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《贤能政治》的读后感10篇

2018-04-27 20:07:02 来源:文章吧 阅读:载入中…

《贤能政治》的读后感10篇

  《贤能政治》是一本由[加] 贝淡宁 / Daniel A. Bell著作,中信出版社出版的精装图书,本书定价:69,页数:459,文章吧小编精心整理的一些读者读后感希望对大家能有帮助

  《贤能政治》读后感(一):阅读体验有些混乱观点尚可但论证过程似乎缺乏说服力

  在目前的时节节点上看这本书似乎很有意思:西方的民主似乎遭遇极大挑战,而东方的政治体制却“神奇”的没有崩溃。这两天川普的“危险举动”似乎也证明了西方民主制度选举出来的领导人缺少专业性和足够的理性。而整个西方社会的撕裂也在现行的民主体制下被不断的放大和加深。

  这本书的英文名翻译过来应当是:中国模式:贤能政治与民主的局限性(The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the limits of democracy)。而中文译本则改名为“为什么尚贤制比民主选举制更适合中国”。 诚然,这本书论证了西方民主制度在“一人一票”这条真理指引存在的诸多弊端,以及政治尚贤制度的优缺点和对中国政治改革未来构想。但是我认为贝淡宁试图通过此书来同时向西方和东方证明,democracy和meritocracy是可以互相借鉴学习,吸收的,这确实如同译者的评论一般,是有些"吃力不讨好“。作者似乎也意识到了这一点,以至于在序言中反复强调自己反对西方民主的立场

  我们也来看看贝淡宁这个人。他曾经在新加坡国立工作时候,其实是对东方这一套价值观批判态度的。而现在他则转变为新儒家学派的一个代表,和书中提到的蒋庆一样,他试图将儒家的价值观融入到当代的中国政治社会当中。应该说他是在对西方的民主现状感到极度的失望之后,才转向了东方的精英主义价值观的。而这种儒家的思想似乎符合越来越稳定的中国社会:在社会结构相对稳定的情况下,大量的中产阶级追求自己的权力和稳定。但在中国这并不太可能意味着一人一票的民主,中国人似乎也对这种程序民主的渴望不高。那么儒家就是一个很好的提供中产阶级需求,以及政府执政合法性的思想。

  但问题是,儒家强调秩序与尊卑,而不是人人平等概念。很显然这会让阶级的固化更加明显,而且最重要的是在执政合法性上有完全的说服力。我觉得这也是贤能政治的最大问题,虽然贝淡宁在书中最强调的是这个制度的腐败以及僵化,但是现实社会中,的确只有一人一票解决政权的合法性问题。但我认为,中国政府执政的合法性在当下也是得到认可的,即便它不是通过一人一票形式选举出来的。而且在一定程度上中国也在做着自己的努力

  我个人认为,其为贤能政治的辩护并不绝对的就是对中国政治制度的辩护。但是中国政治体制的发展过程中,其变化性和包容性似乎要强于西方民主制度,而中国模式就是在这种探索,借鉴和吸收中发展出来的。而这种贤能政治的理念亦适用于今天的西方民主体制,但是在一些政治正确因素下,西方似乎不可能接受理解这种政治体制的优越性何在。这就是为什么作者想要写这样一本书来帮助大家理解贤能政治。

  当然,我认为我们对于”民主“的追求都是一致的。西方的体制民主了,难道贤能政治就一定是不民主的吗?很多人认为,中国在社会法治构建,经济成果稳固之后就可以实现民主。那么,一方面我们在这本书中的论述也看到,贝淡宁论述了西方民主体制的几个结构性的缺点,让其弊端无法消除。另一方面,中国在将来若是民主化,其民主化的形式恐怕也不会是全盘模仿西方的一人一票的形式。基层更加民主,高层更加尚贤,我觉得要是从保障大众利益角度看,这种体制是不是会更加符合我们对于实质民主的追求呢?

  当然我觉得这本书的问题在于其阅读体验似乎不高,不知道是不是和翻译有关。这本书读下来总给我一种不明不白奇怪感受(当然也许是我的阅读能力有限。。。),作者的论述似乎也不是那么直接了当目标明确,给我的感觉看此书有点游离不定,碎片化了的感觉。而之前看郑永年的那本《中国模式》,虽说有点像个论文集但是感觉阅读体验度会好很多。因此在阅读体验方面我觉得可以改进。要是有机会也许会找到英文原本读一下,看看是不是翻译的问题还是作者的论述过程有些问题。

  而结论部分作者对所谓的“中国模式”的定义,是一种基层民主,中层实验性质,高层尚贤的政治体制的定义,我认为似乎并不符合中国社会的现状。我认为这只能说是一种理想的制度设计,但不是一种真正在社会中存在的情况。毕竟,基层民主的落实情况并不是那么理想,而高层的透明缺失让人感到其不一定是完全尚贤的,尽管显然是有尚贤成分的(例如在没有背景的情况下成为中国的顶尖领导人,以及领导人所拥有的执政经验)。

  另外,在一些细节上个人也有少许的异议,例如对两岸关系紧张程度和政权合法性的关系。还有些细节似乎是作者以一个外人的角度观察到的现象,而似乎有些许偏差

  总的来说,我认为这本书只能说一般,和我买之前的预期比则是相对失望的。当然,从贝淡宁个人的这些年态度转变上来看,我觉得他能以在西方“政治不正确”的风险下来写这本书,已经是不错的了。如果有时间的话并且对此议题感兴趣是可以阅读的。

  《贤能政治》读后感(二):【拾光书屋(书评)】文化政治

  究竟什么样的政治,才能使一个国家得到安稳的发展,这是人们一直在追寻的问题。当然了,也是人们一直没有更好的答案的问题。我们现在说的这本书,就是这样的,是将政治的问题,表现在一本书当中的。说我们国家的政治,是民主的,但是,究竟是不是真正的民主,究竟是不是最好的表现的方式呢。现在来说,最起码是好的。但是随着社会的发展,究竟到一个什么样的方向,我们就无从得知了。

  这本书,说的就是我们中国的政治,当然了,仅仅只是以一个外国人眼光来看待我们的政治。最好的地方呢,就是能够清楚的看到我们看不到的地方。毕竟,当局者迷旁观者清,这是自古以来就有的道理。我们看到的,现在的政治,无疑是好的,书中说到了,我们现在的政治,是建立在我们国家的历史上的,我们了解的,就是现在意义上的贤能。孔子的理论就是选贤举能,这是我们国家一直以来就具备的政治特征。为什么说,现在的政治是好的,那就是符合我们国家的经济社会体制的发展,我们的国家是社会主义,而现在的政治,就是建立在我们国家的国情之上的。但是,书中,却不仅仅只是以为的表明共通性,而是存在着旁人的看法,这就是这本书最大的好处,也正是如此,这本书才能说是比较好的。贤能政治,其实就是在我们国家的选贤举能。

  当然了,有了好的一方面,那就有不好的一个方面。我们现在说问题,都要求两面性出发。这本书的另外的,就是不好的地方了。我们分析一个事物好坏,首先要从好的地方开始,然后,就是不好的地方了。这本书,最不好的地方就是,人的局限性,为什么。因为写书的人并不是我们中国人,当然那就存在着文化间的差异,这很明显的从书中表现了,就是在书中的盲目的将我们国家的政治看做是一种原始的存在的方式,妄图从最片面的地方来诠释,这对于看待问题的方式来说,是十分不好的。我们现在看待问题的方式,要从实际的地方出发,才能获得广大的人们的支持,仅仅只是从本地区的文化来出发的话,那就会产生很多的弊端,不能很好的发现问题,当然了,也不能够分析一个方面的问题。

  一个国家的文化的发展是否是符合一个民族文化的发展,首先要做到的是,是否符合实际,在这本书中,并不是完全的符合,因为,存在性,只是建立在所谓的学习的基础之上的。我们面对问题的方式,不单单是从一个方面,而需要的是立足于实际,这样才能获得最正确的处理问题的方式。

  我想这本书,如果是作者真正的在中国体会,才会有更多的东西来诠释,只有那样的话,才能更好的将这本书完善。不光光是如此,在别人评价中国的时候,我想应该真正的融入到环境中,这对于写作来说,实际来说,都是最好的体现了。

  《贤能政治》读后感(三):唯贤是举

  记得很早以前就有过一场辩论,中国到底是应该实行一党专政多党参政的制度还是全盘西化的实行西方民主制。当时的辩论结果已经不可知,但是实践作为检验真理的唯一标准证明目前中国实行的政治制度完全符合我国现有的国情。而且改革开放近四十年来中国经济飞速发展,取得了其他国家需要上百年才能完成资本积累,中国现在已经是世界第二大经济体,有报道称中国将在本世纪中期超越美国成为世界上第一大经济体,实现中华民族伟大复兴。经济的高速发展,必须有正确的政治来指导,就目前来看,我们实行的尚贤制完全符合我国的国情,为我国的经济发展提供了制度保障,也是我国经济能够长期高速发展的重要因素。

  长久以来,西方世界眼中的中国一直都是民主制度的荒原,他们眼中中国政府一党专政制度就是落后代名词,也是西方政府攻击的主要目标。但是,西方式民主制度真的适合我们吗?难道我们实行西方民主制会有比现在更好的发展成果?这些都是一个大大的问号。毫无疑问一人一票的选举制度,体现了人人参政,任何人都不能否认这种制度是错的,但是在正确制度的框架下,投票的毕竟是普通人,他们有着自己喜好需求,希望能够选举出代表自己利益的代言人,如果是这种情况下,这就是民主制度的成功,但是他们选票真的投给了自己的政治倾向吗?如今美国总统大选正在如火如荼的进行,特朗普和希拉里两位特立独行个性鲜明人物代表美国两党进行2017年总统选举,两人的电视辩论会虽然精彩,但是在我脑子里总是出现如同泼妇骂街一般的情景,两人互报对方短处,并且针对那点攻击谩骂,真的不知道他们选出来的到底是个泼妇还是演员

  西方认为中国的尚贤制选举是“人本位”,而我们认为西方民主制的实质是“金本位”。西方认为人本位容易任人唯亲,滋生腐败,我们认为金本位民主被金融劫持沦为金融寡头的工具,其实这些观点都对,西方靠着民主制度取得了成功,我们靠着尚贤制选举取得了成功,就如同没有一味能够包治百病良药一样,同样没有一种政治体制能够适合任何时期任何国家。当初社会主义理论进入中国的时候,同样跟实际情况脱离造成了很大的损失,最后决定走中国化的社会主义制度,跟中国实际国情相结合,这是我们成功的经验,而且中国式的尚贤选举制度并不是一成不变的,我们会根据国情发展情况,适时的去改变优化,不断借鉴国外成功案例,结合中国实际情况,使之不断符合实际发展的需求,经济发展与政治发展同时成长

  《贤能政治》读后感(四):中西方政治对比

  “尚贤使能”的理念是春秋时期贵族等级解体的产物。孔子说:贤能政治始于有教无类的说话,然而,在此过程中并不说人人都能同等的能力做出知情的、道德上站的住脚的政治判断。因此,政治体制的重点在于选拔出超水平领导者做出,正确的,道德的政治决断,基于此,前者认为这样的统治者才会赢取人民信任

  书中作者提出问题:选择民主制的判断是中国政治进步的标准吗?一人一票的选举民主为何很难遴选出优秀的领导者?中国不仅是个经济大国,还是个政治大国,无论是人口、经济、商业军事、在世界具是名列前茅一举一动在世界有着举足轻重影响力,但背后不可忽视的是因人口众多,产生的差异性问题,如贫富差距知识水平,道德差距的一系列标杆性问题,在这一系列的问题下民族制会是一个理想的选择吗?笔者在这个问题上是持否定的态度,那为何在台湾行得通,在大陆不行吗?诚然如作者所说其一位政治背景,其二为台湾的繁荣平均水平上较好,但这些都是关键,重点在于,即使台湾失败,给世界、中国带来不了什么影响,甚至于背后站着中国,给予台湾也不会有太恶劣后果,但中国不同,一旦走钢丝失败,后果是超越红色预警的灾难性人祸,想想就是不寒而栗

  且笔者并不觉得民主制胜于尚贤制度,两者各有千秋。民主制在政治过程中,资本家掌握了过多的权利,对于国家来说未必是福,数据显示,选民在常常是非理性的;在近代,中国的政治体系经历君主立宪、也经历民主制,最后时代选择了此,尚贤制通过重重选拔,在复杂的环境历练,不仅能选拔出能力超群的领导者,经如此选拔的领导者更具长远眼光和全局意识,与前者的民主制的选举有质的区别干部也要经历严格的人才选拔过程,从众多优秀者中脱颖而出由此可知,其能力、政治决策都是超水平的,更何况中国规模巨大,人口众多,使得政治尚贤比民主制更适合中国,可以有效的规避民主制度的缺陷。在过去,中国是非常的落后,只有中央集权的无边界发展,铸就了现在的繁华,繁华后的背后虽有着众多看不见的黑暗,但不可否认这段历史带来国家进步,有人欢喜,也会有人落泪。

  优秀的未必是最好的,只有适合与自身情况相匹配,如此才是最好,因历史与时代,中国必须走出符合自身国情的道路,一个又一个政治环境的落幕,促使着中国对制度的选择,没有完美的制度,任何一个制度都存在缺陷,腐败的增长,已是严重的政治问题,庆幸国内已认识到这个问题,现已对此展开一系列的政策,对此展开打击。

  中国的尚贤制仅仅只是开始,未来还有很长的路要走,最后引用书中的一句话来作为结尾,只有真正做到“上层尚贤,中间试验和基层民主”中国尚贤才能成为这个世纪备受瞩目的政治发展模式。

  特此鸣谢【拾光书屋】

  《贤能政治》读后感(五):自己否定自己

  贝这本书也算是闻名久已。百闻不如一见,等看完这本书后也算是有了个全面的认识。《贤能政治》这本书乍一听很扯淡,再一看其实没那么扯淡,但最后还是感觉很扯淡。 言归正传。贝的这本书,核心在于评价民主政体下“一人一票”选举领导人和中共的贤能选拔人才这两种方式,以此凸显后者的优越性。其实这样的比较完全是管中窥豹,舍本逐末。首先,且不论将民主归结为“一人一票”的选举制度是否太过狭隘,我想问的是,在忽略了法治、分权制衡、媒体舆论后的民主政体还有多大意义? 贝的核心观点还是中国选出的领导人很“贤能”,比民主制领导人各方面能力都要强。但其实最根本的问题可能不是上台的人贤不贤能(很大程度只是有执政能力,贤这种东西在没有制度保障的时候太玄了,甚至贝在附录二已经多次提出了质疑),而是这个能力最后会为谁服务。比如如何解决腐败问题,还有如何解决发展带来的各种公平、正义矛盾,而这完全不是单纯的选拔贤能精英可以解决的了。事实上,很大程度上就是因为选拔上来的“贤能”精英毫无约束导致的。 这种忽略在新加坡那段已经很明显地显现出来。贝只强调了新加坡的精英人才选拔,而忽略掉其他方面。试想一下,如果新加坡没有了严格的法治保障,会不会取得像现在这样良好的发展?要知道,精英人才具有制定法律的能力,不代表着他们就会运用这种能力。贝在这方面好像显得太天真了一些,认为只要精英人才上台就必然代表着其他所有方面都全部自动落实。如何制约精英以权谋私,贝在书中并没有给出合理的解决方式。 所以这就是这本书最关键的缺陷,把西方自由民主制政体一系列相互作用的制度变成单一的“一人一票”选举投票,与中国的贤能政治比起来看起来自然弊端多多。可这种比较完全是管中窥豹,看见一块大花斑点就敢说这边的豹子体格壮,显然是很可笑的。民主自然不是万能良药,需要很多约束条件配合起来才能发挥效用。贝不是不清楚这点,所以他在第三章还算没有丧失良心,提出了三个致命问题。通过这三个问题,他的整本书就已经是没什么意义了。可以算是自己否定自己。 写到这里,突然想起来这本书跟我曾经看过的一个ted演讲很像(是不是本书开始提到的那个视频,等回去再查证一下),那位展示者也是用极其精彩的视频展示了中共的精英选拔制度(应该说跟这本书的核心观点基本一模一样),最后主持人就提了一个问题对面也是立马卡壳:腐败问题。所以包括贝在内,这个贤能选拔精英的缺乏民众参与监督的政体不能,任何人都无法回答这个问题。 其实,如果让我们忽略掉关于民主的各类令人眼花缭乱的概念来下一个简单的定义,人民可以通过各种手段制约上位者,而不是听天由命束手无策,在我看来,这才是民主最核心的要义。西方自由民主制国家或许可以吸取中国贤能政治的选拔经验,以此变得越来越好;我们却只能干坐在这里,等着那些虽然有无数腐败先例但仍然被冠以“贤能”头衔的精英们那一天心怀慈悲大发善心主动改变人民的境况。在当下这样的情况下,贝的这本《贤能政治》对于我们来讲,到底还有多大的意义。 PS:附录一的和谐指数有点意思,不过该指标把家庭要素看得太重了(占比40%),还是不同价值不同文化的差异。 PPS:我必须承认,附录二中这位清华函授的哲学硕士赵冰冰女士的回答也超出了我的想象。

  《贤能政治》读后感(六):贤能政治是什么

  加拿大学者贝淡宁(Daniel A. Bell)在其新作《贤能政治》中认为:贤能政治,即所谓用人上的“政治尚贤制”在中国源远流长,比选举民主制更适合这个问题复杂的古老大国。我们就来看看,他说的这个贤能政治究竟是什么。

  “尚贤”是所有人才选拔制度的共同追求。选贤任能,关键在于如何认定这个“贤”:以什么样的标准,由谁来说了算。选举民主制是公推公认,中国式的“政治尚贤制”是考试选拔入门+领导提拔升迁。前者是公众认定,大多数人对这个人有了解,对他的“贤”有共识。官员权力由公众授予,需要讨好他的选民。后者是领导认定,靠某个领导的主观印象或者某几个领导的密室博弈,说穿了就是唯上。考试则是过一道筛子,缩小范围,方便领导选择。官员权力由上级授予,因此只需讨好领导,并努力进入更大领导的视线。相声里讲过一个对联,上联是:说你行你就行不行也行,下联是:说不行就不行行也不行,横批:不服不行。这就是中国人才选拔制度的写照。

  《贤能政治》这本书中还列举了选举民主制的种种弊端,所谓多数派暴政、少数派暴政、金钱政治等。必须承认,选举民主制的问题确实不少,但我们现在如此,还要为人家的问题担忧,算不算咸吃萝卜淡操心?至于贝淡宁这个观点,一百年前古德诺已经说过一遍了,不足为奇。

  《贤能政治》读后感(七):Meritocratic Elitism, Authoritarian Libertarianism, and the Limits of the China Model

  Meritocratic Elitism, Authoritarian Libertarianism, and the Limits of the China Model Or: What are We Talking about When We Talk about Alternatives?

  As one of the most important contemporary theorists of political meritocracy (PM), Daniel A. Bell defends this selection-and-promotion system as an “alternative model” (Bell 2015: 4) to liberal democracy (LD) in his well-argued book The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy.

  Any meticulous analysis will show that PM as the alleged “China model” can be most accurately interpreted as meritocratic elitism (ME) – to be brief, it emphasizes competent leadership rather than active citizenship. In the East Asian context, Sungmoon Kim defends “Confucian civil society” as an “alternative to meritocratic elitism”, based on recent political experiences in democratized South Korea and Taiwan (Kim 2013: 579). And as a defender of egalitarian liberalism, I further adopt and defend in my own research a type of liberal meritocracy characterized by three institutional elements – public deliberation, democratic accountability, and meritocratic representation – as an alternative to Bell’s ME.

  It looks like a circle: When we talk about an alternative to an alternative, we might also be reexamining those normative presuppositions challenged by the previous critics. When theorists of PM (not only Bell) regard Confucian PM as a prescription for the limits of LD, readers and audience across the world had better remain alert to the everyday liberal requirements and the deep diversity in both Chinese and other societies. Besides, the China Model has limits, too.

  However, a series of new trends emerging between the publication of this book (2015) and today need be responded and reacted to, which has made PM more desirable than before. Populism and exclusive citizenship, anti-establishment or pro-establishment politics, anti-globalization and the continuous demand for global justice, China’s new transnational initiative and new challenges for global governance… All these trends are implying (democratic) citizenship theory in Anglo-American political philosophy since 1990s have not yet succeeded in resolving the problems for which it was conceived. In this sense, the main argument and conclusion of Bell’s book on PM seems more meaningful for democratic countries than for China; and for the West, they are more like an expedient measure.

  If political meritocracy (or meritocracy in general) is unique and desirable at all, the real problématique has always been which type(s) of meritocracy can be both functional and legitimate. But implementing the China model of meritocratic elitism, to quote a Chinese idiom, is no better than quenching a thirst with poison (“引鸩止渴”). To be specific, the undemocratic society advocating political meritocracy has the risk to degenerate into authoritarian libertarianism – meritocratic elitism ignores individual citizens’ right to be moral and political beings; authoritarian libertarianism undermines their equal access to more social resources.

  efore the following discussion, it is worth noting one of the greatest contributions of this book: it provides guidance for further research and debate in all related aspects. The author's writing is superior, with interlocking sections and a well-built structure which help keep the author’s argumentation compellingly persuasive. Reviewing all his books and articles, we could get such an impression that Bell apparently also shares the personal virtues of Iris Marion Young depicted by Martha C. Nussbaum: “intellectual empathy”, and the willingness of staying “vulnerable” when encountering with a different culture in order to “promote a more equal type of friendship” (Nussbaum 2011: ix-x).

  Therefore, I shall present the further comments and critiques with full respect and understanding, wishing to provide more insights into the issues we both care about.

  I What's Really Wrong with Political Meritocracy

  olitical meritocracy, defined by its major advocates as a system that aims at selecting and promoting good leaders with superior intellectual and moral virtues (Bell 2015: 2, 10), has induced two main challenges in contemporary debates in political philosophy where moral egalitarianism has been remaining a presumed conviction.

  Moral egalitarianism, which can be regarded as one of the consequences of the "Western" Enlightenment, is a belief that every individual person should have the equal opportunities and duties (in Rawlsian words, equal benefits and burdens) to be/become a moral being – a morally (and further politically) autonomous and self-responsible human being.

  efore completing (or even before starting) its self-justification, the main challenges this meritocratic elitism (the political meritocracy that concentrates narrowly on leadership) has to deal with include firstly the distinction between "meritocratic" selection and "meritorious" rule and secondly the confrontation between good leadership and active citizenship.

  The first challenge lies both in the natural skepticism about political authorities and in the emphasis for the sake of good governance on decision-making processes rather than the selections of decision-makers; while the second challenge originates both from the concern with who should be the political agents and from the interest in what the term "meritocracy" should mean.

  Here is a preliminary response to the second challenge – the confrontation between good leadership and active citizenship: first of all, if the meritocratic political agents are better to be described as "qualified decision-makers" rather than "good leaders", a form of citizenship meritorious rule based on civic virtues and democratic deliberation will be more desirable and less feasible as a solution to failing political systems than meritocratic elitism; moreover, in the terminology of the Rawlsian social-justice theory, political meritocracy can be further referred to as a principle governing or regulating the distribution of political powers and responsibilities, and as a concept being revised by measuring the comparative merits between equality as "careers open to talents" and equality as "equality of fair opportunity" (see Rawls 1999: 57, 91-2).

  It is considerably notable that the relevant challenges stretch our perspective from the problem with the political and social governance within a political community back to that with the definition of moral and political agents, and even further back to a more fundamental issue about basic social structure and distributive justice.

  To commence the presentation of problematic aspects and the proposal of countermeasures with the logical outset: a promising, comprehensive research on political meritocracy and meritorious politics should start with the understanding of the conflicts between theories of social justice and theories of political meritocracy, then move on to the assessment of the prospect of substituting top-down meritocratic or meritorious leadership with bottom-up public deliberation which is morally more desirable, and next turn to the recommendation for the settlement of the difficulties brought by the co-existence of well-informed public reasonableness and meritocratic authorities.

  In a nutshell, two of the liberal approaches to "citizenship meritorious politics" are public deliberation and democratic accountability. The former is beneficial to the elimination of the threats by meritocratic elitism against moral egalitarianism, and the latter efficiently beneficial to the justification for and the realization of the performance legitimacy of a meritocratic mechanism.

  eside the defense of moral equality and the search for performance legitimacy, a third problem to be solved, which remains more fundamental and deserves more attention, rests on the procedural legitimacy of a meritocratic system. This leads theorists to the discussion on meritocratic representation in order to argue that to what extent and in what sense the meritocratic political agents under the empowerment-and-accountability system, who might act either as meritocratic authorities or meritocratic functionaries or even as random citizens exercising deliberative responsibilities, can be normatively regarded as the representatives of the population, rather than just independent decision-making experts.

  II Liberalism Revisited: Beyond Politics-Focused Political Philosophy

  ell does little (if not nothing) with the above-mentioned three contemporary egalitarian challenges to political meritocracy in his book, although he does pre-process three major problems with PM in the third chapter in the light of Michael Young’s characterization of meritocratic system in general: Corruption, Ossification, and (the lack of) Legitimacy.

  Comparatively speaking, his chapter shows the sincerity of self-reflection, but does not provide effective dissolution and reconstruction. His chapter is titled as “what’s wrong with political meritocracy?”, and accordingly, the title of last section in my article is intended to be what’s “really” wrong with political meritocracy or meritocratic elitism.

  Among the three problems discussed in Bell’s chapter, the anti-corruption section relies on the Singapore’s case of high payment against corruption (the famously addressed “高薪养廉”), the China’s case of Marxist ideology, as well as the author’s hope for the establishment of independent checks without democracy, the independence between the public and private sectors, and the implementation of systematic Confucian moral education. Unfortunately, in a non-democratic country without check-and-balance mechanism and democratic accountability, even the author who has proposed the ideas above is not quite optimistic: corruption in a democracy “won’t threaten the whole system” but “it can make or break a political meritocracy” (Bell 2015: 121-2, 123-5).

  The anti-ossification section draws on a French institution selecting, educating and testing “intellectual political elite regardless of social background” for public service, which seems desirable but has become a reality version of Michael Young’s rising and ossification of a meritocracy . The author tends to solve the problems of ossification of political hierarchies by increasing social and meritorious diversity within the ruling party and enabling virtues such as humbleness and sympathy. However, Bell looks pessimistic once again – he finally recommends elites to “combat the tendency to self-love” (Bell 2015: 127-9, 135).

  The concept “self-love” here is rather interesting, but I’m afraid it is carelessly and interestingly misused as well. Erich Fromm makes a distinction between three key concepts – self-love, selfishness, and narcissism (Fromm 1995: 47-8) – by arguing that self-love and selfishness are “opposites” because selfish persons are totally “incapable” of loving, no matter whether loving others or loving themselves. And narcissism is actually a false notion, because it sounds like withdrawing one’s love “from others” and turning it “toward his own person”, but according to Fromm there are no such withdrawing-and-turning acts like this – once again, selfish persons are just incapable of loving anyone, including self-loving toward himself or herself. I make one step aside to discuss the self-love issue, because in my own work I have referred to “self-love” (rather than the “combat” with it) as a foundation of civic virtues and a remedy for populism and exclusive citizenship.

  And back to the section on legitimacy, Bell’s narrative indirectly confirms that (although this is not his original aim) there is only one possibility of legitimacy in a political system that is by no means democratic. It is performance legitimacy. Nothing else. Therefore, philosophically speaking we can do nothing more than return to the moral dilemma of utilitarianism (and consequentialism in general) . Moreover, few ruling agents of a non-democratic country in reality are fully motivated and capable of achieving the legitimacy based on pure performance. The entire previous section of this article are dealing with the problem of legitimacy in a political meritocracy – I believe I have sketched a better narrative than what Bell's book could do about political legitimacy. And I shall do no repeated work here.

  In brief, with reference to the above-mentioned challenges to meritocratic elitism and my liberal critiques of political meritocracy, the problem of corruption can be solved by democratic accountability, and ossification by civic virtues and active citizenship. Furthermore, if pondering very carefully about the contrast between ossification and equality, we may arrive at a better relationship between good leadership and active citizenship: in an egalitarian society with sufficient mobility, leadership is just a specific case of citizenship.

  For a reader from China (or more generally, from an undemocratic society) with liberal and egalitarian beliefs, all books and articles in defense of political meritocracy are too politics-focused. What’s more, even too leadership-focused. This feeling helps explain why I esteem Bell’s writing and augmentation, but remain uneasy and restless about many of the points he has made and the cases he has adopted. He and I, we have different starting point when determining the position, laying the tone, and establishing the narrative.

  I would like to quote Robert Nozick once again: “moral philosophy sets the background for, and boundaries of, political philosophy. What persons may and may not do to one another limits what they may do through the apparatus of a state, or do to establish such an apparatus. The moral prohibitions it is permissible to enforce are the source of whatever legitimacy the state's fundamental coercive power has” (Nozick 1974: 6).

  ozick’s rule for political theorists is not only urgent for libertarians, but also appealing for all liberals and egalitarians and beyond. Rooted in this, modern political philosophy is about how every individual citizen and person should be treated equally as equals. Accordingly, in order to reconcile liberal democracy and political meritocracy, I have to start with such interlinking concepts as negative and positive liberty/freedom, moral and social equality, autonomy, social justice, inclusive citizenship, pluralism and deep diversity, meritocratic empowerment, as well as research issues like what every individual deserves, what we owe each other and who “we” are in different contexts.

  Egalitarian observers may feel offended upon hearing some untenable and poorly-argued viewpoints from critics of democracy and advocates of meritocracy (sometimes the former and the latter do not belong to the same camp). For example, one author argues that “political participation corrupts” and the people are supposed to have “the right to competent government” (Brennan 2016). And some other authors argue that the people without willingness and motivations should have the “right to be left alone” (see Fan 2013 and Bai 2013). I confess I feel relieved because I haven’t found such misuse of “rights” in Bell’s works.

  Anyhow, an individual-focused theorization is necessary for every academic writer in contemporary political philosophy, no matter whether in the east or in the west. By “individual”, I mean regular individual citizens, not privileged individual social members with or without virtues and merits. Otherwise, why does good leadership matter? Again: politically speaking, leadership is just a specific case of citizenship. Generally speaking in moral philosophy, there is no such virtue that can be or need be well defined solely by leadership – we cannot become a good leader without being a good citizen or a good person at first.

  erhaps, a narrowly defined, leadership-focused meritocracy can, at best, only be regarded as an "alternative" to a narrowly defined democracy. Then it’s not surprising that in Bell’s book democracy is narrowly referred to as electoral democracy – the system described as “one person, one vote”.

  In other words, when we talk about liberalism and democracy, political philosophy is rather inclusive; when we talk about meritocracy, suddenly, political philosophy is narrowed down to a theory of leader selection and promotion. Therefore, the task of a theory of liberal meritocracy (if we do need conceive such a system): 1. to bring back the inclusive contents; 2. to evaluate and revised the aim of leadership-and-selection-focused political meritocracy.

  Just like what I have remarked in the introduction of this article, everything looks like a circle when I try to talk about an alternative to an alternative. I am revisiting, reexamining, and re-adopting those normative presuppositions challenged or ignored by Bell’s works.

  III A Retreat of the Same Author’s Theorization?: from a Horizontal to a Vertical reconciliation

  A politics-focused political theory tends to fail to capture the actual and complicated situations of every individual citizen. A relevant case happens in Bell’s own works: in his former book Beyond Liberal Democracy which is subtitled as “political thinking for an East Asian context” and contains a lot of caring observations about democratic education, international human rights NGOs, minority groups, migrant workers, etc., the narratives and theorizations sound more democratic and less “elitist” than those in his book on political meritocracy.

  The specific case I intend to mention here has also been emphasized by Bell himself: “I have been a strong defender of the second model for nearly two decades. I have changed my mind, however, and now I think the third model is best.” The models are for the reconciliation of democracy and meritocracy, among which the “second model” is a horizontal model that combines democracy and meritocracy at the top and the “third model” is a vertical model that implements democracy at the bottom and meritocracy at the top.

  I regard this as a retreat, or a regression. Bell may not agree with me.

  For a theorist of Confucian democratic citizenship, the horizontal model is already seriously problematic (see Kim 2013). For me, for a Chinese citizen and observer, the most urgent current problem might be that the vertical reconciliation model cannot work well under an authoritarian or post-totalitarian regime – it can only intensify the ossification.

  China has inherited at least two political legacies: the Confucian-Legalist tradition (not the ideal Confucian model) and the communist totalitarianism. A real reflection on the combination of the two is the starting point to conceive and revise any pertinent moral and political philosophy for the economic, political, social, and cultural issues in and from China.

  A counter-model for making sense of everything in reality in China, in contrast with Bell’s “China model” of political meritocracy, is a vertical structure with centralized power at the top and atomized society at the bottom. In a historian’s words, this is a “large-community-based” (大共同体本位) system (see Qin 2003) in which there exists only one way of association and unity and all social and private resources are subject to and mobilized for the sole political authority. This large-community model forces us to reconsider communitarianism and its relevance in contemporary China. Besides, this model resembles Hannah Arendt’s interpretation of totalitarianism’s origins and maintenance in the making of a “classless” mass society (see Arendt esp. 317-8).

  To be fair, the brief description and comparison above might be indispensable, because personally speaking, Bell’s theorization of political meritocracy has a distant root in the liberal-communitarian debate (see Bell 1993) and the related moral pluralism and contextualism (see all his other works) while my critiques of meritocratic elitism has a natural connection with libertarian and republican reflections on totalitarianism (my unpublished undergraduate thesis in 2007) and further with liberal-egalitarian reflections on libertarianism and republicanism (my unpublished PhD dissertation in 2014).

  IV Personalization of Academic Writing and Misunderstandings from Readers

  It might be also based on moral contextualism that Bell’s academic works have a clear “personalization” style, among which the book on political meritocracy seems the least personal. But it still uses quasi-personal experiences as essential sections, which makes the whole argumentation more journalistic and less academic.

  It is, once again, his defense of the vertical model of “democratic Meritocracy” that appears problematic. In the most original and decisive section of this book, he draws mainly on a personal interview with Li Yuanchao (then Minister of the Organization Department of the Communist Party of China Central Committee) as the supportive materials.

  The advantages of personalization in academic writing (or: writing in general) are obvious. It helps create an information symmetry between the author(s) and the reader(s), and ensure that the readers would not be too abstract when considering each controversial argument or statement that tends to incur misunderstandings. For a normative research, it helps reduce readers’ expectation of alleged “truth” or knowledge. But personalization is also the source of misunderstanding. When neither the writer(s) nor the reader(s) can deal well with the causation and other relationships between one piece of information and another, redundant knowledge is the burden. In this case, increased amount of information tends to increase prejudice.

  The positive examples in my opinion include Bell’s former books on China’s “new Confucianism” and on the spirit of cities, and also G. A. Cohen’s book that is famously titled as If You're an Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich. And one lesson worth learning I have in mind lies in Ernst Cassirer’s comment on why Immanuel Kant could be one of the best readers of Jean-Jacques Rousseau: “Kant regarded Rousseau, although he was Rousseau’s immediate contemporary, from a much greater distance than is for us today the case. … He saw in him the author of the Discourse on Inequality, the Social Contract, the New Helois, not of the Confessions, which appeared only later when Kant’s notion of Rousseau had long been fixed.” Based on this, Cassirer refuted Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s belief that “what kind of philosophy a man chooses depends upon what kind of man he is” (Cassirer 1970: 55-8), and also showed all considerate writers and sympathetic readers the importance of moderation and the limits of information.

  V Justifications Left for Meritocratic Elitism: Historical and Theoretical

  From Cassirer's perspective, I can no longer have the luck Kant had when he was that unique reader of Rousseau . I know too much about Bell. And thanks to Bell's writing style, anyone who has read through all of his writings would be as much informed as I am. However, as a reader trying to be sympathetic as well as a researcher trying to be thorough and inclusive, I shall in this final section revisit the main argument(s) of political meritocracy and conceive the historical and normative justifications for it.

  Recent authors and defenders of the theory of political meritocracy have a commitment to institutionalizing PM and embodying its moral values as an alternative to liberal democracy. But the written theories have failed to respond to the real challenges in contemporary political philosophy, and have even evaded all the difficult questions about which liberalism (e.g., theories of social justice and citizenship) and the theory of democracy (e.g., theories of deliberative democracy) have been deeply concerned. We hereby need a further alternative, or the return of liberal values.

  The fundamental principles of political meritocracy can be traced back to an old intuition about division of labor: the most competent and potentially competent ones should be selected and trained to take the positions and responsibilities in social and public life. But in this sense, almost all human institutions and organizations have self-expectations and promises about meritorious decision and management. As for the history of human political systems, no matter whether abdicated or hereditary, aristocratic or republican, centralized or decentralized, authoritarian or democratic, every single system always has the actual need for meritocratic selection and meritorious governance, or at least makes self-justifications based on meritorious performance.

  trictly speaking, meritocracy can be better described as a principle or an indication independent from and utilized by all concrete forms of government rather than a specific political model or organization paralleled with other political systems (such as democracy). As an indication of good or bad governance, meritocracy is orthogonal to the distinction between different forms of government. Considering “meritocratic” can be a predicate of any political system without combining an oxymoron, “meritocracy” need not be a subject term denoting a specific political system.

  As a selecting and promoting method, meritocracy becomes and remains an outstandingly fair and just principle whenever the prevailing method is identifying and choosing from candidates based on their social background and connection (openly or secretly). Historically speaking, this sub-conclusion helps explain why (political) meritocracy is desirable as the source of openness and equal opportunities in ancient societies and some contemporary countries.

  In Michael Young and John Rawls’s works, the critiques of meritocracy are substantially the reflections on the self-ownership of one’s talent and merits (including political talent, virtues and merits) as well as on the libertarian model of free competition and its consequences (including competitions in politics). You may not deserve your talent and merits because they may be or contain morally arbitrary factors.

  ell mistakenly thinks that his theorization of political meritocracy differs from what he calls “economic meritocracy” (Bell 2015: 5-6) in Rawls’s theory of justice, and overconfidently criticizes Young for not distinguishing “clearly between economic meritocracy (people should be rewarded according to their productive capabilities) and political meritocracy (the political system should aim to select and promote leaders with superior ability and virtue)” (Bell 2015: 239). But from a liberal and egalitarian perspective and an individual-focused attitude, as this article has argued, there is no such distinction between different types of meritocracy.

  Throughout human history and the entire democratic-meritocratic debate, there exists one single coherent concept of meritocracy, and this concept remains coherent in economic and political meritocracy. Bell is better to revise his definition than underlines others’ failing to distinguish.

  As Rawls put it, the principles of social justice assigns both “rights” and “duties”, distributes both “benefits” and “burdens” of social cooperation (Rawls 1999: 4). Also, he defines one situation of the “equally open” sub-principle as “equality as careers open to talents” in contrast to “equality as equality of fair opportunity”, and then “forestall the objection to” the latter equality of fair opportunity “that it leads to a meritocratic society” (Rawls 1999: 57, 86).

  Therefore, liberals (such as Rawls) worry about the origins of meritocratic societies , while theorists of political meritocracy worry about the corruption of citizens and the incompetence of active citizenship (Bell 2006: ch. 5). It appears more like a debate based on normative orientations. And regarding the conceptual structure and the relevance to contemporary politics, the former do better.

  ince the egalitarian critiques of meritocracy are substantially the reflections on the libertarianism, egalitarian liberalism provide solutions to a more extensive range of political and economic issues. On the contrary, the undemocratic society promoting political meritocracy has the risk to degenerate into authoritarian libertarianism – meritocratic elitism ignores individual citizens’ right to be moral beings and authoritarian libertarianism undermines the right to more social resources.

  I have, in the first section of this article, sketched a theory of liberal (political) meritocracy in the light of citizenship theory; I can further conceive another theory of egalitarian (general) meritocracy drawing on theories of distributive and non-distributive social justice. Egalitarian meritocracy means, for example, if an individual person remains at a disadvantage in a meritocratic competition because of his or her limits of abilities and virtues, he or she should have access to social and educational support funded by the political system .

  ormatively speaking, two contemporary justifications left for political meritocratic elitism: first, the necessity of modern division of labor which leads to efficiency; second, the weakened particularity of public and political life, which guarantee the diversity of conceptions of well-being (εὐδαιμονία). And the common precondition is a sufficient and equally important position of citizenship beside the focus on leadership as well as, once again, the basis of moral egalitarianism and equal opportunities and possibilities for self-realization and self-improvement of every regular person.

  In a society that cannot support the openness to the negative liberties of its members, if a theorist deliberately emphasizes the selection and promotion of members with superior leadership and virtues (and even further regards this as a unique, desirable “model”), the argumentation always tends to induce a great deal of misunderstandings and to introduce limited academic resources into plenty of debates that are originally not important at all.

  However, personally speaking, in the intellectual adventure of this article I have been reviewing the most thrilling parts of contemporary Anglo-American political philosophy in the colorful light of Bell’s theorization of political meritocracy – an inspiring work is supposed to help with this.

  References

  1. Arendt, Hannah (1973). The origins of totalitarianism. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

  2. Bai, Tongdong (2013). “A Confucian Version of Hybrid Regime: How Does It Work, and Why Is It Superior?”, in The East Asian Challenge for Democracy: Political Meritocracy in Comparative Perspective, Daniel A. Bell and Chenyang Li (eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  3. Bell, Daniel A. (2006). “Taking Elitism Seriously: Democracy with Confucian Characteristics”, in Beyond Liberal Democracy: Political Thinking for an East Asian Context. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

  4. Bell, Daniel A. (2015). The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

  5. Brennan, Jason (2016). Against democracy. Princeton University Press.

  6. Cassirer, Ernst (1970). Rousseau, Kant, Goethe: Two Essays, trans. James Gutmann et al. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

  7. Chan, Joseph (2013). “Political Meritocracy and Meritorious Rule: A Confucian Perspective”, in The East Asian Challenge for Democracy, Bell and Li (eds.).

  8. Fan, Ruiping (2013). “Confucian Meritocracy for Contemporary China”, in The East Asian Challenge for Democracy, Bell and Li (eds.).

  9. Fromm, Erich (1956/1995). The art of loving. London: Thorsons.

  10. Kim, Sungmoon (2013). “To Become a Confucian Democratic Citizen: Against Meritocratic Elitism”, British Journal of Political Science, 43/3 (July 2013), pp. 579-99

  11. Kymlicka, Will and Wayne Norman (1994). “Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory”, Ethics, 104/2 (January 1994), pp. 352-81

  12. Kymlicka, Will (1998). “Liberal Egalitarianism and Civic Republicanism: Friends or Enemies”, in Debating Democracy's Discontent: Essays on American Politics, Law, and Public Philosophy, Anita L. Allen and Milton C. Regan (eds.), Oxford University Press.

  13. Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan (1996). Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe. JHU Press.

  14. Macedo, Stephen (1990). Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  15. Müller, Jan-Werner (2016). What Is Populism? Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press

  16. Nozick, Robert (2013). Anarchy, state, and utopia. New York: Basic Books.

  17. Nussbaum, Martha C. (2011). “Foreword”, in Iris Marion Young, Responsibility for justice. Oxford University Press.

  18. Pettit, Philip (2013). “Meritocratic Representation”, in The East Asian Challenge for Democracy, Bell and Li (eds.).

  19. Qin, Hui (秦晖) (2003). 《传统十论——本土社会的制度文化与其变革》,上海: 复旦大学出版社.

  20. Rawls, John (1971/1999). A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  21. Sen, Amartya (1985). Commodities and Capabilities. North-Holland.

  22. Shi, Tianjian (2014). The Cultural Logic of Politics in Mainland China and Taiwan. New York: Cambridge University Press.

  23. Young, Michael D. (1958). The Rise of the Meritocracy, 1870–2033. London: Thames & Hudson.

  《贤能政治》读后感(八):中国式贤能政治有望成为判断政治体制进步与否的标准

  自鸦片战争以来,有识之士已经就开始打开眼界观察世界,重新审视传承上千年的封建帝制。面对欧美世界的崛起,特别是俄国、日本君主立宪制的成功,激发了国人对国外新型政体的研究,更激发了国人要求废弃传统封建体制、进行政治体制改革的决心。从清朝末年五大臣出洋学习新政和预备立宪,到辛亥革命成功,再到民国军阀混战,直至最后新中国成立,中国的政治体制也经历五大转变,即:从君主专制制到君主立宪制、从君主制到共和制、从内阁制到总统制、从多党制到一党制、从地方自治制到中央集权制。最终,历史选择了人民代表大会制度、基层群众自治制度以及多党合作和政治协商制度。从中国近现代政治体制转型的历史经验和教训,我们可以清醒地看到,当前的政治体制是富有成效的,虽然不够完美,但也能够适应生产力发展,满足社会需求。这也从某种程度上击破了西方世界“好的民主制度”和“坏的专制制度”的二元论论调。

  随着中国经济快速崛起,东方世界的政治价值观正在被重新审视和革新。风险投资家李世默曾在《耶鲁全球》刊文称,在中国共产党领导下,中国取得了巨大成就。数十年来,中共已发展出一套训练、考验、选拔国家领导人的机制。当今世界无数国家实施了被包装成灵丹妙药的民主选举,而国家却停滞不前。中国通过选贤任能的选拔机制所取得的成就让他们望尘莫及。

  随着对中国政治现象的研究,贤能政治成为当前政治体制研究的热词。著名的风险投资家和政治学学者李世默与清华大学哲学系与苏世民书院教授、博士生导师贝淡宁(Daniel A. Bell)对中国的贤能政治有着更为深刻的认识。2015年,贝淡宁教授将这一理论系统化,编著了《贤能政治》一书。本书一上市就引起学界轰动,先后获得《金融时报》2015年年度图书和《卫报》2015年年度最佳假日图书。2016年,中信出版社将其翻译为中文在国内发行。该书是一部系统阐释政治尚贤制这一中国政治模式的开山之作,同时也是一部深入探索西方民主制之外的政治治理模式的著作。

  书中,贝淡宁分析了西方认为最优秀的民主制度的利弊,提出政治尚贤制挑选优秀领导人所需要的智慧能力、社交技能、美德等的必要性,找出政治尚贤制可能存在的腐败问题、僵化问题、以及合法性问题,并对此提出了民主尚贤制的三大模式。在此基础上,对尚贤政治的典范中国政治进行了剖析,认为政治尚贤制比西方的民主制更适合像中国这样的大国,它能够有效规避民主选举制的主要缺陷。最后,贝淡宁指出:真正做到“上层尚贤,中间实验和基层民主”,中国模式的贤能政治就能成为21世纪备受全球瞩目的政治发展模式。

  ——尚贤制是符合中国国情的道路。

  适合的才是最好的。中国不同于有着民主传承的欧洲国家,更不能与美国相提并论。历史发展和时代变革要求中国必须要走一条符合中国国情的民主之路,全盘照搬欧美民主必将导致水土不服,以失败告终。中华民国普选制、内阁制等等制度,无一不在中国败下阵来。在西方世界眼中,民主选举是衡量政治进步或倒退的标准,认为只有以一人一票为基础的选举制度才是最好的,其他一切政治体制都是专制统治。然而在当前诸多实行选举制的国家中,财富和资本严重干涉了政治选举,一部《纸牌屋》就充分说明了美国政治所受“黑金”的影响。诚然,中国是一党制国家,不实行西方意义上的选举。但中国的一党制具有自我更新的能力、选贤任能的体制、深植于民心的政权合法性,这些都是确保政治成功的核心要素。中国的土地政策、对外开放政策以及经济发展政策,在不同阶段根据形势进行大幅度调整,展示了超凡的与时俱进和自我纠错能力。中国的国家规模巨大,情况复杂,公民素质有待进一步提升,这使得政治尚贤制比民主选举制更适合中国国情,它能够有效规避民主选举制的主要缺陷。此外,贝淡宁认为中国选贤任能的政治尚贤制有着深远的历史渊源,影响了过去几十年的社会变革,也比较适合面临复杂政治、社会和经济问题的大国。民意调查也表明,政治尚贤制获得了充分的民众支持。因此,政治尚贤制在中国是选举民主制的一种替代选择。

  ——尚贤制能够选出更加胜任的领导。

  能干的官员才能承担起维护社会利益的责任,这一点以及被世界各国达成共识。西方越来越依赖于单一的选举来选拔领导人,但选举从来就不是选出最优秀的人成为领导的有效机制,也无法避免最坏的人被选举成为领导人。一人一票的民主选举,很容易造成个别具有高度煽动能力的个人采取取悦民众的方式登台亮相,使得民粹主义抬头。英国脱欧以及美国共和党总统候选人特朗普的选举活动等情况的发生,已经使得西方部分知识分子开始对民主选举制产生怀疑。相比之下,中国贤能政治的优势明显。党员干部需要经历严格的人才选拔过程,据统计从低级别的基层做起,逐级晋升,脱颖而出成为正部级干部的几率只有1.4万分之一,平均所需时间至少要23年。特别是在历年的“公考”中,百里挑一已经不再是神话,千里挑一、万中选一更是常态。因此,只有那些表现优秀的人才能走上高位。一个党员成为国家领导人之前,已经自下而上地经历了各种急难险重任务的考验,更重要的是已经层层参与了很多重大战略和政策的讨论与制定。这也是多年来,中国能够保持政策稳定,国家长足发展的关键所在。因此,贝淡宁认为,中国的政治尚贤制不仅能选拔出能力超群的领导者,而且如此选拔出的领导者更具长远眼光和全局意识,能够做出更加具有说服力的政治决断。

  ——尚贤制具有更高的灵活性和连续性。

  在民主体制下,因为政党轮流上台执政,不能确保维持和扩展前景良好的新尝试,从而意味着政策领域缺乏推动实验和革新的积极性。相对西方民主而言,中国政治制度既具有集中力量干大事的能力,也有先行试点逐渐铺开的优势。中国可以对经济政策进行试验,或者通过试点的方式对现有政策进行补充,在总结经验的基础上,积极调整完善,把值得向往的地方改革创新经验推广到全国。最典型的就是深圳特区的对外开放经验、家庭联产承包责任制等等。这种先行试错的方法是西方民主政体无法效仿的。在政策连续性上,中国的尚贤制更是西方民主无可比拟。中国领导人上台之后能够制订长期计划并做出关系到所有利害关系人利益的决定,包括子孙后代的利益和居住在国外的人的利益。而多党制体系下的官员因为需要担心下一届选举,在决策时更有可能受到短期政治利益考虑的影响。民选领袖更容易受到强大特殊利益集团的游说的摆布,受政府政策影响的非选民利益如子孙后代的利益很有可能被牺牲掉。二者之间最大的差别在于,依据选贤任能原则选拔的领袖则是根据他们做了什么而非他们说了什么来评价的。

  当然,任何政治体制都不是完美的,都有缺陷。比如腐败问题,过去30年中国的腐败出现了爆炸性增长,如今已经成为明显的政治问题。无论反腐败过程中出现了何种滥权现象或者政治偏见,净化体制是必须的。庆幸的是,中国已经清醒地认识到问题的严重性,十八大以来,推行强力政策“打虎拍蝇”,净化党内肌体,并成功清理掉高级别和基层腐败分子,显示了中国强烈的反腐败决心,因为政权的生死存亡依赖于解决腐败问题。这场反腐败战役,持续时间长,也更系统化。目前,中国领袖已经显示出朝着积极方向前进的信号,《纪律处分条例》、《问责条例》一系列规章制度的出台,都是对尚贤制的补充和完善。

  不管怎样,贤能政治已经在中国显示出了强大的力量。在未来,也极有可能成为判断政治体制进步与否的标准。《贤能政治》开启了中国式政治体制研究的新篇章。

  《贤能政治》读后感(九):该走哪条路?——《贤能政治》有感

  谈到道路选择的问题,中国大陆的人民之前所选择的共产党,选择了走共产主义道路,信奉的是马克思主义学说,就如我们在政治课本上经常读到的:中国的政治体制是非常民主的,与西方国家等伪民主不同,中国的选举不是金钱选举,虽然不是一人一票,但是采取的人民代表选举制度也相应的节约了许多时间和成本。但是也正因为这一选举程序,也一直被西方等国家和学者批评为名义上的民主,实质上的专制,而随着互联网的发展,我们也时常在网上看到一些网民将中国的体制与现在的朝鲜进行一些对比,并说现在的朝鲜也就是改革开放前的中国等等。虽然这些观点相当偏激,但是中国的民主制度与西方国家相比确实是有非常大的区别,尤其是在政府官员的任用上面。我们看到的更多的是政府官员的任用是采取的任命制,而不是一人一票的民选制,这样的制度到底好还是不好?国外的媒体和专家我认为不经过仔细的深入调查研究是没有发言权的。

  在我看来,中国大陆现在的这种政治制度虽然不是像西方国家那种选举民主制那么明显,但是就凭到现在整个社会在这个制度下表现发展的还算健康的样子,可以说这样的制度还是有其合理成分的,可以说着与中国的国情背景是密不可分的。但是如果要我仔细将这里面的原因说得清清楚楚的话,我还真回答不上来。不过我拿到的这本由加拿大作家贝淡宁所著的《贤能政治》就将这一问题诠释得相当透彻。作者系清华大学哲学系与苏世民书院教授、博士生导师,拥有牛津大学哲学博士学位,曾任斯坦福大学、普林斯顿大学、新加坡国立大学以及希伯来大学的研究员,可以说这样的一些列的头衔可以体现其在这本书中的观点还是保持着严谨的中立态度的。

  从这本书的署名就可以看出,作者本质上还是认为中国的选举制度不是民主制(当然这也与其身份有关,我们国人当然只能坚定的说是民主制啦),作者认为中国大陆的选举提拔制度就是尚贤制,这可能对于我们国人来说有一点陌生。不过不要紧,作者在本书的五个章节的正文中就对西方的选举民主制和中国的尚贤制进行了详细的对比解说。

  例如第一章“民主是最不坏的政治制度吗?”这里面就主要探讨了西方选举民主制中的缺点,不管多数派还是少数派当政,都有弊端(请参阅‘多数派暴政’和‘少数派暴政’),紧接着后面的四个章节就采取了层层递进的模式将尚贤制的选举体系,问题等进行了解析,并且将尚贤制的模式进行了归类整理,例如第四章“民主尚贤制的三大模式”中我们就可以发现我们中国现在的政治选举制度其实就包含在这里面,我个人认为属于垂直模式。

  本书的正文篇幅不长,也就不到两百页,但是里面的文字体系结构是相当严谨的,没有多余的废话,可以说专业性极强,所以抱着娱乐的态度来阅读本书的话,这一部分读者可能会被书中的大量数据与逻辑推理语句所打败。但是另一方面来说,本书对于想要深入研究中国的政治制度的人来说是非常难得的,尤其是本书的作者还是海外身份,这也使得本书与国内的官方书籍相比,研究的价值也就更高(至于为什么这么说,你懂得)。

  《贤能政治》读后感(十):这是在向民主宣战吗?——评《贤能政治》

  牛津大学的斯坦•林根教授认为作者贝淡宁是在“贬低民主”,他认为“贝淡宁是中国体制的崇拜者”,并暗指贝淡宁希望中国的敌人是失败的。撇开这位林根教授暗示中国是不民主的这一点,让我们从客观角度来看待这本书,从政治学角度理性分析民主选举与尚贤制度各自的优缺点。

  那么,作者贝淡宁真的在本书中贬低民主了吗?他是在向民主宣战吗?

  在回答“民主是个坏东西吗?”中作者这样解释道“我并没有要贬低民主的意图。正好相反:我强烈支持实施选举民主的国家进行民主选举。”同时他指出,他希望通过吸取尚贤制的优点使基于民主选举的民主制得到改善。民主并不坏,但却不够完善。同时作者通过引用赛缪尔•亨廷顿的观点以向读者指出民主选举的存在是需要一定的前提比如选民的素质作为支撑的,在尚不能达到民主选举的条件时,过早地去实行反而将不利于国家的稳定。但这并非是对民主的贬低,而是指出了民主选举存在所需具备的条件。与其说贝淡宁不看好民主制度,不如说是作者认为实行选举民主需要满足的条件以目前的状态来说较难实现。

  本书是基于中国大环境下对选举民主政治与尚贤政治适用性与可行性的探讨。作者通过引用各类政治理论家的观点及其文献,从而论证自己的观点,并使得一切变得有据可循。早在高中政治的哲学部分关于“矛盾”的哲学理论中,“具体问题具体分析”被我们长期当做至理名言,这句话同样适用于政治制度的实际运用,这要求政治制度必须与政治环境相匹配,根据国情选择合适的制度。这种哲学思想不仅仅停留在理论层面,更是深入实践当中,中国为什么能够长期保持统一,为什么我国选择了中国共产党领导的多党合作制,而不是像其他国家那样的一党制、两党制或多党制度。国情决定政治制度,也是国情决定了选举制度。

  在论述完民主选举制度存在的弊端后,贝淡宁为我们详细的分析了政治尚贤制对优秀领导人的要求,不仅要德智体美全美发展,同时要具备良好的应激能力。而作者也并非完全偏袒尚贤制,面对尚贤制可能引发的三大问题——腐败、僵化、合法性,贝淡宁通过引用现实案例与文献知识,为我们展现了这些弊端产生拥有悠久的历史根源。

  “中国模式”一词算是本书的核心词之一,当我们讨论民主选举与政治尚贤制度,都无法脱离中国模式这一根本,纵观历史长河,民主是人类文明发展到一定高度时的必然,而在那之前,尚贤制度更适用于当前国情,无论是保证经济还是社会发展的稳定性,这都要求中国在民主制度上存在一定的“保守性”,而这种“保守”也是为了更加民主的明天。

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