正义论读后感10篇
《正义论》是一本由[美] 约翰·罗尔斯著作，中国社会科学出版社出版的平装图书，本书定价：32.00元，页数：627，文章吧小编精心整理的一些读者的读后感，希望对大家能有帮助。
《正义论》读后感(一)：正义社会靠什么？--读《正义论》之二
其实中国的“天道”、“理”与罗尔斯的“正义”还是有点相像的，中国也不是完全没有正义的精神，只是总是不出众，不被人发掘，当一个社会缺少一种东西时，一是大力去弘扬这种东西，一是对这种东西表现出极大的冷漠。对弘扬社会缺乏的东西，像明末时期，淫靡腐化最盛，女人也开放的很，就有很多贞洁牌坊竖起来，以此表达对纯洁女性的向往，我们现在提倡八荣八耻，也是对当今社会，尤其是主流社会的不知荣耻的一种提醒而已。当我们口中一套背后一套时，我们毕竟知道那些口中的是对的，背后的是错的，而当我们去忽视冷漠时，我们连嘴里都不说，直接去做，并认为这是理所当然，但岂不知这个“理”只是你自己的理或你团体的“理”，而不是公理，即不是正义。
《正义论》只读了一小部分，些许领悟对错不知，表达出来共享：
怎样才能形成一个正义基础的社会？靠两步，一是一个正义的社会制度，一个是程序的正义。
正义的社会制度怎样形成？罗尔斯提出一个“无知之幕”的概念，就是假设出一种情形，大家都不知道彼此的优、劣，分不清各自所处的状态，在这种状态下大家共同制定出一种生存的规则，这种规则基本就是正义的。这种制定规则的方式虽然肯定有很多缺陷，但是思来想去，没有别的更好的办法能制定出这种“正义”的规则，至少这种制定规则的方式是相对最好。
什么是程序正义？以前大家都提程序合法，我不知道是不是与这个程序正义有无关联，但意义却完全不同，程序正义有点像英美法系的衡平法，即习惯法，就是说一个案子我判决了，就形成判例，以后再有类似的案子就要按这个判例来判，我的法律知识不成系统，但我对此的理解就是，比如说你偷了10000元，判你一年的监禁，以后又有人偷了9000，在偷的过程中与偷一万的案例情形也雷同，即没什么杀人、防火等等其他罪行，那判这偷9000的就不能超过一年，最多是一年。程序的正义就是这样，规则对每个人是相同的，违反规则的处罚也是相同，。就是在一种制度制定出来后，大家都是同样遵守，不遵守就要受到处罚，且同样类型的违反制度就要受到同样类型的处罚。
不正义的制度靠正义的程序能否维持，罗尔斯给了一个否定的答案，所以这两项对一个正义社会的形成是相辅相成、缺一不可的。但是我有一个想法是：在我们无法形成正义制度时，是不是能够靠程序的正义来倒逼制度呢？
《正义论》读后感(二)：不是书评
买了之后大概先看了下序言，然后扔在那。畏难，担心，于是先看看别的吧，一放3个月。
可是书最终还是要读的，毕竟花了几十大圆呢，总不能放着生灰，与其这样当初就应该用这个钱买点鸡爪啃啃；再者，就像古文一样既然有兴趣，有愿望多了解一点，强制阅读还是很必要的。看多了，想多了再回头思考下或许就豁然开朗了。
有人说过：哲学在康德之后，再也不是业余哲学家可以玩的。大量的专业名词，严谨的逻辑推理等等，几乎我看过的所有哲学家都承认自己的论证冗长；繁琐；艰涩。
好在就像费马定理一样，求证，演算是专家们做的事，我作为普通读者跟关心的是实用性，工具性的东西。常识是验证一个哲学理论的钥匙（当然常识常常有问题），但就像主人遛狗，牵着绳子总不至于跑太远。
于是迎难而上了，在上一批书看完后决定死磕。每天掘进30页左右，20几天终于看完，对的仅仅是看完。理论部分。及目的最后部分实在是太艰深了，有的段落反复的看，还是不甚了了。罗尔斯你伤害到我的自尊了，你知道吗？而自尊是最基本的善，这可是你说的。好在制度及部分目的还算是通畅，也是有所得的。
以前跟朋友聊天也一直聊到一些话题：关于良心拒绝，关于暴力反抗及非暴力反抗，对不正义法律的服从与否，大多数原则是否靠谱，关于宽容，关于时间偏爱关于个人道德感的来源等等总感觉在某些时候卡住或陷入逻辑矛盾，就深觉需要一种站得住脚的理论框架，这也是我看这本书的目的，现在虽然不懂的地方很多，也不期待自己能很快搞懂，但还是很满意的。或许以后可以再回头看看。
内容不敢随便评论，没这个水准，差远了。老罗在目的篇里提到自尊作为一种善，有赖于相互合理期望的社会成员的肯定。我觉得自尊的评价应该更多的立足于建立在合理的生活计划，对自己计划的合理性，以及对自己实现计划能力上的肯定的一种偏向于自我肯定吧。唉先存着吧。
正义论在某种程度上是一种相当严苛的理论。就像康德说的，人作为一种自由平等的理性存在物，对自己的一种严格的自律，动机才是跟主要的，更直面自己良知的。但是怎么说呢，就像一句老话：求仁得仁有何怨。
先写到这吧，以后重看这本书的时候，再做修改。
（谢绝评论，如果有的话）
《正义论》读后感(三)：读《正义论》
读《正义论》
先说几句题外话，当看完《正义论》的那一刻，我不禁暗自松了口气。这本书我读得颇感吃力，不仅是因为近600页的厚度，更是因为它的内容。书中许多理论概念及其关系、某些量化图表的分析以及一系列相关体系的逻辑推演，都给我的阅读与理解带来了不小的障碍。所以读得有些囫囵吞枣、不求甚解，以至于并不能很好地把握全书的内容。但不可否认的是，花费一定精力时间去阅读《正义论》这样一本书对我而言是值得的，不仅因为这是一次对自我的小小挑战，更是因为我真的从中有所获益，对许多问题有了更深更广的思考。作者渊博的学识和缜密的思维也让我敬佩不已。
拿到书才知道《正义论》被归为“伦理名著”范畴，罗尔斯的头衔也是“美国著名哲学家、伦理学家”。在我的感觉中，西方伦理学似乎常常只是为论道德而论道德，多专注于道德方面的逻辑学和认识论。而《正义论》却不然，它似乎力图建构一个伦理学体系，并试图把它应用于实质性的问题中。
《正义论》这本书分为三个部分：理论、制度、目的。它从不同的方面和角度去阐释、论证“作为公平的正义”这一概念及进一步引申出的正义二原则。由于本书的内容丰富以及我的水平实在有限，所以仅遴选自己感受较深部分中的几个问题并尝试结合自己的认识做一点论述。
一
作为意识形态中的一个重要内容，人们对正义的认识是纷繁复杂、见仁见智的，而这些见解亦无法评论孰是孰非。但作为一个由人类群体构成的社会，我们就需构建一个相对合理的正义观来应用于社会的基本结构，以维持社会的良性运行，而如何构建这一正义观就成了关键。
无疑，构建这一正义观是相当困难的，但罗尔斯巧妙地用一种在原初状态下通过有理性的人们缔结契约的方式来简化这一过程。我认为这其中比较重要的概念有：无知之幕（the veil of ignorance）、相互冷淡（mutually disinterested）、契约、最大最小值规则（maximin rule）。
设置无知之幕的作用大概在于尽量屏蔽影响人们缔结契约的各种特殊信息。缔结契约的人们不知道各自的社会地位、天赋秉性以及各自善的观念的具体内容，也不知道他们属于什么时代和社会经济、政治状况及文明水平。他们所知道的只是他们的社会处于正义的环境之中，只知道有关人类社会的一般事实，政治、经济理论原则、社会组织基础和人们基础的心理学法则。由于所有人的处境都是相似的的，无人能够设计有利于他的特殊情况的原则。这样一来，正义原则就是一种公平的协议或契约的结果。
缔结契约的各方被假设为有理性的和相互冷淡的。这并不意味着各方都是利己主义者，而是被理解为对他人利益冷淡的个人。他们不寻求相互亲密，不忌妒也不虚荣，更不想损害他人，只是试图通过努力推进他们的善的观念，而这样人们便更有可能达到一致的原则。
由于缔结契约的背景建立在一系列的假设之上，这里的契约具有了更多的抽象性。而在此种背景下订立的原则便具有了某些特征，即一般性、普遍性、公开性、有序性、终极性。
最大最小值是一个我觉得很重要的概念，最大最小值意即“最小值的最大化”。当人们订立原则时，由于对自身前景的茫然无知，他们往往不会想到自己最好的处境是什么，而是会考虑如果自己落入最差的处境后将如何应对，即做最坏的打算。那么人们就会在尽量提高最坏处境的条件，即寻求最小值可能变为的最大状态。这样一来，即使自己不幸的成为“最小值”状态的人，自己还是可以忍受的。这便成为了订立正义原则的一个基本立场。
二
下面，我想先摆出正义二原则再选择其中几点加以讨论。
正义二原则：
第一个正义原则：每个人对与所有人所拥有的最广泛平等的基本自由体系相容的类似自由体系都应有一种平等的权利（平等自由原则）。
（1）在与正义的储存原则一致的情况下，适合于最少受惠者的最大利益（差别原则）；
（2）依系于在机会公平平等的条件下职务和地位向所有人开放（机会的公正平等原则）。
罗尔斯进一步以一种词典式序列来解决两个原则孰先孰后的优先性问题,即第一原则优先于第二原则，第二原则中的公平机会又优先于差别原则。
不难看出，罗尔斯把自由（包括良心自由、思想自由、个人自由和平等的政治权利）看的尤为重要，他指出自由只能为了自由的缘故而被限制。较大的经济和社会利益并不能构成接受较小的平等自由的一个充足理由。只有当存在着一种强制的危险性、并且从自由本身的观点来看反对这种强制是不明智（如可能造成更大的不自由）的时候，对自由的限制或对不平等的自由的同意才是可允许的。
平等作为与自由相辅相成的一个概念，自然也在正义论中得到了充分的体现，正义论中所要阐释的平等原则主要是指平等地分配人的基本的权利和义务（包括政治权利等）。而社会和经济的不平等在某种程度上是被认可的，但这种不平等必须受到差别原则的严格限制。
差别原则是站在社会中最少受惠者的立场上订立的，它来源于“最小最大值”规则，这大概正是罗尔斯的理论中最能够反映社会福利思想的一部分。罗尔斯认为天赋与出身并不是道德上应得的，它是一种社会的共有资产，是一个中性的事实，但社会制度如何对待和处理他们却表现出正义与否的性质。
差别原则旨在确保使每个人都从社会合作中受益。它改变了社会的基本机构的目标，使整个制度结构不再强调社会效率，而是强调这样一种观念：那些先天有利的人，不论他是谁，只能在改善那些不利者的状况的条件下得利，否则这种得利就是不正义的。照这样看来，差别原则似乎达到了某种补偿原则的目的。
差别原则可以看作是“作为公平的正义”与功利主义间的一个重要区别。功利主义旨在追求一种最大的社会效率，而为了追求这种效率，它往往不免会牺牲少数人的利益并把这看作是合理的。
但在罗尔斯看来，功利主义体系往往是不稳定的，除非那些必须做出牺牲的人把比他们自己利益更广泛的利益视为根本利益，但这往往不容易发生。进而功利主义总会在道德教育中强调同情的作用，以及仁爱在德性中所占据的中心地位。但除非同情和仁爱能够普遍深入地培养，否则功利主义的正义观就有被动摇的危险。
这些使我想到了另外一个问题。作为一个西方学者，罗尔斯在论述功利主义者为达到其目的时，说他们常用的旗帜是用仁爱和同情，我想这其中的原因大概在于西方的宗教传统和个人主义传统。但到了中国，情况就大不相同了：在历来强调秩序与集体的中国传统文化（儒家思想）和我国最基本的指导思想马克思主义（这点大概更为重要）的影响下，我听到的口号更多带有较强的社会道德色彩，如 “为社会主义事业奋斗”等。但无论以何种面貌出现，它们要达到的目的的本质似乎是相通的。
进而，我想到了许多国策：“城乡二元制”、“共同富裕”、“西气东输”•••••呵呵，真是太多了，包括实行过的、正在实行的和即将实行的，它们总是充斥着或多或少的功利主义色彩。可这些难道就是处在社会主义初级阶段的社会中的我们应该和必须承受的吗？不管结论如何，反正我对此多少抱有些疑问。
接着，我想引入三个比较有趣的概念：完善的程序正义，不完善的程序正义、纯粹程序正义。
完善的程序正义有一个决定什么结果是正义的独立标准和一种保证达到这一结果的程序。不完善的程序正义有一种判断正确结果的独立标准，却没有可以保证达到它的程序。而纯粹程序正义则不存在对正当结果的独立标准，只存在一种正确的或公平的程序。
现实中我们并不能找到像完善的程序正义那样既有好的目标，又有好的程序去达到这一目标的制度。我们制定的法规往往属于不完善的程序正义，即虽然有好的目标，但在执行过程中总会出现这样后那样的问题，使最终的结果变为不好的结果。书中举得刑事审判就是一个典型的例子。期望的结果是只要被告有罪，他就应被宣判为有罪，但事实上并非如此。即便法律被仔细遵循，过程被公正恰当的引导，还是有可能达到错误结果：无罪的人被判有罪，有罪的人却逍遥法外。这种不正义并非来自人的过错，而是因为某些情况的偶然结合挫败了法律规范的目的。
“作为公平的正义”是一种典型的纯粹程序正义。它并没有告诉你它的目标是什么，但只要恰当地遵守它，但无论结果怎样也会是公平正义的。由此我们不难想见正义二原则巨大的实际意义，它恰恰给不完善的程序正义作了很好的补充。我们把它应运与社会制度中去的，起到的更多是一个“纠错”功能，即有了它的限制和监督，我们的社会中不正义的部分会不断地被排除出去，进而使运行可以变得更加正义。它像一把尺子，我们用它可以去衡量社会各种制度和程序的正义性。
于是我们可以进一步对正义的社会做出一个阐释，即什么样的社会是趋向正义的。它的判断标准并不在于某种意识形态中对于资本主义社会和社会主义社会的区别。而是在于能够摒弃或至少控制人的非正义倾向。当非正义的趋势产生时，其他力量都被调动起来维持整个社会结构的正义，确保社会的良好运行。这样我们可以看到良好的社会运行是可以不断进行自我修正和完善的。罗尔斯在“制度”一编中设计了一种良好社会的模式，包括通过四个阶段将两个正义原则运用于制定具体的法规政策和把政府划分为四个部门（配给部门、稳定部门、转让部门、分配部门）的构想等内容，这里不再细述。
三
显而易见，与功利主义、至善主义相区别，正义论并不是一种目的论，这点也是罗尔斯在书中反复强调的。但如果非要为“作为公平的正义”找出一个它想要达到的目的的话，我想这个目的大概就是康德哲学中所要表达的一个核心理念：人是目的。这并不是一句空洞的口号，而是充满人性关怀和具有积极意义的一个命题。
但反观现实，本末倒置的例子似乎比比皆是。当大家都在为每年GDP的飙升欢欣鼓舞之时，是否想过，它的目的和意义又何在呢？这些数据带给我们的究竟是什么呢？也许是我认识的偏差，我总会不觉嗅出 “为发展而发展”的气息。可当我们的眼中只剩下了一堆数字，而忘记了对自己理想生活的概念，更不去深究人到底为了什么而活着时，我们还剩下些什么呢？
最后我想说一点个人有关理论建构的看法：一个理论被建构并被人们认同和采纳，并不表示它是最好的或是绝对正确的。而是说我们现在还没有找到更合理的解释，那就暂时请它载我们一程，直到我们找到更合理的解释为止。所以毋宁说，有价值的理论往往都扮演着“善意地欺骗者”的角色，然而它起到的作用却是积极正面的。
“作为公平的正义”这一带有些许“乌托邦”色彩但极具现实意义的理论的意义大概也在于此。罗尔斯试图通过构建“作为公平的正义理论”为现实中各种社会的良性运行提供一个阿基米德支点，而在我看来这个目的无疑多多少少是达到了些的。
就我个人而言，我真心地期盼着“作为公平的正义理论”在真正需要它的地方生根发芽、茁壮成长，如果真的有那么一天，我们将会怎么样呢？我当然不知道，但我将默默地等待着，等待着这个问题的答案。
《正义论》读后感(四)：An assessment of Rawls' theory of justice: How likely would Rawls succeed to respond to criticis
Introduction
Rawls' theory of justice as a remarkable masterpiece has triggered tremendous work on it. From the methodology of contractarian, the concepts of original position, to its rational creation – the two principles of justice as fairness, all of them have significant influence on the fields of justice. However, due to the limited nature of human reason, any theory would entail defects discovered by later scholars. But before we consider those criticisms, it is necessary to understand the rationale of Rawls' theory of justice. And I would endorse to assess every step of Rawls' reasoning along with its respective criticisms as the best way. This paper would be divided into three parts: first, I would start from the method Rawls adopted to bring his two principles of justice; second, I would assess the two principles carefully, especially the second one with regard to Rawls' reasoning, and analyse how he responded or would respond to the alternatives and criticisms; third, I would come back to assess his methodological rationale with regard to Amartya Sen's criticism.
A. Methodological understanding
Rawls, as a neo-Kantian, shares two basic thoughts with Kant: anti-utilitarian and contractarian. The anti-utilitarian aspect of Rawls' theory is evident throughout his work. This anti-utilitarian stance comes out most clearly in the first principle of justice, which will be illustrated in the second part. The contractarianism is the foundation and starting point of Rawls' theory of justice. The rationale of contractarianism is of significant importance to facilitate our understanding of his theory and a pivotal part to support his theory – otherwise his theoretical edifice of justice would be easily struck down.
I. Why did Rawls adopt the contractarian approach？
We all know that in the history there was no such time period of human beings sitting together, contracting to form a real society. Just as Kant pointed out:
“It is in fact merely an idea of reason, which nonetheless has undoubted practical reality; for it can oblige every legislator to frame his laws in such a way that they could have been produced by the united will of a whole nation, and to regard each subject, in so far as he can claim citizenship, as if he had consented within the general will”.
The real appeal of contractarianism is its universal applicability, which is a natural result of reason. Because our reasoning is common, any rational person would accept a reasonable deduction. We cannot find the answer of justice merely from historical researches, for existing social systems do not necessarily entail justification or legitimization. The only way is to utilize our reason. If we agree with the reasoning process of creating a certain social structure, no matter it exists in reality or not, its validity is retroactive, regardless of whether or not we did engage in the contract from the beginning. The key to Kant's theory of justice lies within its universal applicability; whatever you or I decide can be used by everyone because our reasoning is common.
Common reason is the precondition for contractarianism. But what is the source of obligation of a contract？ Why would one feel obliged to conform with the contract？ One might say a party's breach of contract would be punished by the rest of parties. But the mere external force is not sufficient to answer these questions for two reasons. On the one hand, the compliance is not a mere result of fear, but a result of sense of obligation. Suppose a robber commands you to surrender your property. Acting out of fear, you would follow his order. But you would never agree that it is a form of contract. On the other hand, suppose another situation where you conduct a contract with a businessman. One of the term is that if one party fails to perform, the other has the right to get compensation. When it occurs that you fail to perform, you would be punished by the monetary damages. But that is part of the terms of contract, to a broader extent, you are not violating the remedial term.
A sense of obligation stems from the moral force of a contract and an actual contract may have two basis of moral force: consent and benefit. Suppose you reach an agreement with a businessman: if he decorate your house, you should pay him. But right after you reach the agreement, you regret for it. Can you unilaterally nullify the contract if the businessman does not agree to do so？ The instinctive response of a person in the society must be a negative answer. But one would argue, since the businessman has not made any effort, there is no loss for both parties to void the contract. One possible response is that you have cause the prospective loss of the businessman – it would be an answer by lawyers. A systemic response is that you are trying to destroy the valid and autonomous system of contract – that is, your violating the contract per se is wrong.
However, consent is a later moral force compared with benefit, because at the beginning there is no system of contract. A more fundamental moral force of contract is reciprocity. Take the same example of decorating house. If absent your consent, the businessman unilaterally decorated your house. Are you obliged to pay him？ Actually it is a story of David Hume who found his house decorated by a local businessman without his permit. And certainly Hume's refusing to pay was sued by the businessman. Finally the judge found for the plaintiff because Hume had benefited from it and thus formed an implicit benefit-based contract. Although this ruling may not be supported by modern courts, it signals the most basic nature of a contract – reciprocity. A contract between rational and equal parties must entail reciprocity.
ecause of the universal applicability and the two strong moral forces of a contract, the contractual methodology that Rawls chose is wise and the principles it created would be more convincing in terms of the procedure of forming social structure.
II. The rationale of original position
A contractarian approach is refined from the actual contract, but nevertheless different from an actual contract. The two moral forces of contract are not fulfilled in reality because of the imperfect condition of parties. Adopting the contractarian approach to create or justify a social structure as justice and fairness should overcome the imperfectness of actual contracts. In fact, the mere fact of contract is not sufficient to be fair; and the factual contract is not necessary to a fair mechanism.
The consent-based contract could be tainted by unequal bargaining power. Even though in the absence of force, the disparity between the leverage that each parties possess is a catastrophe to fair terms. It is possible that a migrant worker agreed to forced labor by threat of the employer that otherwise he would be deported back to homeland.
The benefit-based contract could be unfair if one party lack the knowledge. An illiterate worker would agreed with a sly employer to work without fair payment. Those defects of actual contracts definitely play havoc with the justification of a just fair social structure. In order to avoid those defects, Rawls' creative assumption of original position effectively eliminates the problems of actual contracts.
The most striking feature of the original position is the veil of ignorance, which prevents other arbitrary facts about citizens from influencing the agreement among their representatives. Behind the veil of ignorance, the informational situation of the parties that represent real citizens is as follows1:
arties do not know:
The race, ethnicity, gender, age, income, wealth, natural endowments, comprehensive doctrine, etc. of any of the citizens in society, or to which generation in the history of the society these citizens belong.
The political system of the society, its class structure, economic system, or level of economic development.
arties do know:
That citizens in the society have different comprehensive doctrines and plans of life; that all citizens have interests in more primary goods.
That the society is under conditions of moderate scarcity: there is enough to go around, but not enough for everyone to get what they want;
General facts about human social life; facts of common sense; general conclusions of science (including economics and psychology) that are uncontroversial.
This is a very important starting point for later agreement on the two principles. In absence of it, the two principles would lack stringency and persuasion. The basic feature of the veil of ignorance is that it keeps us from knowing facts about ourselves and our specific preferences.
. The two principles of justice
Having constructed the original position, Rawls moved to substantive discussion of theory of justice. He coined the concept of reflective equilibrium as a method for arriving at the content of the principles of justice. The method of reflective equilibrium facilitates the most abstract aim of political philosophy, which is to reach justified conclusions about how political institutions should be arranged. Although Rawls uses broad reflective equilibrium, it still received several challenges. Many of the more specific charges brought against the method—for example, that it is overly conservative, in the sense that it unduly privileges the beliefs that one holds before inquiry begins—can be seen as variations on this more general theme2. It would trigger complicated analysis so I will not address it further in my paper. Suppose the reflective equilibrium is basically effective. Rawls proceeds by adjusting various beliefs until they are in "equilibrium" and finally comes about the two principles of justice as fairness.
I. First Principle
The first principle is also called liberty principle:
Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value.
The basic liberties of citizens are, the political liberty to vote and run for office, freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience, freedom of personal property and freedom from arbitrary arrest.
The basic liberties are equal to everyone and inalienable even for the sake of the second principle. Here Rawls ranks the two principle, giving the liberty principle higher priority and this is the fundamental difference between Rawls and utilitarian. Rawls rejects utilitarian approach to maximize the common good without any restriction on the deprival of individual's rights or liberties. By the method of reflective equilibrium, such utilitarianism is undesirable. Because no one knows whether he will be entitled to more of social welfare or talent than others, or he will be suffered in an underprivileged condition. In modern society, liberty is of the highest significance. The basic liberties and rights should never be encroached by collectivism. As Marx Weber illustrated, the modernization is a process of disenchantment. There is no rationalized nation that would sacrifice individual rights for so-called common good – which could be the will of god or Charisma. However, it does not mean that common good is not important anymore. Rawls just prioritizes the basic liberties instead of common good – with regard to this, he is definitely a libertarian as opposed to utilitarian.
If one reads carefully, he would discover that the basic liberties does not include economic liberty. Rawls says:
liberties not on the list, for example, the right to own certain kinds of property (e.g. means of production) and freedom of contract as understood by the doctrine of laissez-faire are not basic; and so they are not protected by the priority of the first principle3.
Why does Rawls exclude the economic liberty？ Because he thinks the distributive justice is morally necessary to avoid moral arbitrariness. Including economic liberty would also conflict with the second principle. This signals Rawls' departure of traditional libertarianism, which is endorsed by Robert Nozick. The divergence between them would be illustrated in next section. To assess the reasonableness of this exclusion, we should first assess whether the second principle could be justified, which is the most contentious part of Rawls' theory of justice in the field of political philosophy.
II. Second Principle
The second principle is also called difference principle:
ocial and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions:
first, they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity;
and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.
o the difference principles consist of two parts: 1) they are attached to positions and offices open to all; 2) they maximally benefit the least advantaged. Before we examine the two parts, let us first look at other alternative mechanisms.
a) Feudal Aristocracy. In feudal society, there is rigid hierarchy. The ruling class possess almost all the properties of the society. The ruling family would strengthen their power through inheritance, so the social mobility is very weak, leading to freezing social classes. Behind the veil of ignorance, no rational person would accept this system due to its extreme moral arbitrariness – one's birth decides one's destiny.
) Traditional libertarianism. A social structure modelled after traditional libertarianism is an improvement of Feudal Aristocracy. It advocates free market and open opportunity. It shares the core rationale with legal positivism – formal equality. However, formal equality, or equality before law has long been criticized as mere justification for capitalist legal system. Take famous O.J. Simpson case for example. Suppose that he was not wealthy enough to employ the dream team lawyers. The result would probably be totally different. David Cole in his book No Equal Justice said4:
impson, of course, was atypical in every way. The very factors that played to his advantage at trial generally work to the disadvantage of the vast majority of black defendants. Simpson had virtually unlimited resources, a jury that identified with him along racial grounds, and celebrity status. Most black defendants, by contrast, cannot afford any attorney, much less a “dream team.” Their fate is usually decided by predominantly or exclusively white juries. And most black defendants find that their image is linked in America’s mind not with celebrity, but with criminality.***
***Whites have a disproportionate share of the wealth in our society, and are more likely to be able to buy a good defense; white defendants generally face juries composed of members of their own race; and a white person’s face is not stereotypically associated with crime. Thus, what dismayed whites in Simpson’s case is precisely what generally works to their advantage, while what blacks cheered is what most often works to their disadvantage.
Equality before law is merely an unconvincing justification for libertarian legal system if we do not build the capacity of underprivileged. The formal equality is like a transparent veil; once it covers the colourful society, it would never reflect effective neutrality which people expect. That is de facto inequality and it is a built-in defect of formal justice. Kropotkin once said in his book law and authority, that law has a mixed feature: part of it protects the interests of populace, which renders the justification for the whole legal system; but the other part provides a privileged condition for a small group of people. How could we eliminate the latter while preserve the former？
In addition to the legal system, the other aspects of traditional libertarian social structure is biased in favor of luck, which is morally arbitrary according to Rawls. Suppose the college admission process is based on scores. It opens the opportunity of education to all students if they perform well enough to reach the minimum score the university requires. This seemingly being very equal, however, is in fact fails to consider the differences of students' starting points. Some are poor and received less qualified education while others are rich enough to get into the most prestigious high school, enjoying the elite eduction. To correct this problem, here comes another alternative.
c) Meritocracy. Meritocracy advocates fair equality of opportunity, which is also the first part of difference principle. This social structure focuses on providing the same starting point through head-start education. It effectively corrects the defect of traditional libertarian system. However, in the college admission system, who would be admitted？ Undoubtedly, the students with higher score. But is the admitted student morally deserved？ As Rawls argues, talent and effort are still morally arbitrary. It is convincing that talent is morally arbitrary, but why is effort arbitrary？ It is one of the most mysterious part of Rawls' reasoning. Obviously he does not believe much in free will – to some extent he is a determinist. Determinism means individual moral responsibility is impossible. It seems impossible to deduce from Rawls' reasoning anything which is moral desert – perhaps any result from complying the second part of difference principle is moral desert. However, this argument of Rawls has drawn far less attention from the political philosophers. But I would treat it as a potential weak point, which would be discussed later.
After discussing the defects of these alternatives above, we would next turn to the ideal social system that Rawls constructs by his reflective equilibrium approach. The second part of difference principle is to maximally benefit the least advantaged, which is also known as “maximin strategy” – that is the only way to justify the social and economic inequalities. Its appeal is that, different from the traditional egalitarian, it would not level the talent or other moral arbitrariness, but to benefit the least advantaged. It could also be regarded as a compromise between leftism and rightism. Having established the new system, Rawls would be faced with many challenges. It is exciting to see how likely Rawls would succeed to respond to those challenges in a consistent way. I would only address three strongest arguments – Rawls has responded some in his work; if not, I would make some prudential and possible arguments for him.
The first argument is the effort issue. People in favor of Meritocracy would criticize the difference principle which is biased against giving credit to one's effort. Rawls pointed out that not only talent we do not morally deserve, but also work ethics are not within the scope of free will. A study suggests that the first child of the family would be more diligent than the second. In addition to birth order, the family education is the most influential factor in shaping one's behavior of working hard in the future. As the book of Unequal Childhoods written by the sociologist Annette Lareau indicates, the differences of family education between working class and middle class to some extent determines how the children behave in a society when they grow up5. A child from middle class is more adapted to social system and naturally work hard, as if he has no choice. As I mentioned above, Rawls is a determinist. He is trying to distinguish moral desert from entitlement to legitimate expectations.
quot;A just scheme answers to what men are entitled to; it satisfies their legitimate expectations as founded upon social institutions... But what they are entitled is not proportional to nor dependent upon their intrinsic worth.6"
The argument of this distinction could be understood from both vertical and horizontal perspectives. From the horizontal perspective, one's talent is not morally deserved, but an entitlement to legitimate expectation. In a society of Rawls' justice, one's talent would not be levelled down to mundaneness, in order to equalize people's conditions. Instead, gifted people are entitled to legitimate expectation of honour, property and respect from society. But those entitlements cannot serve as a justification for moral arbitrariness. The only way to justify it is to benefit the least advantaged who are not endowed with the same talents. The talented cannot take for granted those talents and enjoy them without concerning about the unlucky people. Because of Rawls' understanding of moral arbitrariness, he is eager to create a community, where rational people communicate together, dedicated to the just social structure. It has nothing to do with good samaritan, it is merely a result of reason. Behind the veil of ignorance, no one knows his individual conditions, so the most rational compromise is to redistribute social welfare. Then the moral forces of contract restrict people's behaviour, as a rational justification for the social structure. From the vertical perspective, different societies in the history favor different talents. In medieval Tuscany, fresco painters were highly valued; in twenty-first-century California, computer programmers are, and so on. Whether my skills yield a lot or a little depends on what the society happens to want. What counts as contributing depends on the qualities a given society happens to prize7.
In terms of talent, it is easy to argue that it is morally arbitrary. But treating one's effort as fully moral arbitrariness is not so convincing. There is, however, an alternative argument which can be made by Rawls. Stepping back from the conclusion that effort is also morally arbitrary and admitting that effort is to certain extent motivated by free will, Rawls could argue that we are still crediting effort since there is restricted and justified inequality. Actually, in a society of Meritocracy, not the effort that society credits, but the contribution to the society. It is almost impossible to measure one's effort alone, because effort is externalized as contribution, in combination of many other factors. And it is inefficient to credit effort instead of contribution, because a diligent person may not benefit the least advantaged as much as a talented person does.
The second argument is the incentive issue: why would the talented people work hard if they cannot enjoy the whole fruits of their effort？ The easiest answer would be: Rawls has been trying to strike the balance by allowing inequalities. However, Cohen makes a stronger criticism8:
The difference principle can be used to justify paying incentives that induce inequalities only when the attitude of talented people runs counter to the spirit of the difference principle itself: they would not need special incentives if they were themselves unambivalently committed to the principle. Accordingly, they must be thought of as outside the community upholding the principle when it is used to justify incentive payments to them.
To generalize, whenever incentive pay given to already highly paid talented persons would seem to be justified from the standpoint of the difference principle, there is a superior alternative: let the talented work at this productive employment without demanding or receiving the incentive pay. Incentives are not needed in a society in which all members of society internalize Rawls’ principles, so the difference principle in these circumstances would not justify inequalities via incentives. In a just society, the difference principle would not justify incentive-based inequalities9.
However, I am not convinced by this argument with regard to a vicious circle. Because the difference principle entails paying incentives, then the talented people agree to be committed to the principle. Without internalizing the incentive, the difference principle would otherwise not exist – a better way must be equal distribution – thus it would not be accepted by talented people. So I cannot see any merit in this argument in a circle. In addition, the basic nature of human reason is rationality – Rawls is not expecting everyone to be a good samaritan. The incentive-based inequality is a necessary response to the selfishness in human nature. As long as a social system could bring the selfishness and common good into conformity – when people act out of selfishness, they also benefit the least advantaged, it is a desirable system. No one would doubt that there is always a better alternative, which is to distribute equally without any worry about talented people lacking incentives. However, it is merely an ideal assumption of human nature given the long history of human beings. Selfishness and common good is a transcending conflicting group of conceptions. Every social structure is trying to strike a balance between them, to achieve its justice.
The third argument is the most challenging one: self-ownership issue. After Rawls publishing A Theory of Justice, Nozick made the counterargument in his later published book, Anarchy, State and Utopia. Although Anarchy, State and Utopia has been construed as a response to Rawls' A Theory of Justice, Rawls never provided a direct and sustained rebuttal.
ozick, an advocate of procedural justice, argues that redistribution equals to taking of earnings, which equals to forced labor, and thus a form of slavery. In the beginning, I have mentioned that Rawls is an anti-utilitarian. However, the redistribution process, in the eye of Nozick, is merely a form of using people and thus cannot be disentangled with utilitarianism. Thus astonishing interpretation is very challenging, on the solid basis of self-ownership. Nozick criticizes that Rawls fails to comply with the principle of self-possession.
elf-possession was first illustrated by John Locke. According to Locke, the property was prior to the society. Because people owned ourselves, they owned their labor and thus the property created by their labor. People shared the common will to preserve their own property, so the state of nature was peaceful instead of as violent as Hobbes describes. However, the anarchy was sometimes disturbed by the state of war, in which one appeals to force instead of right over others. In order to preserve their lives, liberty and property, they should find a way to avoid the state of war. And undoubtedly, the only way is to make a contract and enter into the society. Influenced by this line of reasoning, Nozick argues that self-ownership and the property right are among those most fundamental rights that no one could deprive. Therefore Nozick focuses on the entitlement theory which is to protect property in the society. Nozick proposes a 3-part “Entitlement Theory”10:
If the world were wholly just, the following definition would exhaustively cover the subject of justice in holdings:
(1) A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding.
(2) A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the holding.
(3) No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of (a) and (b).
The complete principle of distributive justice would say simply that a distribution is just if everyone is entitled to the holdings they possess under the distribution (Nozick, p.151).
It is definitely another self-consistent set of justice theory. That is why it is very difficult for Rawls to refute it as a whole. And even Rawls himself regards his theory of justice as “a” theory of justice, not “the” theory of justice. However, Rawls could make some possible arguments. Since it is the consent of the governed, people give away some of their self-ownership to the community to allow it to redistribute justly. Arising out of the common reason, it is universally accepted and thus not constituting any violation. However, Nozick would say the self-ownership being the most basic and inalienable rights, any consent is voided. An example of slavery would support Nozick's argument. In the history, there were some places where people who were so poor that they themselves voluntarily agreed to be slaves. So even there is consent, any slavery system would be deemed violating jus cogens or say, international criminal law. But the example of assisted suicide represent the non-unanimous attitude toward the divergent theories of Rawls and Nozick. Some support the legality of assisted suicide as long as the person agreed, while others oppose it fiercely.
A deeper understanding of their divergence lies in their different focus. Rawls focuses on the dismissal of moral desert while Nozick focuses on the legitimate entitlement. As mentioned above, the Rawls' refutation of moral desert is itself not undisputed or convincing enough for all people because of his determinist view of the world. Even though we accept that moral desert is impossible, we must take Nozick's criticism of the potential risks built-in Rawls' theory seriously. The conventional understanding of Nozick's criticism is as a libertarian assessment of procedural justice which maintains that while it might be true that peoples' actions are, in whole or in part, determined by factors that are morally arbitrary, this is irrelevant to assignments of distributive shares11.
ozick claimed that to treat peoples' natural talents as collective assets is to contradict the very basis of the deontological liberalism Rawls wishes to defend, i.e. respect for the individual and the distinction between persons12. Nozick argued that Rawls' suggestion that not only natural talents but also virtues of character are undeserved aspects of ourselves for which we cannot take credit, "can succeed in blocking the introduction of a person's autonomous choices and actions (and their results) only by attributing everything noteworthy about the person completely to certain sorts of 'external' factors. So denigrating a person's autonomy and prime responsibility for his actions is a risky line to take for a theory that otherwise wishes to buttress the dignity and self-respect of autonomous beings.13"
However, I would not agree with Nozick's argument, for it cuts the line of Rawls' reasoning. He only focuses on Rawls' redistribution process without paying attention to his pre-conditioned reasoning – dismissal of moral desert. If we adopt Rawls' dismissal of moral desert, it is a very natural deduction that we are not really self-owned. And self-ownership is merely an illusion created by traditional libertarian. Here would should distinguish between the moral argument and legal/socially systematic argument. Even if we have a legal system or other social system that recognizes the right of self-ownership. In the assessment in terms of justice or morality, the recognition does not necessarily pass the test. If we want to challenge Rawls' theory, it is indispensable to tackle the issues from the beginning of his reasoning: the dismissal of moral desert. The reason why we cannot decide whether Nozick or Rawls is right, is that we are not convinced by Rawls' full dismissal of moral desert. Unfortunately, few studies take his axiom seriously.
From the broadest perspective, Rawls and Nozick's divergence represents the revised, the most contentious debate of liberty v. equality. Although both of them regard themselves as libertarian, obviously Rawls is trying to strike a balance between liberty and equality, both of which he thinks are important to a just social structure. And the swing between liberty and equality has long existed since the ancient time. Allan bloom in his book, the Republic of Plato made an incisive comment of it: Man's dual nature makes it impossible to solve the problem posed by the two kinds of goods. Every decent regime is some kind of uneasy compromise between them14.
C. Assessment of methodological rationale
In the theory of justice, Rawls adopts the contractarian methodology and refine from actual contracts through the original position to establish a perfect mechanism. The criticisms of the methodology and substance would be of comparable significance. There are some criticisms of the contractarian approach. There is a general criticism of contractarian approach, which denounces the approach as a mere defence of capitalism. JG Murphy in Marxism and Contribution brings an example15:
A man has been convicted of armed robbery. On investigation, we learn that he is an impoverished black whose whole life has been one of frustrating alienation from the prevailing socio-economic structure - no job, no transportation if he could get a job, substandard education for his whole family, condescending-tardy-inadequate welfare payments, harassment by the police but no real protection by them against the dangers in his community, and near total exclusion from the political process. Learning all this, would we still want to talk - as many do - of his suffering punishment under the rubric of "paying a debt to society"？ Surely not. Debt for what？
Extracting the present piece of the society, it is hard to justify a certain time period because for some persons, their whole lives are miserable – and we cannot simply assume it is just that they are unlucky persons who should endure all miseries as long as talented people benefit them. To be clear, Rawls is trying to establish a not-the-worst mechanism to ease the arbitrary condition, rather than fundamentally change the original set of arbitrariness.
If we are not convinced by the contractarian approach, then what is the alternative？ Amartya Sen in his book The Idea of Justice makes an argument to linking responsibility to effective power. He uses the example of mother and kid to demonstrate the obligation of effective power. He recognizes the power of authority and further links it with responsibility. It is a displacement of contractual relationship by a softer and stronger interconnection within a community. However, I still reserve my doubt on the effectiveness of this linking, for rational people are not all good samaritans; instinctively they would try to break the soft restrictions.
As for another criticism made by Sen that it is not as useful to conceive of a transcendental and perfect concept of justice as to practice justice in actual social context. He advocates the relative assessment of justice. However, without the perfect concept of justice, how could we make the assessment？ In the world of mathematics, no one would be able to draw a perfect circle. However, no one would doubt the value of such non-existing circle because it serves as the guidance, leading us to the better. So the significance of perfectness lies rightly in its impossibility.
Conclusion
To conclude, I demonstrate the whole line of reasoning implied in his theory of justice, from the contractual approach, original position to the reflective equilibrium strategy, on the one hand in terms of the procedure and one the other hand, the substantive principles deprived from the process. I present the major criticisms of each step of reasoning followed by possible or actual arguments made by Rawlsian. Finally, I come back to the criticisms of the methodology, which could be illustrated more clearly after the detailed assessments of the substance. Although Rawls' theory of justice is faced with many criticisms, the basic line of reasoning is very consistent. Just as Rawls himself pointed out, it is only “a theory of justice” and the significance of guidance in practice lies in its perfectness and impossibility.
1. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rawls/
2. Kelly, Thomas, and Sarah McGrath. "Is reflective equilibrium enough？" Philosophical Perspectives 24
3. Rawls, A theory of Justice, p.54 revised edition
4. Cole, David. No equal justice: Race and class in the American criminal justice system. The New Press, 1999.
5. Lareau, Annette. Unequal childhoods: Class, race, and family life. University of California Press, 2011.
6. See Rawls, supra note 1, at 310-15
7. Sandel, Michael J. Justice: What's the right thing to do？ Farrar Straus & Giroux, 2010. p.162
8. Cohen, Gerald A. "Incentives, inequality, and community." The Tanner lectures on human values 13 (1992): 263-329.
9. http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/rarneson/Jerry%20Cohen%20versus%20John%20Rawls.pdf
10. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-distributive/
11. Levine, Andrew (1999), "Rewarding Effort", The Journal of Political Philosophy 7: 404-418, at p. 406f.
12. Nozick, Robert (1974), Anarchy, State, and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, p. 228
13. Ibid p. 214
14. Bloom, Allan David. The republic of Plato. Basic Books (AZ), 1991. p.411
15. Murphy, Jeffrie G. "Marxism and retribution." Philosophy & Public Affairs 2.3 (1973): 217-243.
（格式好像有点问题。。Rawls对我影响至深
《正义论》读后感(五)：中国的公平正义还有多远？——罗尔斯《正义论》读后感
花了12天读完了这部巨著，对我触动还是挺大的。刚逛了下豆瓣，发现给这本书作评论的人特别少，而且很多人反应这部书难度，我就突然对自己的信心倍增，因为我没有觉得它难度，只是觉得罗尔斯是个太谨慎的学者了，总是不断给自己设置理论上的限制，并且从先验和经验两条路径来系统而仔细的论证自己的正义原则。
在第一编“理论”部分，罗尔斯主要从原初状态出发，为了让原则更加的简单而且易于推出，他还预设了无知之幕，由此，他论证了处于无知之幕状态下的人们会倾向于统一两个正义原则，第一原则即自由平等原则，第二原则即机会均等及差别原则。虽然主要内容只有这么多，但是谨慎的罗尔斯花了整整一编来说明这些问题，包括对无知之幕的限定，对原初状态的说明，以及为什么要假设这样一个前提，通过与功利主义、直觉主义的对比，说明人们为什么会选择正义原则（最大最小值推理），正义原则有着什么样的特征，而这两个正义原则之间以及内部又有怎样的词汇序列，这种词汇序列是如何形成的……总之，罗尔斯在不断的与各种功利主义对比中，详细而又全面的说明了正义的两个原则是如何被选择的。
第二遍“制度”部分，罗尔斯主要是描述满足两个正义原则的社会基本结构并考察它们给个人所带来的义务和职责。应该说，这是理论应用于现实的制度和个人的部分。这也是使理论不至流于形而上的思考的重要一环。在应用于制度时有四个阶段的序列，即接受正义原则、立宪阶段、立法阶段、法官和行政官员把指定的规范应用于具体个人阶段，这四个阶段也是去无知之幕的过程。而正义原则的第二原则即机会均等和差别原则在经济分配制度中也将发挥着重要的作用。罗尔斯还考虑用储蓄正义来解决代际间的正义问题。至于在个人的责任和义务部分，罗尔斯基于正义原则推导出了许多个人的义务和责任，如忠诚、承诺等。另外，罗尔斯还特别考察了社会出现不正义法律的情况，他强调这种情况是可能发生的，而且人们还必须去遵守，因为这是过半数原则所通过了的，但是人们也可以通过非暴力的反抗和良心的拒绝等方式来表示抗议。总之，在这一编里，罗尔斯更多的是将理论上的正义原则和现实情况结合起来，从而为政治制度和经济体制的安排提供了一些具体的方案。
第三编“目的”部分，罗尔斯主要是对正义原则的一些补充说明，解决其稳定性以及和善的一致性的问题，这涉及到讨论什么是善，在选择善时所需要的合理选择原则及审慎合理性原则，正义感与善的一致以及它在维护社会稳定方面的重要作用，正义感如何获得等等。我感觉这部分的条理不是很清楚，但是主要论述的还是关于稳定性和一致性的问题，而其中牵扯到了很多道德哲学的概念。
应该说，罗尔斯《正义论》的逻辑还是挺清楚的，而且论证也特别的仔细而清晰，从演绎的和经验的两条路证明了正义的两个原则，成为能替代功利主义的新的伦理观。罗尔斯走的是一条契约论的路线，继承而又超越了传统的霍布斯、洛克的思想，并借鉴的吸收了康德的某些思想。他试图恢复社会的正义，坚持公平正义的理想，这样一种坚持而崇高的理想我是十分钦佩的，而且我觉得这是当下社会的每个人都应该坚持的理想，如果每个人都能坚持了这样的原则，那么社会也就会治理的更好了。可是，当前在西方国家尤其是中国，人们的思想都太过于功利了，人们把人当做手段而不是目的，从而更加注重发展一些工具性的东西，赚钱甚至成为很多人的人生理想和追求，整个社会成为了一个技术型工具型的社会，我深深的感到悲哀和无助。我总在想，这样一种社会风气的形成到底是社会体制的问题还是教育的问题还是历史的必然呢？
罗尔斯的回答必然是社会体制的问题，因为正义的原则还没有被人们普遍的意识到接受并贯彻：平等自由并没有放在第一位，并且人们往往同意牺牲平等自由而换取更大的经济效益，或者国家打着和谐的旗号去肆意的践踏人民的自由权，机会也不是对每个人都敞开，往往富裕的有权的人有更多的机会并且更容易取得成功，这也就是为什么中国出现了“富二代”“官二代”的现象，并不是具有相同才能的人就能获得同等的地位，另外社会的发展也并没有把最少受惠者的利益的提高放在重要地位，农民，农民工们作为社会最底层的人并不安居乐业，他们对于自己所受到的损失和不公平待遇往往表示极其的不满和愤慨，整个社会的贫富差距越来越大。
可以看到，在中国，正义原则的任何一条原则都没有得到贯彻和落实，一个真正公平正义的社会在中国能建立起来吗？中国的政治体制改革之路还有多远呢？我希望在我有生之年可以看到，而我也要为着中国的民主自由平等而不懈努力奋斗！
《正义论》读后感(六)：幻想中的平衡
20:48 2014/11/20
看约翰·罗尔斯的正义论，从标题到正文，无一不泛着恶心，所谓正义或者不正义，本不是可以讨论的问题，只是立场不同而已。而且永远无法达到假设条件，即是各个阶层的人和谐相处，维护一种对双方都有利的契约，这种契约被命名为“作为公平的正义”。当作幻想小说，乌托邦世界看还是极好的，可是说着说着就变味了，罗尔斯开始从原始社会讲起。就如同卢梭的《论人类不平等起源与基础》一样，回溯到那个原始社会，满是野人的社会，有个屁用啊从特点上来说根本就不像是一个物种好吗。虽然说一百多年前达尔文学说已经被广泛接受了，可这只是溯源而已。溯源和当代的区别可大着呢。就像你的婴儿时期，这和成年期能一样么？若是没有进化论的发现，那么社会契约又当如何扯呢？我看你还怎么扯到野人去。时间可以消磨一切，就像才几十年前的文革，对现在的年轻人来说，都像是平行空间里的玄幻小说，很难当真可它确实发生了，我们都知道这是事实却难以代入体会。过个几十年，情况变了，都已经不同了，更何况几百万年？
随便一个契约或者理论都要拿进化论说事未免显得装逼装洋气，这让我想起了我们结构化学的假设条件。那根本就不是绝对的真理，只是在五个假设的完美的条件下的近似结论而已。而哲学和自然科学又完全不同，说是经验主义，却又要靠逻辑论证。而对于正义这样的主题居然也会扯到用逻辑来论证并且以原始社会为假设条件作了一个完美的幻想？真真是让我反胃不已读不下去。绝对的正义存在吗？各个阶层安居自己的世界，相互妥协各取利益维护着一个无法使他们有进攻欲望即是无法有前进的激情的狗屁契约？这怕只是当权者的梦罢了。
《正义论》读后感(七)：中国人缺什么
中国人缺什么？一度以为中国人缺乏信仰，可能是吧！但是姑且不要说几尽灰飞烟灭的共产主义信仰还在少数人心理残存，看看成千上万的佛教徒、基督徒那种虔诚劲，中国人根本不比美国人、英国人、意大利人信仰差，只不过信仰多元而已，但是，你总不能让十几亿人口都有一种信仰吧，“同一个世界，同一个梦想”，那叫口号，傻子才相信几十亿人都有同一个梦想。
现在正读罗尔斯的《正义论》，学习文件的脑子读这种书也真是勉为其难，半天转不过来，读了一个多月了还没读200页，但这也有优势，有时间咀嚼啊，慢慢品味，越来越感觉中国人真正所缺的，那就是“正义“。
古往今来，虽然公平对我们来说只不过是镜中花、水中月，但我们一直没少了对公平的追求，连农民大伯2000年前都要提出“王侯将相宁有种乎“的口号，就不要说现在了，公平快被说烂了。
怎样才是公平？地主的牙床我们都要睡一睡不叫公平，一部分人因腐先富起来后变的更富更不叫公平。公平是一种结果，但是形成这结果的前因如果不是正义的，就不会形成真正的公平。
同样，我们渴望民主，但是如果不是在正义的原则下形成的民主，谁又能保证这场民主不是多数人残害少数人的工具？
中国人是外表的集体主义，骨子里的利己主义，利益聚集成成千上万个团体，“为尊者隐，为亲者伪”这是几千年文明积淀的结果，我们从来没有思考过正义。
纷繁芜杂的世间我努力要把这本《正义论》看完，而且幻想发了大财的那一天，我要买10万本此书免费赠送给正读大学的青年们！
《正义论》读后感(八)：2014/10/7 19:12:29
正义论 (罗尔斯)
- Your Highlight at location 1165-1169 | Added on Tuesday, 7 October 2014 05:44:50
就法律体制来说，形式正义仅仅是支持和保障合法期望的法治的一个方面。有一种不正义就是由于法官和其他权威人士在裁决权利要求时没有能够恪守适当的规则或对这些规则作适当说明。如果一个人的性格和爱好竟然使他倾向于这种行动，那么他就是不正义的。此外，即使法律和体制是不正义的，但只要它们始终如一地得到实施，也往往是比较好的。
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正义论 (罗尔斯)
- Your Highlight at location 1188-1191 | Added on Tuesday, 7 October 2014 05:46:21
第一个原则：每一个人都有平等的权利去拥有可以与别人的类似自由权并存的最广泛的基本自由权， 第二个原则：对社会和经济不平等的安排应能使这种不平等不但（1）可以合理地指望符合每一个人的利益，而且（2）与向所有人开放的地位和职务联系在一起。
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正义论 (罗尔斯)
- Your Highlight at location 2859-2860 | Added on Tuesday, 7 October 2014 10:36:53
正义观的一个合意的特征就是：它应该公开表明人们的相互尊重。
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正义论 (罗尔斯)
- Your Highlight at location 3516-3525 | Added on Tuesday, 7 October 2014 11:16:52
从历史上看，立宪政体的一个主要缺点是它不能确保政治自由权的公平价值。必要的纠正措施从来不曾采取过，事实上，对这种措施也似乎从未认真考虑过。财产和财富分配上的悬殊，虽然远远超出了可以与政治平等并存的程度，但一般为法律制度所容忍。公共资源从来不曾用来维护为实现政治自由权所必需的体制。从本质上说，这种缺陷在于民主的政治过程充其量只是一种有控制的竞争；它在理论上甚至不具备价格理论赋予真正竞争性市场的那种理想的属性。而且，政治制度中不正义的影响比市场的缺陷要严重得多。政治权力迅速积累并变得不平等起来；得到好处的人可以利用国家的强制性工具和国家的法律，来确保自己的有利地位。这样，经济和社会制度中的不公平可能很快就破坏了在幸运条件下也许会存在的任何政治平等。普选制还不是充足的抵消力量；因为只要政党和选举经费不是来自公共资金，而是来自私人捐助，那么政治讲坛就要受到占支配地位的势力的牵制，从而使为确立正义的宪法统治所必需的基本措施很少能够适当地提出。
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正义论 (罗尔斯)
- Your Highlight at location 3965-3966 | Added on Tuesday, 7 October 2014 11:27:11
康德认为，不能按照道德法则去行动，只能引起羞耻心，而不会产生负罪感
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正义论 (罗尔斯)
- Your Highlight at location 4455-4456 | Added on Tuesday, 7 October 2014 11:36:43
康德认为，上代人仅仅为了下代人的缘故而承受重担，而结果却让最后一代人幸运地坐享其成，这种情况令人感到费解。
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正义论 (罗尔斯)
- Your Highlight at location 4858-4859 | Added on Tuesday, 7 October 2014 11:43:54
诉诸共同利益是民主社会的政治约定。
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《正义论》读后感(九)：正义之所论
罗尔斯的《正义论》作于二十世纪七十年代，很让我惊奇的是当代还有如此学问的学者。对正义的讨论，其实在古希腊亚里士多德时期就已开始，在十七、十八世纪的欧洲尤为盛行，但后来讨论有些衰落，长时间受到冷落。直到罗尔斯的正义论问世，正义的研究再一次跃上了一个新的台阶，罗尔斯以其独特的分析思路重构了正义的基本理论，成为二十世纪不可多得的学者。
罗尔斯提出组织良好的社会：（1）每个人都接受、也都知道别人接受同样的正义原则。（2）基本的社会制度普遍地满足、也普遍为人所知地满足这些原则。
罗尔斯讲正义，可到底正义原则会不会随着客观环境的变化改变呢？这涉及到正义的标准问题。我想，无论社会多么复杂变化，人的价值判断始终存在终极的善，这个善是不会变的。当下的社会被喻为物欲横流的社会，其实是嫁接西方功利主义的结果。文革后的自由呼唤人的彻底解放，其影响不亚于“五四”，功利主义、人文主义的出现亦属正常。但是，中国在一个思想准备不足、制度构建不充分的阶段吸收这些主义，没有形成自己的哲学理念，难免道德沦丧。因此，有些人开始怀疑社会的核心价值标准，开始怀疑善恶、开始媚俗，但终极的善是不会变的。人们的判断标准出现两重，在理想的精神世界中人们十分明确善恶区分，在现实的实际生活中则奉行利己主义。所以，对自己而言，选择什么作为自己为人的第一标准呢？终极的善，这是永恒的真理。所以，正义的基本观念是不会变的，这个基本观念存在于人的想象当中，虽然现实的变化常常与理想不符，但这样一个理想的状态是值得我们追求的。罗尔斯构建的正义论正是在这个假设基础上展开的。罗尔斯所要建立的乃是脱离于人类特殊的社会分配制度和组织制度下普遍的正义观，抽象出最基本的正义，而后以此正义论指导人类的制度建立。
“正义原则是在一种公平的原处状态中被一致同意的。”正义原则的最终达成乃是“被一致同意的”，正义原则仍是契约。这所实现的正义与公平的概念不同，也许它不公平，但却是正义的。
罗尔斯言：“假定原初状态决定着一系列原则，那么下述情况就是真实的：凡是社会制度满足这些原则的时候，那些介入其中的人们就能够互相说，他们正按照这样的条件在合作——只要他们是自由平等的人，他们的互相联系就是公平的，他们就都会同意这些条件。”
这其中的“自由平等的人”是如何定义的？自由可以理解为人身自由，而平等指的是什么平等呢？是地位、财产，还是其他的平等。在现实中，地位、财产是不平等的。人们手中掌握的生产资料决定了人的不平等，罗尔斯假定的平等只能是精神上的平等，尊严的平等。难道在尊严平等的情况下，人们之间的相互联系就是公平的吗？因此，这样达成的公平只能是抽象的公平，是一个临界的状态。现实的复杂规定性使得现实总是处于不公平的状态，抽象的公平是一个极限值，我们只能无限接近它，但总是无法实现它。但这就足够了，它为社会提供了一个努力的方向和目标。
休谟曾经说过：“正义只是起源于人的自私和有限的慷慨、以及自然为满足人类需要所准备的稀少的供应。认识自然界最受虐的生物，自然赋予人无限的欲望，却仅仅给予他有限的手段去实现。人的自然属性是极其脆弱的，单个人获得的收益无法满足其欲望。因此合作与社会得以实行。但人对自然的无限占有必然引发合作的冲突，正义由此产生，即正义起源于人的自私和的有限的慷慨。”社会形成了正义的原则，就任何单个的行为而言，我的正义行为或许在各个方面都是有害的，只是在别人也会效仿我的榜样的这个假设上，我才能够被诱导了去采纳那一种德。这似乎意味着社会的卡特尔化，每个人在做出自我选择之时假设别人同样如此效仿。正义的原则是否会因个人的破坏而变得难以维系了呢？我想是不会的。个人对原则的破坏只能导致众人道德上的鄙视和制度上的规制。通过这些惩罚措施，破坏原则的人会逐渐减少至一个相对稳定的状态，从而不会影响整个社会的正常运行。
罗尔斯所要讨论的正义观，是一种最原始的纯粹的正义观。这样的正义观念用来指导人们建立权利和义务的分配体制。我们亦可以将其归入团体合作原则的确立。但罗尔斯是想论证人们为何有这样的好坏标准之分，区别这种好坏的前提是存在好坏区别。好坏的区别是由于什么原因呢？好坏的区别正是正义的由来。功利主义认为正是由于人的功利的自然属性导致正义的出现，尔后能够定义什么是好坏。
根据罗尔斯的理论，我想考察一下中国古代和中国当代改革的正义性问题。这其中涉及东西方人权观的差别。罗尔斯在论及正义的原则时提出两个原则：1、每个人对与其他人所拥有的最广泛的基本自由体系相容的类似的自由体系都应有一种平等的权利。2、社会的和经济的不平等应这样安排，使它们①被合理的期望适合于每一个人的利益；并且②依系于地位和职位向所有人开放。这两条的第一条具有普世的人权观。人的生命权、财产权、自由的权利，这些是东西方普遍承认的，而现在双方争论的重点在于社会经济利益与普世的自由权利之间的优先问题。功利主义原则要求我们最大限度地增加代表人的期望总额，允许我们用一些人的所得补偿另一些人的所失。这样，在东方社会着那个普遍存在着社会利益的最优可以牺牲一部分人的自由权利为代价，个人要服从大局。而西方则认为我们不能根据处在某一地位的人们的较大利益超过了处在另一地位的人们的损失额而证明收入或权力方面的差别是正义的，因为对自由的侵犯很少能通过这种方式来抵消。西方坚持第一原则对第二原则的绝对优先。不平等只能是在财富和财产的分配方面。而东方则是第二原则比第一原则优先，即在特定的状态下个人的自由可以受到限制。东方社会强调整体，忽视个人权利的诉求。因此，西方国家一直批评中国的人权状况恶劣，但我在这里要指出的是，并不是中国的人权糟糕，而是中西方的人权观存在差异，这种差异是文化差异的一部分。我们很难说文化之间孰优孰劣，文化是每个民族在漫长的历史长河中根据各自特定的环境自然形成的，是每个民族在无数次的自我选择和自我淘汰中存留下来的。为什么西方那么重视个人的自由和政治权利呢？这与欧洲的历史有关。众所周知，中世纪是宗教神学禁锢人们思想和灵魂的时期，漫长的压抑使得欧洲对自由的向往变得愈发得强烈，文艺复兴正是人们呼唤自由的逆向表现。因此，欧洲近代的政治哲学无一例外强调人的解放，呼唤人性的自由。而中国则不是这样，中国的宗教一直是服务于世俗社会的，宗教从未像欧洲那样登峰造极。并且，如果严格按照西方的定义，中国的封建社会仅存在于夏商周三代，之后的中国一直是以小农经济为主，自耕农的数量相当可观，直至宋代市民社会的形成。可以说，中国的人们一直拥有相对宽松的自由，对自由的诉求反而没有西方那样强烈，相反中国的宗族观念使得我们强调整体，强调联系。这样的发展都是每个民族自我选择的，必然具有其合理性，因此西方的指责具有片面性。
但是否说我们就可以任意的限制个人的自由以达到社会整体福利的最优呢？当然不是，中西方的正义观不同，并不代表就有高低贵贱之分。我们汲取西方民主的优秀成分，补我们之不足，这样能更好的实现中国的民主目标。西方也要学习中国的整体和谐思想，这样才能减少对抗与冲突。我认为罗尔斯的机会平等原则就很有意义，我们不能保证每个人的自然禀赋相同，事实上这也是不可能的，但我们必须提供那些先天禀赋不好的人在后天得以奋起直追的机会。这样的社会才是一个流动的社会，各个阶层的矛盾才不至于积累至极而激烈爆发。这也是为什么改革开放虽然造成巨大的贫富差距，但人们的抱怨却相对较少的原因。
《正义论》读后感(十)：读《正义论》
1 正义是社会制度的首要价值，正象真理是思想体系的首要价值一样。一种理论，无论它多么精致和剪接，只要它不真实，就必须加以拒绝或修正；同样，某些法律和制度，不管它们如何有效率和有条理，只要它们不正义，就必须加以改造或废除。每个人都拥有一种基于正义的不可侵犯性，这种不可侵犯性即使以社会整体利益之名也不能逾越。因此，正义非定了为了一些人的最大利更大利益而剥夺另一些人的自由是正当的，不承认许多人享受的较大利益能绰绰有余地补偿强加于少数人的牺牲。所以，在一个正义的社会里，平等的公民自由是确定不移的，由正义所保障的权利绝不受制于政治的交易或社会利益的权衡。允许我们默认一种有错误的理论的唯一前提是尚无一种较好的理论，同样，使我们忍受一种不正义只能是在需要用它来避免另一种更大的不正义的情况下才有可能。作为人类活动的首要价值，真理和正义是决不妥协的。
8 我认为，正义的概念就是由它的原则在分配权利和义务、决定社会利益的适当划分方面的作用所确定的。而一种正义的观念则是对这种作用的一个解释。
12 在确立作为公平的正义观时，一个主要的任务显然是考察处在远处状态中的人们将会选择哪些正义原则。
20 西季维克的《伦理学的方法》对于功利主义的总结。
29 以下情况只是功利主义理论的一个特征：它在决定一个正义社会应鼓励什么样的道德性格的问题时非常依赖于自然事实和人类生活中的偶然因素，而作为公平的正义的道德理想则教深刻地孕育在伦理学理论的首要原则之中。这正是自然权利观点（契约论传统）对立与功利理论的一个特点。
30 在洛克那里，平等权利的作用正在于保证对自然状态的唯一被允许的违反是那些尊重这些权利和服务于公共利益的违反。显然，洛克所赞成的对自然状态的所有改变都要满足这个条件，都将是所有关心推进他们目标的理性人在一种平等状态中会同意的。
70 对于正义的图像分析。p90 差别原则。
191 注1中提到了康斯坦特的论著《古代自由与现代自由》（1819年）等，以及以赛亚柏林的《自由四论》。
233 亚里士多德评论说，具有一种正义感是人的一个特征，他们对正义的共同理解造就了一个城邦。同样，我们可以说，根据我们的讨论，对作为公平的正义的共同理解造就了一种宪法民主。
241 第一个原则：每个人对与所有人所拥有的最广泛平等的基本自由体系相容的类似自由体系都应有一种平等的权利。
优先的规则：两个正义原则应以词典式次序排列，因此自由只能为了自由的缘故而被限制。这有两种情况：（1）一种不够广泛的自由必须加强由所有人分享的完整自由体系；（2）一种不够平等的自由必须可以为那些拥有较少自由的公民所接受。
注意罗尔斯详尽的论述方式。他十分谨慎，也善于组织庞大的内容来论证几个核心的问题，这应该与所受的训练有关。
351 对非暴力反抗的论述。注意，这一理论只适合一个接近正义的社会而设计，适合于多少是正义的民主国家中。
本书的价值还在于，里面大量附属的推论基本涵盖了道德哲学的所有论题。
420 规定一个人的善就是一项合理的生活计划的成功的实施（类似于柏拉图在理想国中的主张）
440 第八章 正义感 讨论一个组织良好的社会的成员们如何获得正义感的问题。可能这个现实意义比较强。罗尔斯从父母对儿童的影响出发，隐含着家庭作为社会基本单元的重要性，同时，一是要让儿童感觉爱，二是必须用儿童能理解的方式传输规则。而实际上，罗尔斯通过将爱与正义的联接，构筑了抵制功利主义的关键论断。
447 三个关键的心理学法则。由家庭到社团到制度的延伸。
罗尔斯试图完成从正义出发的建构，而摆脱以往从价值出发容易碰到的困难。当然，这本著作需要反复研读。