义相吻合的统计规律上方可建构出可理解的行动类型（社会学规则），进行理性建构。Keith Tribe翻译为：A true causal construal of a given action means that its external execution and its motive are properly recognised, and at the same time are rendered meaningfully understandable in its context. A true causal construal of typical action (an understandable type of action) requires that the circumstances typically claimed for such action to some degree appear meaningfully adequate, and also that these circumstances can to some extent also be treated as causally adequate. Without such meaningful adequacy (Sinnadäquanz), then even where there is the greatest, precisely quantifiable probabilistic regularity in its occurrence (both external and psychic), we are left only with an unintelligible (or only partially intelligible) statistical probability. On the other hand, even the most evident meaningful adequacy has significance for sociological knowledge only to the extent that a correct causal statement can be given—as proof of the existence of a (specifiable) Chance that action does tend to follow an apparently meaningful course with specifiable frequency, or something close to it ( either on average, or in a “pure” case). Only those statistical regularities that correspond to the understandable intended meaning of social action are in the sense used here understandable types of action, that is, “sociological rules.”pp.88.

8. 因无法理解而没有指称为“社会学的事实”的过程或规律并非不重要，“理解社会学”并非主张这类过程或规律只可被移到前述反射性行为。【16】

9. 行动从主观可理解的方向来看，只存在于一个或更多个体的行为，生物学实体（如细胞）的行为并不包括在内。【16-7】***（Action, in the sense of the meaningful and comprehensible orientation of one’s own behaviour, is for us always the behaviour of one or more individual persons.pp.89.）集体概念也不可被忽略（ignore），“但从社会学对于行动主体理解性的诠释来说，这些集体构造必须被视为只不过是特殊行动的组织模式和结果，因为这些个人是主观可理解性行动唯一的承载者。”【17】***（for sociological construal and understanding of action these entities remain merely processes and specific contexts for the action of individual people, since for us these are the sole understandable agents of meaningfully oriented action. pp.89-90.）三个重要关联：（1）获得可理解的专门术语；【17】（2）集体实在的概念……“其意义在个人的心灵里，半是某些实际存在的事，半是某些‘应然’的想象。……行动者在导引其行动倾向时，诸如此类的想象具有强大的、通常是决定性的、对于真实个人行动的因果性影响。尤其是当这些想象涉及（应然的）规范命令或禁制时更特别明显。”如现代国家，“作为个人间社会互动的复合体，它的存在乃基于不同的个人行动是朝向相信政府存在或应该存在，如此任何具法律倾向的秩序方能有其效力。”【18】[collective constructs drawn from everyday thought, from the law or other discipline, are ideas in the heads of real people (not only judges and officials but also the wider “public”), ideas in part about what exists, in part about what should exist, and ideas to which they orient their action. As such, these ideas have a quite power ful, often even dominating, causal significance for the manner in which the action of real persons occurs. This is especially true of ideas about what should, or should not, exist.pp.90.]（3）“有机的”社会学派方法意图以“整体”出发理解社会互动，对个人行动和行为的诠释类似于身体的器官；【18】韦伯的理解社会学强调对参与其中的个人能够“理解”其行动的主观意义，认为主观意义的理解是社会学知识的根本特质。【20】韦伯重申“个人主义式”的方法并非包括任何意义下的个人主义的价值判断，同样“我们应避免下面相关的错误，即把社会学概念中不可避免的会含有某种理性特质，与信仰理性动机的主导、甚至给予‘理性主义’正面评价此两者混淆了。”社会主义的经济在社会学理解中一样要以“个人主义”方式（个人的行动诠释性理解）进行。“实际的社会学经验研究以下列这个问题开始：是什么东西决定且导致个人和在此‘共同体’中的参与者，能以这种合群的方式出现且持续这样存在？任何功能分析的概念形式（企图从整体出发），只能作为像这类研究的先期准备而已。”【23】***[We should discount the monumental misapprehension that an “individualistic” method involves an individualistic evaluation of any kind, just as we preclude the view that the inevitably rational character of concept formation involves a belief in the primacy of rational motives, or even a positive evaluation of “rationalism.” Even a socialist economy would have to be construed and understood “individualistically,” that is, on the basis of the action of individuals, the types of “functionaries” who arise in it, just as exchange transactions would be understood by marginal utility theory (or a yet to be found “better” alternative that in this respect has a similar method). For even there, the most significant empirical socio logical work always begins with the question: Which motives determined, and do determine, the individual functionaries and members of this “community” to behave in such a way that this community was first created, and continues to exist？ All functional concept formation that starts at the level of the “ whole” is only a preliminary for such an investigation, a preparation whose utility and indispensability—if done properly—no one can dispute.pp.95.]

10. [“法则”……事实上是由观察在既定状况下、某种社会行动被预期可能发生的典型机会后所得出的通则，同时这种社会行动又得以通过行动者典型的动机与典型的主观意义而获得理解。若那些被观察的典型行动过程乃是基于纯粹目的理性式的动机，或是（观察者）所建构的类型在方法上能达到启发的效果，因此在行动的目的-手段联系上根据经验有着明确的关系——尤其当手段的选择清楚到“无可避免”时——此类法则便能够获致高度的可理解性与明确性。在这种情况下，我们可以相当肯定地说：如果人们严格地依目的理性来行动，那么便必须只能如此而没有其他可能的选择。因为当事人既然有着确切的目的，则从“技术”的理由来看，他只有一种而没有其他的手段可供运用了。]这也表明把“心理学”当作理解社会学的终极“基础”的企图是错误的。【24】***[It is usual to call some principles of the sociology of Verstehen “laws”— Gresham’s “Law,” for example. Such principles are formed from observation and represent the typical chances that, given the existence of particular circumstances, we might expect a certain pattern of social action that can in turn be understood in terms of the typical motives and typical intentions of the actor. ……if action were strictly purposively rational, then action would have to take this course and no other.pp.95.]

11. 韦伯把社会学看作“建立类型概念，并追求经验事实的普遍规律的一门学科”；“历史学则致力于对那些个别的、具有文化显著性的行动、结构和人格进行因果分析与解释。”【25】***[Sociology constructs concepts of types and seeks general rules for events— this much has been repeatedly assumed in the foregoing. This contrasts with history, which seeks the causal analysis and imputation of individuated, culturally significant action, constructs, and personalities.pp.96. ]他进一步指出，“社会学概念的抽象特质和具体的历史现实相比较下，必然是相对地缺乏实质内容，并以此作为其成立的条件。而其长处则是得以提供更为明确的概念工具，这种明确性的提高，有赖于社会学的概念建构尽可能地追求最适程度的意义妥当性。”涉及理性的（价值理性和目的理性）概念和规则时特别有希望取得成功，但也寻求将非理性现象加以掌握。【26】***[As with any generalising science, its abstractions are necessarily relatively empty of content as compared with the concrete reality of the historical. On the other hand, it does offer enhanced conceptual precision (Eindeutigkeit). This enhancement in precision is achieved through the optimisation of meaningful adequacy for which sociological concept formation strives. pp.96-7.]社会学和现实保持着距离，并以下列形式获取对现实的认识：理念型。【26】***[ In all cases, rational or irrational, sociology distances itself from reality and serves knowledge of it in the following way: by registering the degree of convergence of a historical phenomenon to one or more of these concepts, and so placing this phenomenon as part of reality.……If these words are to mean anything unambiguous, sociology has for its part to form “pure” (“ideal”) types of such constructs, each of which displays the consistent uniformity associated with the maximisation of meaningful adequacy, but which because of this degree of conceptual consistency will prob ably never assume this absolutely ideal pure form in reality, just as little as a physical reaction is calculated assuming absolutely empty space. Sociological casuistry is only possible in terms of pure (“ideal”) types.pp.97.]理念型并非“平均”类型。【27】提及可以通过现实过程与理念型的距离获得关于行动者真实动机的知识，【27】理念型具有型塑专门概念、进行分类和启发上的功能。【28】理念型也可适用于主观内在的过程。【28】

II. 社会行动的概念

1. 韦伯对“社会行动”的定义为：“社会行动（包括不作为和容忍的性恶我）可以指向他人过去的、现在的或未来预期的行为……所谓‘他人’，可以是个人是熟人是不确定的多数人或完全陌生的其他人。”【29】[Social action (including refraining from an action, or tolerating a situation) can be oriented to the past, present, or future anticipated action of others (revenge for earlier assaults, resistance to present assault, defence measures……These “ others” can be individual and familiar, or in definitely numerous and quite unfamiliar.pp.99.] ***Guenther Roth与Claus Wittich把其他人一句翻译为：[The "others" may be individual persons, and may be known to the actor as such, or may constitute an indefinite plurality and may be entirely unknown as individuals. pp.22.]胡景北译本翻译为“可能是单个人和熟人，也可能是不定的很多人和完全陌生的人。”【胡，28】注意这里对熟人和陌生人的区分。

2. 韦伯指出，“社会”行动指向他人的行动。【29】

3. 韦伯指出，具有社会性特征的人与人之间的相互接触只限于行动者有意义地将自己行动指向他人的情况。【29-30】it is social only when one’s own behaviour is sensibly oriented to that of others.pp.99. 胡景北译本翻译为，只有自己的行为在意向上以别人的举动为取向时，这一行为才具有社会的性质。【胡译本，29】

4. 韦伯指出，社会行动并不等同于：（a）许多人同样一致的行动；或（b）受到他人影响的每个行动。【30】***[Social action is identical with neither: (a) similar action on the part of many, nor (b) all action influenced by the behaviour of others.pp.100.]后一种，提及勒庞的“群众心理学”，认为个体与群众情境缺乏“有意义”的联系，以及对他人行动的“模仿”纯粹基于反射作用而缺乏有意义指向他人行动的进一步结果。【30】

二、社会行动的类型

韦伯区分了四种社会行动的类型：

（1）目的理性式，是通过对周围环境和他人客体行为的期待所决定的行动，这种期待被当作达到行动者本人所追求的和经过理性计算的目的的“条件”或“手段”。【31-2】[by purposive rationality: through expectations of the behaviour of external objects and other people, and employing these expectations as a “condition” or “means” for one’s own rational ends, as sought after and considered objectives. pp.101.] Guenther Roth与Claus Wittich把目的理性翻译为instrumentally rational, pp.24.【工具理性，阎克文，114】胡景北译本同样翻译为目的理性。【胡译本，第32页】顾忠华在译注重指出，“目的理性”含摄了两层关系，一是目的设定的合宜程度，一是目的和手段间的联系，“工具理性”的翻译仅侧重于手段选择，这种用法可能来自法兰克福学派的影响。【32】

（2）价值理性式，是通过有意识地坚信某些特定行为的——伦理的、审美的、宗教的或其他任何形式——自身价值，无关于能否成功，纯由其信仰所决定的行动；【32】[value rationality: through conscious belief in the unconditional and intrinsic value — whether this is understood as ethical, aesthetic, religious, or however construed — of a specific form of particular comportment purely for itself, unrelated to its outcome;pp.101] Guenther Roth与Claus Wittich翻译为Value-rational（pp.25）胡译本也翻译为价值理性。【胡，32】

（3）情感式，尤其是情绪式，是通过当下的情感和感觉状态所决定的行动；【32】[affect, especially emotion: through actual emotions and feelings. pp.101.] Guenther Roth与Claus Wittich翻译为affectual (especially emotional) (pp.25)也就是情绪的（尤其是情感的），阎克文第114页。胡景北译本翻译为“感情因素，尤其是情绪因素”。【胡译本，第32页】

（4）传统式，是通过根深蒂固的习惯所决定的行动。【32】[tradition: through ingrained habituation.pp.101] 这一类型的翻译比较一致。

1. 严格的传统式行动即反射性行为，完全处于“有意义地”行动指向的边缘地带。日常行动都接近此类型，且“由于和习惯的联系在不同程度与意义下可以被有意识地加以维持，此时这种类型便接近于第二种类型。”【33】[The greater part of everyday action approaches this type, which not only represents a marginal case for any systematic taxonomy but also because adherence to the familiar can be sustained with various degrees of self-consciousness (more about this later) and in different senses; in this case, the type approaches (2) above.pp.102.]

2. 严格的情感式行动也常处于“有意识地”行为的边缘或其范围之外，但当受情感制约的行动乃是有意识地使情绪状况得以纾解，便成为一种“升华”，通常但不一定朝着“价值理性化”、朝着目的性行动或两者兼有的方向移动。【33】**[It is sublimated when affectually determined action involves the conscious release of feeling, in which case it usually, but not always, finds itself on its way to “value rationalisation,” or to purposive action.pp.102.]这里Keith Tribe并未翻译两者兼有的情况。Guenther Roth与Claus Wittich译本中为[It is a case of sublimation when affectually determined action occurs in the form of conscious release of emotional tension. When this happens it is usually well on the road to rationalization in one or the other or both of the above senses. pp.25.]胡景北译本翻译为“但如果感情决定的行为变成有意识的情感发泄，这一行为便升级了：在绝大多数（并非全部）情况下，它正处于向‘价值理性’或者目的理性行为，或者同时向这两者转化的过程中。”【胡，33】

3. 韦伯比较了情感式倾向和价值理性式倾向。二者的共同特点在于，行动的意义并非看得见的成功，而纯粹以作出这些特定形式的行动为其依归。差别在于，情感式行动是为了满足情感的需要作出反应的行动，价值理性式行动是通过对行动的终极立场有意识揭橥和始终一贯地按部就班朝向其信奉的价值，这是一种始终依循着“诫命”或“要求”的导引，并以此为己任的行动。【33】***[Affectual and value rational orientation of action differ in their conscious elaboration of the ultimate details of action and consistent planful orientation with respect to these details.……Whoever acts in a purely value rational manner acts without regard to the

foreseeable consequences of action in the ser vice of convictions, following the apparent bidding of duty, honour, beauty, religious pronouncement, piety, or the importance of a “cause” of whatever kind. Value rational action is in our sense always action made at the “bidding” of “demands” that the actor believes to be imposed on him or herself. We will talk here of value rationality only to the extent that human action is oriented to such demands— something that occurs in greatly varying degrees, and mostly only in a very small number of cases. As we shall see, this form is important enough to be distinguished as a special type, although there is no intention here of establishing an exhaustive typology of action.pp.102.] ***Guenther Roth与Claus Wittich译本的翻译是：[The orientation of value·rational action is distinguished from the affectual type by its clearly selfconscious formulation of the ultimate values governing the action and the consistently planned orientation of its detailed course to these values.……Examples of pure value-rational orientation would be the actions of persons who, regardless of possible cost to themselves, act to put into practice their convictions, of what seems to them to be required by duty, honor, the pursuit of beauty, a religious call, personal loyalty, or the importance of some "cause" no matter in what it consists. In our terminology, value-rational always involves “commands” of "demands" which, in the actor's opinion, are binding on him. It is only in cases where human action is motivated by the fulfillment of such unconditional demands that it win be called value-rational.pp.25]

4. 根据顾忠华译本，[目的理性行动的成立，是行动者将其行动指向目的手段和附带结果，同时他会去理性地衡量手段之于目的、目的之于附带结果，最后也会考量各种可能目的之间的各种关系。无论如何，它既非情感式（尤其不是情绪式），亦非传统式的行动。对于彼此竞争或相冲突的目的与结果间作抉择，在另一方面可以是带有价值理性的指向的：这时候，行动只有其手段部分属于目的理性的范围。或者行动者可以在面对竞争和冲突的目的时，不涉及对“诫命”和要求的价值理性指向，只单纯地将其视作给定的主观需求，并在量表上排列出他自己有意识地衡量后的轻重缓急顺序（所谓的“边际效用”原则），如此他便可以按照这一顺序尽可能地满足他的需求。价值理性式和目的理性式的指向之间因此可以存在着各式各样的关系。但是，从目的理性的观点而言，价值理性始终是——而且当它愈将所指向的价值提高为绝对价值，则愈益表现为——非理性的。因为人们愈只一味顾及行动的自身价值（纯洁的信念、美感、绝对的善、绝对的义务等），那么便愈不会去计较行动的后果为何。不过，绝对的目的理性行动基本上一样也只是一种建构出来的边界情况。]【34】根据这段文本，我们可知目的理性和价值理性的区别在于，价值理性蕴含价值的绝对性（和非理性、不顾及后果），目的理性则是理性衡量并在诸多彼此竞争或冲突的目的与结果之间做抉择。Keith Tribe翻译为：[Whoever acts in a purposively rational manner orients their action to the purpose, means, and associated consequences of an act, and so rationally weighs the relation of means to ends, that of the ends to the associated consequences, and that of the various possible ends to each other; hence, action that is neither affective (especially not emotional) nor traditional. The decision between competing and conflicting aims and consequences can in this way be oriented value rationally; in this case, only the means are selected by purposively rational criteria. Alternatively, the individual can deal with competing and conflicting aims without resorting to value rationality, taking “dictates” and “demands” simply as given subjective feelings of need arranged on a scale that is consciously balanced according to their urgency, orienting action so that they will, as far as is possible, be satisfied in this sequence (the principle of “marginal utility”). Hence, there are many ways in which the value rational orientation of action can relate to purposive rationality. From the perspective of purposive rationality, however, value rationality must always be irrational, the more so when action is governed by absolute values. For the more that action elevates such absolute values, the less it reflects on the consequence of such action, and the more unconditional do considerations of inner disposition, beauty, the absolute good, and absolute duty become. Absolutely purposive rational action is for the most part a marginal case, however. pp.102-103.]其余两个译本似乎与此并没有太大差别。帕森斯反对把二者的区别看作内在的手段-目的链条的中介环节（目的理性）和终极目的成分（价值理性），因为韦伯的概念都是既包括手段-目的关系，也包括终极目的的完备的行动类型。在冯·塞廷的由责任伦理和信念伦理关联行动类型的启发下，他认为二者的区别如下：[行动者或则认识到获致价值的许多合乎情理的方向，尽管这些方向不全然同等重要；或则他把全部行动指向一个单一的特定价值（例如救赎）——该特定价值在如下意义上是绝对的：所有其他潜在价值仅仅作为获致这一核心价值的手段和条件（可能的助力或阻碍）才值得注意。…在第一种情况下，行动者不仅必须要选择达到一种特定目的的手段——这对两者是共同的，而且还必须把诸价值即诸终极目的加以权衡比较；他不仅必须关注一项特定行动过程对于获致其本身直接目的或终极目的可能直接造成的后果，还必须关注该行动过程对于其他价值直接或间接可能造成的后果。因此，持这种立场的人渴求客观知识的欲望特别强烈。因此只有掌握客观知识，他才能理性地作出这种判断。他的行动必须着眼于达到和谐，在许多领域中按照轻重缓急不同获致价值的最大化。在这点上，韦伯的确远不相信在不同的可能的价值之间有着前定的和谐，而不存在任何真正的冲突。相反，他对此种处境抱悲观的看法，认为在可能的不同价值领域之间存在着深刻的冲突，特别强调行动的出乎意料的间接影响所造成的不幸结果。【帕森斯：《社会行动的结构》，第720-721页】[这两种合理性行动类型之间的区别，是由终极目的体系的两种极端类型的区分所决定的。]【722】英文版pp.643-5.

5. 韦伯指出上述分类只是理念型。【35】

三、社会关系的概念

韦伯把“社会关系”界定为“多数行动者互相考虑对方，因此指向彼此联系的行为”。因此，它建立在人们可以就一种（有意义的）特定方式从事社会行动的机会上。【35】***[ Social “relationship” shall refer to the meaningful content of the mutual disposition of several persons, and comportment arising from such an orientation. A social relationship therefore consists entirely and quite exclusively of the Chance that action will be social in a (meaningfully) manifest sense, leaving to one side for the moment the basis of this Chance.pp.103.]

1. “社会关系”的基本特征在于行动者和他人间存在着某种最低限度的相互关联，并不涉及是否存在合作或对立关系。【35】（A leading characteristic of the concept shall therefore be the existence in the relationship of a minimum of mutual orientation one to another.pp.103）

2. “意义”指的是由参与者主观认定的意义内涵的“纯粹”类型，社会关系只存在于参与者依其行动的意义内涵相互发生过、发生着或未来会发生一定关联的机会里。【35】（It is always a matter of the intended, empirical meaning of participants for each actual or average case, or in a constructed “pure” type— never of a normatively “correct” or metaphysically “true” meaning. A social relationship— even where it is a matter of so called social constructs such as state, church, cooperative association, marriage, and so forth— consists exclusively and solely in the Chance that action whose meaningful content demonstrably arises from mutually orientated action has occurred, occurs, or will occur.pp.104.）***Guenther Roth与Claus Wittich译本讨论“意义”概念时同样给出的是具体情况下和理念型两种情况，The "meaning" relevant in this context is always a case of the meaning imputed to the parties in a given concrete case, on the average, or in a theoretically formulated pure type. pp.27.胡译本同样给出两种情况，[社会关系概念中涉及的意向，始终是在个别场合下，参与者实际持有的或者平均持有的经验性的意向，或者在构想的“纯粹”模式里参与者持有的经验性意向。]【37】

3. 韦伯区分了“单向式”（one sided）的社会关系，即参与者赋予的主观意义内涵不同；“双向式”（mutual）的社会关系，参与者的意义内涵完全相互“符合”时成立。【36】

4. 韦伯把社会关系区分为易逝性质的和可持续性质的。可持续的指的是“某种意义相互符应——即双方皆期望如此——的行为、有持续地重复发生的机会存在。”【36】唯有在这种机会中才有让意义相符应的行动的“几率”发生，才谈得上社会关系的“存在”或“维持。”【36-7】以“友谊”和“国家”为例，并指出不适用法律观点。【37】[it is only the existence of this Chance— the greater or lesser probability that action corresponding to this meaning takes place, and nothing more than this— that signifies the “existence” of the social relationship. That a “friendship” or a “state” exists, or did exist, means exclusively and only that: we (the observers) consider that a Chance exists or existed that, given the particular disposition of particular people, action will follow a specifiable path according to an averagely intended meaning— and no more. pp.105.]

5. 社会关系的意义内涵中保持相对不变者可形成“准则”，其平均的和大略的内在态度是参与者期望于他的同伴并将自己的行动指向这类准则的基础。韦伯指出，行动愈理性（目的和价值）愈合乎此种情况，以性爱上或纯粹情感式关系（如忠诚，Keith Tribe英译本为piety， pp.105.；Guenther Roth与Claus Wittich译本为loyalty，pp.28.；胡景北译本为“崇敬”，第39页）较商业契约，主观意义予以理性表达的可能性小。【37】***[The substantive meaning that perpetuates a social relationship can be formulated in “maxims,” general adherence to which participants expect from their partner(s), and according to which they in return generally orient their action. This is more frequently the case the more (purposively or value) rationally oriented the general character of the action is.pp.105] 6. 社会关系的意义内涵可由相互的共识形成，这意味着参与者彼此承诺将来的行动。【37】韦伯指出行动中有“目的理性”的期望和“价值理性”的信守义务。【37-8】Actors orient their own action to this expectation partly in a purposively rational manner (expressing some degree of “loyalty”), and partly value rationally, as a “duty” to “adhere” on their own part to the concluded agreement as understood by them. pp.106.

四、行动取向的类型：习俗、风俗

韦伯强调社会学考察的是具有可被观察到的规律性，行动在相似的主观意义引导下重复发生的行为模式，与历史学注重个别关联不同。他对习俗、风俗做出如下界定：[当一种社会行动取向的规律性有实际存在的机会时，我们称它为“习俗”。如果这种机会在一群人中仅仅是由于反复操练而产生的。假若这类操练是基于长期习以为常的结果，习俗将称之为“风俗”。否则，行动取向的规律性可被视作是“受利害状况所制约的”，如果其存在的机会只是通过行动者纯粹目的理性地指向同样的期望从而被如此制约的话。]【38】Keith Tribe英译本：[An actually existing Chance of regularity in the orientation of social action will be called a practice if and to the extent that the Chance of its existing among a group of people depends solely on its actual performance. A practice that has become familiar through lengthy exercise shall be called a custom. A custom is regarded as having been “determined by interests” if and to the extent that the Chance of its empirical existence is determined solely by the purposively rational orientation of individual action to similar expectations. pp.106]关键术语被分别翻译为practice和custom，二者的区别在于familiar（pp.106.）。Guenther Roth与Claus Wittich译本翻译为usage和custom，二者区别在于long standing（pp.29.）。阎克文译本据此翻译为“习惯”和“习俗”（持之以恒的习惯）【阎译本，119】胡景北译本翻译为“习惯”和“风俗”，区别在于“长期”。【胡译本，41】第一个术语可以理解为“习惯”，第二个术语翻译为“习俗”或“风俗”有待斟酌，注意familiar的翻译似乎比持久或长期的意涵更为丰富。

1. “时尚”也属于习惯，因其新颖性。“Fashion” is also a practice. By contrast with the definition of “custom,” fashion is a “practice” if the source of an action’s orientation becomes the novelty of the relevant behaviour.（pp.106）比较fashion和convention，皆源于对status differences的欲求。Guenther Roth与Claus Wittich译本中关键术语同样被翻译为fashion和novelty。

2. 习俗是没有外在保证的规则，从而区别于“常规”和“法律”，这意味着它并非有强制“效力”的规定，没有人会“要求”他人一定如此。韦伯也指出从风俗到有效力的常规再到法律之间的过渡相当模糊。【39】***[By contrast with “convention” and “law,” “custom” does not involve an externally guaranteed rule to which the actor actually adheres voluntarily ( whether such adherence is “unthinking,” for “convenience,” or for any other reason) and whose probable observance he can for these reasons expect from others belonging to this group of people. Custom would not, in this sense, be something “validating”: no one can “require” its observance, that one conform to it. There is a fluid transition from here to established convention and law. pp.107.] Guenther Roth与Claus Wittich译本关键术语翻译相同。胡景北译本翻译为“惯例”和“法律”。【胡，42】

3. 社会行动的规律性并非取决于有效的规范取向或风俗，而是完全取决于：“参与者的社会行动方式依其特质而言，乃是尽量配合他们主观的正常估算下的利益，并将行动倾向于这种主观的想法和知识。”合乎目的理性【40】韦伯提到行动“理性化”，“把内在未经思索地接受流传下来的风俗习惯，替换成深思熟虑有计划地适应于利害状况。”【40】这可以积极朝向价值理性化，消极朝着牺牲风俗习惯、情感式行动甚至不利于价值理性式行动，只为成全一种弃绝任何价值信念的纯粹目的理性式行动的方向前进。【40-1】

4. 止于风俗习惯的行动的稳定性问题。利害状况的稳定性。【41】Keith Tribe英译本翻译为The strength of (mere) custom和the strength of given interests（pp.108.）Guenther Roth与Claus Wittich译本分别翻译为The stability of merely customary action和the stability of action in terms of self-interest（pp.30.）

五、正当的秩序

韦伯讨论了行动特别是涉及社会关系的社会行动指向参与者相信存在的正当秩序，这种行动真正出现的机会即此一秩序的“效力”。【41】[Action, especially social action, and even more specifically, a social relationship, can be oriented by an actor’s conception of the existence of a legitimate order. The Chance that this actually occurs will be called the “validity” of the relevant order.pp.108.]

1. 秩序的效力意含着比习俗或自利心所决定的规律性社会行动更多的东西。【42】The “validity” of an order means more here than mere regularity of the course taken by social action conditioned by custom or by given interests.pp.109.

2. 韦伯写道，“只有当一种社会关系的内容是指向可决定的‘准则’才能被称为是一种‘秩序’。只有这样一种秩序才被认为有效。”【42】（only speak of this order being “validated” if this actual orientation to those principles is also in practice followed because these principles are in some way or another recognised as binding or exemplary for the action.pp.109）Guenther Roth与Claus Wittich译本及阎克文译本、胡景北译本结构划分更为清晰。在韦伯看来，基于纯粹目的理性动机的秩序、基于习俗的秩序以及具有正当性的秩序稳定性有差异。[An order that is internalized only for purely purposively rational motives is generally a great deal more volatile than an orientation based solely on custom, from the sheer familiarity of a mode of behaviour; this is the most frequently encountered internalised attitude. But such an order is even more unstable than an order with the prestige of being considered exemplary or obligatory, or as we might say, which enjoys “legitimacy.” The transition from merely traditional or merely purposively rational motivated orientation to an orientation based on a belief in its legitimacy is, of course, in reality an extremely fluid one.pp.109.]

3. 每种秩序是有效的，只要行动实际上有指向它们的机会存在，提及施塔姆勒。【43】他反对施塔姆勒认为秩序和经验性行动之间无法在概念上建立因果关系的说法，[事实上，在对一般理解下的秩序效力有所想象并使其行动朝向于此一秩序理念的机会，以及与其相关的经济行动之间，的确（在特定情况下）存在着惯用意义下的“因果关系”。就社会学而言，光是这种朝向（秩序的）想象的机会本身，便构成了所谓的有效秩序。]【44】[there is a Chance that action will actually be oriented to it.pp.110.……there is of course a causal relationship in its quite usual sense between the Chance that action will be oriented by a belief (of whatever kind) in the validity of an order and economic action. But for sociology, as opposed to the law, this Chance of orientation by a belief “is” “the” valid order.pp.111.]

六、正当秩序的类型：常规和法律

韦伯指出，秩序的正当性可以由两种主要方式保证：【44】1. 内在的：（a）情感的；（b）价值理性的；（c）宗教的；2. 对特殊的外在效果的期待（如利害状况等所保证）。【44】他界定了两种正当秩序的类型：（1）常规，效力由一种机会而外在地被保证，若在既定的社会群体中偏离它将导致相对普遍且实际感受得到的不同意反应的社会；（2）法律，若它的外在保证是通过下列机会，即靠着一群执行人员为了集体承诺或对违规的惩戒，而可能运用对个人生理或心理的强制。【45】根据Keith Tribe英译本，[a) convention, where its validity is externally underwritten by the Chance that deviation from its observance will, in a given human group, result in relatively general and in practice tangible disapproval; b) Law, where its validity is externally underwritten by the Chance that physical or mental coercion will be applied by a specialised staff of people whose task is to enforce conformity or punish contravention. pp.112.]阎克文和胡景北分别翻译为惯例和法律。【阎，124；胡，51】

1. 常规，风俗的一部分，在既定社群之中产生，被视为一种“有效”的共同意见，并以不同意的方式对抗偏差，相比于法律是非被执行人员所强制，批评施塔姆勒。【45】根据顾译本给出的英注，“常规”比“习惯”更狭隘，它通常只涉及某些已被视作是合法秩序之一部分的规范模式，“习惯”则和顺从行为的合法性或道德义务上的问题并不十分相干。【39】**[ The term convention denotes a “custom” treated as “valid” within a human group and where disapproval acts as a guarantee against infringement. By contrast with the law (as here defined), there is no specialised staff of people charged with its enforcement.pp.112.]

2. 法律，最关键的是有随时准备强制处理的执行人员（氏族时代的执法者，当代的法官机构等），国际法被否认是法律。【46】（For the concept of “law” as employed here, the existence of a staff dedicated to its enforcement is its most decisive feature. pp113.）阎克文译本翻译为“履行职能的班子”，【125】胡景北译本翻译为“强制班子”。【52】

3. 除非有特殊状况，将以现代区分法理规范和法律裁决的理解方式讨论。【47】（legal principle and legal decision. pp.114.）阎克文译本翻译为法律原则和司法裁决。【127】

4. 秩序可能被内在的主观态度保证，法律、常规及“